

THE
THEOLOGY OF
THE EARLY
GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

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THE GIFFORD LECTURES
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PREFACE

THIS book, which might be entitled *The Origin of Natural Theology and the Greeks*, represents the Gifford Lectures which I delivered at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, in 1936. How this subject is related to the purpose of the Gifford Lectures has been stated in the first chapter. The publication of this book has been delayed by other books which I have had to finish during these past ten years. The lectures now appear in a greatly improved form and with numerous additions, most of all the extensive notes. Although these have been printed at the end of the volume, for the convenience of the general reader, they form an essential part of my inquiry.

It is perhaps not unnecessary to state that the present book does not pretend to give a complete history of the early period of Greek philosophy with which it is concerned. Rather, I have concentrated on one particular aspect of this much-discussed subject, an aspect which has been unduly neglected or minimized by scholars of the positivistic school because in the early Greek philosophy of nature they saw their own likeness. Reacting against this one-sided picture, the opponents of this school have represented all Greek cosmological thought as an outgrowth of mysticism and Orphism, something quite irrational. If we avoid these extremes, there remains the fact that the new and revolutionizing ideas which these early Greek thinkers developed about the nature of the universe had a direct impact upon their conception of what they—in a new sense—called 'God' or 'the Divine'. It goes without saying that the terms 'God', 'the Divine', and 'theology' must not be understood here in their later Christian but in the Greek sense. The history of the philosophical theology of the Greeks is the history of their rational approach to the nature of reality itself in its successive phases.

In the present book I have traced this development through the heroic age of Greek cosmological thought down to the time of the Sophists. In a second volume, against the pre-Socratic background, I should like to treat the period from Socrates and Plato down to the time when, under the influence of this tradition of Greek philosophical theology, the Jewish-Christian

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CHAPTER I

THE THEOLOGY OF THE GREEK THINKERS

THE aim of the Gifford Lectures has been determined once and for all by their founder, who specified that they should deal with that group of problems which we designate by the name of natural theology. Hitherto most of the lecturers have been philosophers or theologians. If I, as classical philologist and student of the humanities, have any justification for ranging my own efforts in this field along with theirs, it lies solely in Lord Gifford's further stipulation that the lectures may also deal with the history of these problems.

The venerable chain of tradition by which this history is linked together spans two and a half millennia. Its value is by no means purely antiquarian. Philosophical thought is much more closely and indissolubly bound up with its history than are the special sciences with theirs. One might perhaps say that the relation between modern and ancient philosophy is more comparable to that between the works of the poets of our own time and the great classical poems of the past. For here again it is from the immortality of past greatness that the new creation draws its vital breath.

Whenever we speak of the beginnings of European philosophy we think of the Greeks; and any attempt to trace the origins of natural or philosophical theology must likewise begin with them. The idea of *theologia naturalis* has come to our world from a work that has long since become classical for the Christian occident—the *De civitate Dei* of St. Augustine. After attacking belief in heathen gods as an illusion throughout his first five books,¹ he proceeds in the sixth to expound the Christian doctrine of the One God and sets out to demonstrate its thorough accordance with the deepest insights of Greek philosophy. This view of Christian theology as confirming and rounding out the truths of pre-Christian thought expresses very well the positive side of the relations between the new religion and pagan antiquity. Now for St. Augustine, as for any typical Neoplatonist of his century, the one supreme representative of Greek philosophy was Plato; the other thinkers were merely minor figures around the base of Plato's mighty monument.²

social life of the human community.⁵ This thesis is one which St. Augustine stoutly opposes. He looks upon Varro's State gods as not a whit better or truer than the infamous myths of the poets. He excuses Varro's reactionary and—as it seems to him—fundamentally false attitude towards the whole problem of State religion by pointing out that Varro was living in a time of scant political liberty, with the old order crumbling about him, so that his own conservatism compelled him to defend the Roman national religion as the very soul of the Roman republic.⁶ But if there be some truth in this observation, yet for the same reason the old Roman religion, even in its most recent and strongly Hellenized form, was unable to become the religion of the empire in which so many different nations were united. To St. Augustine it is inconceivable that any true religion should be restricted to a single nation. God is essentially universal and must be worshipped universally.⁷ This, indeed, is a basic Christian doctrine; but it is in the universalism of Greek philosophy that St. Augustine finds its chief support. Greek philosophy is genuine natural theology because it is based on rational insight into the nature of reality itself; the theologies of myth and State, on the contrary, have nothing to do with nature but are mere artificial conventions, entirely man-made. St. Augustine himself says that this opposition is the very basis of the concept of natural theology.⁸ Obviously he has in mind the old antithesis of *φύσει* and *θέσει*. Even Socrates' pupil Antisthenes, whose influence upon the Stoic philosophy was profound, had distinguished the one *φύσει θεός* from the many *θέσει θεοί*,⁹ among whom he included the gods of the poets no less than those of the official cult. So from the standpoint of natural theology the gods of the poets and those of the State were on precisely the same footing. This is a point which St. Augustine quite properly brings up against Varro.¹⁰ Obviously Varro's threefold division was intended to blur the sharpness of this antithesis in order that the State gods might be rescued from the general repudiation of the *θέσει θεοί* and thus be permitted to retain their birthright. The division was really a compromise. We do not know who first introduced it. At any rate it must have been some Hellenistic (probably Stoic) philosopher, for Varro still used for his three *genera theologiae* the Greek adjectives *mythicon*, *politicon*, and *physicon*.

used to indicate a special complex of problems and a special intellectual attitude.¹⁵ But his usage apparently involves an inner contradiction. On the one hand, he understands by 'theology' that fundamental branch of philosophical science which he also calls 'first philosophy' or 'science of first principles'—the branch which later acquires the name of 'metaphysics' among his followers. In this sense theology is the ultimate and highest goal of all philosophical study of Being.¹⁶ In historical contexts, however, he uses the term to designate certain non-philosophers such as Hesiod and Pherecydes, whom he contrasts rather sharply with the oldest genuine philosophers or physicists.¹⁷ In this sense one might say of the older period that philosophy begins where theology ends. We can find good evidence of this conception in the first book of Aristotle's lost dialogue *On Philosophy*, which was highly renowned in antiquity. When, for instance, he discusses the historical antecedents of his own scientific philosophy and goes so far as to take the religious systems of the Orient into account, I suspect that the remarkable range of his purview can be most simply explained if we remember that the men who stood for this kind of wisdom (*σοφία*) impressed him as falling into the category of *θεολόγος* in the second sense I have described.¹⁸ Aristotle's pupil Eudemus of Rhodes, the first man to write a history of theology, uses the same system of classification. Accordingly he too gives special attention to the Oriental religious systems when he deals with the contributions of the Greek verse- and prose-writers on theogony—the origin of the gods. But Eudemus would never have included his master Aristotle, the creator of metaphysics or theology in the philosophical sense, among the theologians.

I should like to dispel this apparent contradiction by referring to a passage in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle, after developing his own theory of the unmoved mover of the universe and the movers of the spheres, turns back to the ancient religious conception of the gods in heaven. He sees here an intimation of the truth; but religion, he feels, has amplified this true intimation mythologically by inventing the anthropomorphic gods.¹⁹ Thus the theologians represent human thought in its primitive mythological stage. In later years philosophy returns—on a rational plane—to the problem

But in the oldest Greek thought there is no such differentiation. Hence there arises a methodological difficulty; for if we really hope to understand the isolated utterances of Anaximander or Heraclitus on God or 'the Divine', we must always take their philosophy as a whole, as an indivisible organism, never considering the theological components apart from the physical or ontological. On the other hand, there are obvious reasons why it is here impossible to spread out all the traditional material before us and enter into all the special problems in the history of the earliest Greek thought. Since this has been done fairly often, we shall have to presuppose some acquaintance with the traditional field of research.²⁴ We must now turn our attention to one particular side of philosophical thought, without losing sight of the whole context. In this way we may approach some of the relevant testimonia at rather close range and deal with them by direct interpretation. For herein, I think, lies our only chance of making new headway where the terrain has already been so thoroughly explored.

Ever since the time of Aristotle it has been one of the conventions of the history of philosophy to look at these thinkers from a perspective that emphasizes their achievements as natural scientists.²⁵ Aristotle called them the *φυσικοί* (in the ancient sense of the term), which in turn led modern interpreters of the nineteenth century to understand them as the first physicists (in the modern sense). The pioneers of natural science could easily be pardoned, so it seemed, for having mingled their great new scientific intuitions with other half-mythological elements: it was the task of the modern historical mind to separate these features from each other and to select as truly relevant the scientific ideas which can be construed as an anticipation of our own empirical science. The modern historians of Greek philosophy who lived during the period of the metaphysical systems of Hegel and the other German idealists, namely Zeller and his school, dwelt primarily on Plato, Aristotle, and the speculative philosophers. The age of positivism which followed, with such representatives as Burnet and Gomperz, stressed in turn the empirical and scientific character of the early thinkers. In their zeal for proving the modernity of the pre-Socratics they have often minimized or even neglected that aspect of the first philosophers with which this book is

civilization and which we try to impose on former ages in our historical interpretation of their products. In so doing we often deprive ourselves of the insight into their true nature, and perhaps even of the blessing, which they could afford us. A genuine understanding of the religious intellectualism of the early Greeks is one of the first steps on the road towards a more adequate evaluation of the later historical phases of the Greek mind. Out of these heroic beginnings there gradually developed the philosophical transformation and revival of religion in Plato's theology, in the systems of Aristotle and the Hellenistic schools (Stoics, Epicureans, &c.), and most of all in the system of theology which was the product of the conflict and mutual penetration of Greek tradition with Jewish and other Oriental religions and finally with the Christian faith. The spiritual foundations of this growing humanistic world unity were (1) the *Imperium Romanum*, so far as it was maintained by the idea of a world-wide rule of law and justice; (2) the Greek *paideia*, so far as it was conceived as the start of a universal human culture; and (3) a 'universal' (*καθολικῇ*) theology as the religious framework of such a civilization. The philosophical theology of the early Greek thinkers, as St. Augustine in his *De civitate Dei* clearly recognized and emphatically enounced, marks the starting-point of this gradually developing universal theology.

I long ago started my work on pre-Socratic philosophy under such men as Hermann Diels and Wilamowitz and am bound to approach it as a part of the history of the Greek genius; but I have also spent a whole life on the study of Christian tradition, especially in its ancient Greek and Roman phase. I therefore am deeply impressed by the continuity of the fundamental forms of thought and expression which triumphantly bridges the chasm between these antithetic periods of the human mind and integrates them into one universal civilization.

Earlier writers than Aristotle have noticed some relationship between certain ideas of the natural philosophers and those of the earliest Greek poets. To be sure, the suggestion that Homer anticipated Thales' theory that water is the basic principle of all things (a suggestion which may have come from the Platonic school) is one which Aristotle himself regards with an air of critical reserve.²⁷ But as far as the problems of metaphysics

of the gods naturally afforded much more opportunity for *σοφίζεσθαι*—that is, for the introduction of original explanations and constructions such as we find in Hesiod's *Theogony*. It is precisely this coalescence of the traditional representations of the gods with the element of subjective intellectual activity that determines the theological character of Hesiod's work.

In the older epic there was no thought of calling the poet by his name; he was simply an anonymous vehicle for inspiration from the Muses, carrying far and wide the legends of ancient times. This fact provides a standard *topos* for *prooimia*; but Hesiod makes it an occasion for a bit of personal history. He tells us how the Muses appeared to him, Hesiod, while he was tending his sheep at the foot of Mount Helicon, and gave him the rhapsode's staff to betoken his mission as a singer. Here the new emergence of the subjective is already clearly expressed. But its appearance also implies a new responsibility. The Muses say to Hesiod:

We know how to tell many falsehoods that sound like the truth;
But we also know how to utter the truth when we choose.³³

Obviously Hesiod feels that here he has gone beyond the older poets; for he claims to tell the truth about the very beings that it is hardest to know anything about—the gods themselves.³⁴ His work shall reveal the origin of all the gods now reigning upon Olympus; he will also tell us how the world has come to be, with all its present order.³⁵ He must, therefore, record all the relevant myths and show how they fit together; he may perhaps have to eliminate many versions that strike him as incorrect, or devise new connexions where tradition has none to supply.

Hesiod's basic postulate is that even the gods have come into being. This was by no means a new idea at the time. It had often been presupposed in the legends, even though it might seem inconsistent with the familiar language about the eternal gods.³⁶ Zeus himself and many others of the great cult divinities had had their own parents and youthful years. Such stories had even been told of Kronos and Rheia, who were made the children of Ouranos and Gaia. Farther back than this the series did not go; the ultimate beginning had been reached, and no more questions were asked. No one who tried to bring all these tales of the divine ancestry into a definite sequence, as Hesiod

who presides over all the more wholesome competition in this world. The very existence of this later correction is striking evidence of the extent to which Hesiod's attitude towards mythology was affected by the new issues he raised. These questions keep turning up everywhere throughout the *Theogony*; and their scope is broad enough to include all the problems to which the religious consciousness of his period gives rise, whether he seeks to explain the fact of evil and tribulation or to justify the reign of the gods themselves. For even they are not immune from criticism, now that man's own devices for regulation of State and community are beginning to be called into question; and Hesiod's genealogical conception of the divine government makes him see this world as a battlefield for the great new gods of Light, and the dark, wayward, elemental powers of ages long since past. The struggle of these two groups for supremacy has at last raged itself out, and Zeus is victorious; but the earth's murky depths still fume and bubble with the reeking breath of the vanquished. In thus depicting the punishment of the rebels in the world below,⁴² no less than in his invectives against man's injustice here on earth as a crime against the authority of Zeus and his divine justice, Hesiod reveals the theological nature of his thought.

While the *Theogony* invades the realm of human life, it never loses touch with the natural world-order. Theogony leads back to cosmogony when the poet proceeds to connect the reigning dynasty of the gods with the primeval Ouranos and Gaia. We have already noted that Hesiod's thought never reaches beyond Heaven and Earth, the two foundations of the visible world; before these was Chaos.⁴³ In the *Physics* Aristotle speaks of Chaos as empty space (τόπος);⁴⁴ and another passage of the *Theogony* shows it to be nothing else than the space that yawns between Earth and Heaven.⁴⁵ Apparently the idea of Chaos belongs to the prehistoric heritage of the Indo-European peoples; for the word is connected with χάσκω ('gape'), and from the same stem *gap*-Nordic mythology has formed the word *ginunga-gap* to express this same notion of the gaping abyss that existed at the beginning of the world. The common idea of Chaos as something in which all things are wildly confused is quite mistaken; and the antithesis between Chaos and Cosmos, which rests on this incorrect view, is purely a modern invention.

still be subjected to some empirical control, or at worst be found to conflict with experience; so it is quite inevitable that they should become targets of criticism for anyone who, like the natural philosopher, thinks for himself and begins with the evidence of his senses. But negative criticism is not the only response that Hesiod arouses in these men, for there is much in his *Theogony* that is of direct philosophical significance to them. We can see, for instance, the way in which his peculiar conception of Eros as the first of the gods is later developed by Parmenides and Empedocles. Indeed this idea has been of almost unlimited fruitfulness throughout the history of philosophy, even down to the nineteenth-century theories of cosmic love. To Empedocles, Love (or, as he calls it, *Φιλία*) is the efficient cause of every union of cosmic forces. This function has simply been taken over from the Eros of Hesiod. At the very beginning of his account of the world's origin, the poet introduces Eros as one of the oldest and mightiest of gods, coeval with Earth and Heaven, the first couple, who are joined in loving union by his power.⁴⁸ The story of Earth and Heaven and their marriage was one of the traditional myths; and Hesiod reasons quite logically when he infers that Eros must have been as old a divinity as they, and so deserving of one of the first places.⁴⁹ The union of Heaven and Earth begins the long series of procreations which provides the main content of the *Theogony* and occupies the centre of Hesiod's theological interest. How could he help inquiring into the source of this urge which brought all divine couples together and even joined theogony with cosmogony—the veritable cause by which the world came to be? And how could anyone who thinks of so many natural and moral forces as divine persons fail to see a god in the Eros uniting all things?

Historians of religion have pointed out that Eros had a very old cult in Boeotian Thespieae at the foot of Mount Helicon, though he does not appear elsewhere as a cult divinity in early times. Inasmuch as Hesiod also had a special personal relationship to the Muses of this his own home soil, the fact that he assigns to Eros so great a role might be explained by natural partiality to the god of his own neighbourhood. But this explanation strikes me as rather superficial. It is true enough that the cult may have given him good reason for meditating

all-ruling principle. But in the Hesiodic conception we already find the germ of the quest for a single natural principle which we meet in the later philosophers. Its influence will become particularly clear in the new forms which the Hesiodic Eros takes in the works of Parmenides and Empedocles. When Hesiod's thought at last gives way to truly philosophical thinking, the Divine is sought inside the world—not outside it, as in the Jewish-Christian theology that develops out of the book of Genesis. Hesiod will then be reckoned more as cosmogonist than as theogonist, and the divine nature will be sought in those forces by which all things are engendered. In this philosophy Eros will become more important than all the gods whom Hesiod makes him bring into being. The gods are a part of the mythological tradition; and as Hesiod's thinking is utterly rooted in myth, this is all that is needed to make them real for his theology.⁵⁰ Accordingly he never has any reason to inquire into the nature of the Divine as such. This fundamental question is one that cannot be raised until a time when all Hesiod's individual divine figures and the very myths themselves have become problematical. And such a stage does not occur until the moment when man comes to recognize that his only source of certainty in dealing with the actual lies in experience and in self-consistent thinking grounded upon experience. While this standpoint is quite different from Hesiod's, I believe I have shown that it is not absolutely alien to him, but is closely connected with his theological explanation of the world, which indeed provides the background for its own peculiar problems. Thus it is quite natural that this new thinking should not be so fundamentally unconcerned with the problem of the Divine as is often supposed; on the contrary, it accepts this problem as one of its essential heritages from the previous period, while at the same time it restates it in a new and generalized philosophical form.

commonly, even in later times, to denote a man's household goods and property; in philosophical language its scope is now widened to include everything that human perception finds in the world.² In thus broadly defining its subject-matter, philosophy shows that it has reached a new level, even in matters of theology; for among these *δντα* the heavenly forces piously reported in the earlier myths will find no place, and can no longer be taken for granted at the outset, as can the actual presence of things like stars and air, earth and sea, rivers and mountains, plants, animals, and men. Thunder and lightning are given facts; but can this be said of Zeus, the god who sends them? At all events, he does not belong to the realm of things that meet the senses; and beyond that realm we cannot go. Even if we recognize that eyes and ears do not reach very far, and that imagination travels immeasurable distances beyond the bounds of direct perception, the *δντα* that imagination finds will always be of the same sort as the things that present themselves to the senses, or at least very similar.

So reserved an intellectual approach implies a profound alteration in man's state of mind as compared with the mythological stage. His attitude towards myth itself has changed. It is true that the older philosophical thinkers have left us no direct statements about their relationship to the traditional myths; but it is inconceivable that they could have failed to regard their own ideas as most patently antithetical to a way of life grounded on the assumption that any mythical tale in general acceptance must be true. In particular they must have felt that there should be no intrusion of *μῦθοι* in any genuine knowledge of the world. Now the word *μῦθοι* had originally been a harmless designation for any speech or narration; but by the time of the Milesians, when men were beginning to turn to a more immediate source of knowledge, it must undoubtedly have started to take on that negative sense which was to become almost universal by the time of Thucydides, and which is expressed with a particularly clear connotation in the adjective *μυθώδης*: here we have the mythical in the sense of the fabulous and unauthenticated, as contrasted with any verifiable truth or reality. Thucydides uses the word 'mythical' to discredit the traditional verse and prose accounts of the older periods of Greek history; and surely an Ionian philosopher of

perience. But his view of the origin of things brings him very close to the theological creation-myths, or rather leads him to compete with them. For while his theory seems to be purely physical, he evidently thinks of it as also having what we may call a metaphysical character. This fact is revealed by the only one of his utterances that has come down to us in verbal form (if, indeed, it actually goes back to him): *πάντα πλήρη θεῶν*, 'everything is full of gods'. Two hundred years later, at the end of this first period of philosophical thinking, Plato cites this apophthegm with special emphasis, almost as if it were the primal word and the very quintessence of all philosophy.⁷ Plato finds it of profound historical significance that the philosophy of nature, so long regarded as a source of atheism, should, in his own doctrine of the star-gods, have returned to the same basic truth with which it started.⁸ And his theologizing disciple, Philip of Opus, cites these words in his *Epinomis*⁹ as the ultimate formula of the philosophical study of Being, supposedly substantiated by the most modern astronomical theories of the celestial bodies.

In attaching this new content to Thales' ancient dictum, Plato is naturally interpreting it in his own way; we can only guess what Thales really had in mind. We have several bits of evidence that he was interested in magnets, and Aristotle suggests that he may here have been thinking of magnetic attraction. This would mean that Thales must have used this single phenomenon as a basis for a generalization about the nature of the so-called inorganic world. The assertion that everything is full of gods would then mean something like this: everything is full of mysterious living forces; the distinction between animate and inanimate nature has no foundation in fact; everything has a soul.¹⁰ Thales would thus have made his observation of magnetism a premise for inferring the Oneness of all reality as something alive. This interpretation is still far from certain. But at any rate the words reveal that the man who utters them is aware of a shift in his attitude towards the prevalent ideas about the gods: although he speaks of gods, he is obviously using the word in a sense rather different from that in which the majority of men would use it. In contrast to the usual conception of the gods' nature, he declares that everything is full of gods. This statement cannot refer to those gods with

Anaximander we can find our bearings much more precisely. With this philosopher we are for the first time in a position to see clearly how that which we may call his theology is a direct outgrowth from the germ of his new intuition of *φύσις*. Naturally we cannot here consider all the details of his thought. But in Anaximander we find the first unified and all-embracing world-picture, based on a natural deduction and explanation of all phenomena. This explanation, of course, is a far cry from our present-day science both in method and in results; but as a total achievement it still bears witness to an enormous power of intellect, constructive rather than analytic. Anaximander is striving to find the key to the hidden structure of reality by studying the way in which it has come to be what it is; we can trace this effort in the zeal with which he seeks to discover mathematical proportion and harmony in the relationships of the world-whole and its parts. To-day, of course, there still seems to be something very primitive in the geometrical schematization with which this model of the world is put together, no less than in the uniformity with which Anaximander applies it to cosmology and geography alike; but if we consider it as a work of art, it is an overwhelming expression of the conviction with which he approaches the world as a whole, and of the demand that the universe shall have a rational meaning. This world-view marks the first clear emergence of philosophy in the mind of man. To many of us to-day it seems hardly possible to look back any farther than this primary philosophical experience of significant Being; and yet we can see that man's repose in Being is not to be taken as a matter of course. Philosophy is rather the supreme stage of a new self-assurance on man's part, under whose foundations lie vanquished a wild army of darksome forces. Anaximander's cosmos marks the triumph of the intellect over a whole world of rough and unformed powers which threaten human existence with primeval danger at the very moment when the old order of living, the feudal and mythical order, known to us only in the earliest phase of Greek culture, the Homeric epic, and already past its prime, finally goes to pieces.

Even the old gods are denied admission to the new world-system, though their names and their cults persist. Their passing leaves a gap which the philosopher now must fill, and

beginning is deduced from the very content of this conception. Only the Boundless satisfies the requirements which the idea of an absolute beginning involves; for it is itself without temporal beginning since it has no bounds. Aristotle then proceeds to deduce the chief properties of the *apeiron* from the concept of an absolute beginning:

'As a beginning, it must also be something that has not become and cannot pass away. For that which has become must necessarily come to an end, and all passing-away likewise has an end. Thus, as we have said, it is itself without beginning, but is rather—so it is thought—the beginning of everything else. And it encompasses all things and governs all things, as those persons declare who posit no other causes besides the *apeiron*, such as mind [*νοῦς*] or love [*φιλία*].' (Here he is thinking of Anaxagoras and Empedocles.) 'And this, they say, is the Divine. For it is immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers maintain.'¹⁶

The explicit reference to Anaximander at the end of this passage makes it quite certain that in this demonstration of the *apeiron* we have before us not merely Aristotle's own reflections but some of the thoughts of Anaximander himself.¹⁷ Aristotle rules out Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the ground that they do not represent the theory of the *apeiron* in its purity, but recognize the efficacy of additional causal factors.¹⁸ Their philosophy is accordingly more complex. Among the genuine representatives of the theory of the *apeiron*, Aristotle rightly singles out Anaximander rather than anyone else, for he is the pioneer and leader of this movement. It was he who applied the epithets 'immortal' and 'indestructible' to the Boundless, from which he held all becoming to arise. The other predications which Aristotle mentions obviously are due to him too, for they all fit together as a whole.¹⁹ We shall have something to say later about their significance for Anaximander's theology. But is Anaximander also responsible for the deduction in which the dialectic of the *peras* and *apeiron* is used to prove that the Boundless has no beginning?²⁰ If Simplicius is right in maintaining that Anaximander was the first to use the word *arché*,²¹ his statement would be a valuable signpost in helping us to answer this question. Simplicius draws this bit of historical erudition from the foundational work of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus on the teachings of the natural philosophers, which,

has become the point of departure for most modern scholars; he thinks that this can be explained by a slight verbal disparity between Hippolytus and Simplicius, which he traces back to a simple mechanical corruption of the text in Hippolytus.²⁷ But from another passage of Simplicius it is evident that this author has construed Theophrastus in exactly the same way as Hippolytus has done; for he says there quite clearly that Anaximander was the first to designate the substratum (i.e. the *apeiron*) as *arché*.²⁸ If that which Hippolytus and Simplicius report as a fact were false, then either they must have both independently misunderstood their source, Theophrastus, in the same way (which is not at all likely), or their source, Theophrastus, must himself be looked upon as responsible for the error in the first place. But inasmuch as Theophrastus made direct use of Anaximander's own writings, this is quite improbable, especially since the matter here involved was an important one for him and not difficult to verify. It is far more likely that Hippolytus and Simplicius, following Theophrastus himself, both agreed in holding that Anaximander was the first to use the word *arché*, and it remains most probable that this view is correct.

But how shall we deal with the consideration that the concept of *arché* ('principle') is primarily Aristotelian and not otherwise found in the pre-Socratics? The frequency with which this concept appears in the ancient doxographical tradition about the pre-Socratics is due obviously to the Peripatetic terminology of Theophrastus, who is the principal source for this literature. In the present case, however, the difference lies in the fact that Theophrastus expressly attributes the first appearance of the word *arché* to Anaximander. But this statement no more implies that Anaximander used the word (*ἄρχη*) *arché* in the sense of Aristotle and Theophrastus, than Eudemus' parallel assertion, that the word 'element' (*stoicheion*) appears in its first philosophical context in Plato,²⁹ means that Plato used this word in the Aristotelian sense. Theophrastus merely reports that the word *arché* was used by Anaximander. But perhaps it is possible to go back still earlier than either Aristotle or Theophrastus and come closer to Anaximander by tracing the continuity of thought in pre-Socratic philosophy. One avowed follower of Anaximander is Melissus of Samos. He belongs to

discover that such a Being, which has neither beginning nor end, is itself the beginning and end of everything? A similar thought is expressed in the well-known Orphic verse, 'Zeus is beginning, middle, and end'. Hesiod could not have made such a statement; it was too much out of keeping with the old genealogy of the gods. The writer of this line is not concerned with the origin of his god, but rather with his eternity and his being. The Orphic writer has already been influenced by philosophical thought; so it is not surprising that the philosophers themselves, from Plato and the author of the treatise *De mundo* on, should find him congenial and refer to his work. For us it is important to see how the concept of a being which is without beginning and end and is therefore itself beginning and end, is connected with the idea of the supreme god. Did it have such an association for Anaximander? We can give this question a final answer only by considering it in connexion with the other predicates which he attributes to his *apeiron*. It is significant that ancient tradition has already ascribed to Thales the statement that the Divine is 'that which has neither beginning nor end'.³⁵ Naturally there is no real authority for connecting this apophthegm (which appears in an anecdotal context in Diogenes Laertius) with the half-mythical first of philosophers himself. But it is important that the idea of something without beginning or end, which we have restored to Anaximander, is here set back at the very outset of Milesian reflection and associated with speculation concerning the Divine. We shall presently see that the ontological considerations which underlie Anaximander's *apeiron* possess just such a theological significance for him throughout.

Again the statements of Aristotle must serve as our point of departure. He continues:³⁶

'And it encompasses all things and governs all things, as those persons declare who posit no other causes besides the *apeiron*, such as mind [Anaxagoras] or love [Empedocles]. And this, they say, is the Divine; for it is immortal [*ἀθάνατον*] and indestructible [*ἀνώλεθρον*], as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers maintain.'

Is Aristotle here freely paraphrasing the thoughts of his predecessor, or do we still hear in this poetical form of speech the bold language of an older race of thinkers? A philologically

write a philosophical work in prose.⁴² The vigour of expression that marks his one surviving fragment still glows through Aristotle's sober account, especially in the series of epithets with which he characterizes his first principle. We can trace these in full detail even now. The Boundless is unborn and imperishable, all-encompassing and all-governing (notice the solemn, hieratic repetition of the word 'all');⁴³ we are not surprised when Aristotle continues with the words, 'And this is the Divine, for it is immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers maintain.'

The phrase 'the Divine' does not appear merely as one more predicate applied to the first principle; on the contrary, the substantivization of the adjective with the definite article shows rather that this is introduced as an independent concept, essentially religious in character, and now identified with the rational principle, the Boundless. That this expression is of epoch-making importance in Greek philosophy is clear from the frequency with which we encounter similar statements both in the other pre-Socratics and in later philosophers. Taking the natural world as their starting-point, they develop the idea of some highest principle (for instance, the *ens perfectissimum* of Aristotle and the world-forming fire of the Stoics) and then proceed to assert of it that 'this must be the Divine'.⁴⁴ As far as I have been able to discover from the remaining evidence, the concept of the Divine as such does not appear before Anaximander.⁴⁵ Later, in the time of Herodotus and the tragic poets, it will become a frequent substitute for the phrase *οἱ θεοί* ('the gods'), just as in that period we shall often meet the singular *ὁ θεός* ('the god', or, perhaps better, simply 'God').⁴⁶ But any such general locution is still unheard of in the earliest days of Ionian philosophy. Therefore the first appearance of the expression 'the Divine' is all the more noteworthy. We have already observed that while Hesiod's theology admits many kinds of gods, he has not yet inquired into their nature. But whoever first uses the general concept of the Divine must consider this question; and Anaximander does so. When he says that the Boundless 'encompasses all things and governs all things', he is satisfying the loftiest demands which religious thought has required of divinity from time immemorial; for he makes it the bearer of supreme power and dominion. Moreover,

idea of endlessness and eternity which Anaximander links with his new concept of the Divine.

In other respects his teachings are not so sharply opposed to the Greek polytheism as might appear from what we have said. Sources from the later years of the ancient period have left us a number of remarkable testimonia which certainly go back to Theophrastus and must accordingly have been based on direct acquaintance with Anaximander's writings.⁴⁹ These testimonia all agree in stating that he believed in innumerable worlds—an indication that he took the Boundless quite seriously. Apparently this belief involved not only an infinite succession of worlds in time, but also the simultaneous existence of innumerable worlds or heavens, for the equidistance of the *kosmoi* from one another is expressly mentioned. I see no reason not to take this tradition literally.⁵⁰ Anaximander is said to have called these worlds 'gods', thus teaching that there are innumerable gods; and as these worlds arise and pass away periodically, Cicero can speak of the *nativi dei* of Anaximander, who are not eternal but merely long-lived.⁵¹ The conception of the *δοιχαλῶνες* is a familiar one in Greek religion; we find it again in Empedocles⁵²—another reason for attributing it to Anaximander. But if this is so, then the gods of the innumerable worlds, which have come into existence, must differ somehow from the *apeiron*, which is the sole complete realization of the Divine as such, without beginning and without end. And just as our philosopher has followed traditional Greek conceptions in identifying the primal substance of the world with that which is divine and eternal, he likewise betrays the influence of Hesiodic thought-patterns when he maintains that these innumerable god-worlds issue genealogically from this same divine substance and after unimaginable intervals of time sink back again into its bosom. We may, in fact, see in this view a kind of philosophical theogony.

We find the *θεῖον* and the individual gods side by side again in Herodotus. But as they here mean something quite different from what Anaximander the philosopher has in mind, we must not attach too much weight to their juxtaposition; it merely serves to show that for Greek sensibility, if not for ours, they are by no means incompatible. We shall discuss later the relationship between the One God of Xenophanes and the other

Orphic interpretation was first proposed, the wording of the sentence itself has undergone some revision. From the best manuscripts Diels has brought the word ἀλλήλους back to light—a word that is missing in the older printed versions of Simplicius. This makes the sentence read: 'Things must pay the penalty and make atonement to one another for their injustice.'⁵⁷ This is something quite different, and not at all hard to visualize. It involves the image of a scene in a courtroom. When there are two parties to a dispute, the one who has taken more than his share, whether by force or by trickery, must pay damages for his pleonexy to the party he has wronged. To the Greeks, for whom the just is the equal, this pleonexy, or taking-too-much, is the essence of injustice. We must not think of civil and constitutional rights, but simply of property rights—the daily quarrel over mine and thine. When Anaximander proposes this image as an explanation of the coming-to-be and passing-away of things in the natural world, he is obviously thinking of their very existence as dependent on a state of having-too-much, for which they must make amends by ceding to others the things they now enjoy. A very similar idea appears in Heraclitus when he says that 'these live the death of those, while those die the life of these'.⁵⁸ And this atonement occurs 'according to the ordering of Time', or rather, as I prefer to explain it, 'according to Time's decree'.

For this is what *τάττω* and *τάξις* mean in the law-courts.⁵⁹ The conception of Time as a judge can be found among other writers of this period—in Solon, for instance, who defends himself 'before the bench of Time'. The underlying idea is that Time will always discover and avenge any act of injustice, even without human co-operation. This was an age when the idea of justice was being made the basis upon which state and society were to be built; it was not looked upon as a mere convention, but as an immanently effective norm inherent in reality itself.⁶⁰ If we see this political analogue clearly, we can no longer be in doubt as to the meaning of Anaximander's image. Not only in the world of politics but in the whole realm of Being there is just such an immanent justice; whatever happens, this justice will still prevail, and coming-to-be and passing-away take place in accordance with it. In the life of politics the Greek language refers to the reign of justice by the term *kosmos*; but

Air as their primordial element, shows how firmly this feature is connected with the whole Anaximandrian philosophy as he sees it.⁶⁴ His successors, too, have retained it; and this in itself is a sufficient basis for the claims of the pre-Socratic philosophy to be regarded as natural theology.

of his convictions about the common welfare, whether critical or didactic; and it is characteristic of Xenophanes that he did not, as Anaximander did, set forth a complete theory of the world in the new, untrammelled form of prose, but asserted in poetry his views on various problems of philosophy. At this time it was customary for all poetry to be recited in public, and tradition states explicitly that Xenophanes recited his own poems in person.² What is new is that his verses are not concerned with practical or personal matters, but with problems of *Weltanschauung*—the nature of the gods, natural phenomena, the origin of all things, truth, doubt, and false authority. In these fervid pronouncements, the poet's ego emerges quite unabashed at the slightest excuse. Thus we learn that even as an old man of ninety-two he is still wandering through the Greek lands, and that he has been leading this irregular life for the past sixty-seven years³—presumably ever since his migration from Colophon to the Greek West, where he seems to have spent most of his time. He recalls the elegance of the Ionian culture in his old home,⁴ describes the Medic invasion, and tells of sitting by the fire in winter-time, engaged in pleasant conversation, and being asked how old he was when the Medes appeared.⁵

The poems in which all these personal references appear can hardly have been devoted to presenting a philosophical system. Xenophanes was not the man to write a connected didactic poem in the manner of Hesiod or Parmenides.⁶ In the main his works were quite unphilosophical. This is obviously true of his great historical epic on the founding of his native city Colophon, for which he may have found a stimulus in the tales of the city's history by another fellow-townsmen and equally famous contemporary poet, Mimnermus. We have already noted that Xenophanes also wrote an epic on the colonization of Elea in southern Italy—an event that occurred in his own lifetime, although he did not take part in it himself.⁷ Even these two long narrative poems were therefore decidedly personal in origin.

But the personal character of Xenophanes' work is most clearly revealed in his invention of a new type of poetry—the *silloi*.⁸ These poems were satirical in character. Although they were generally written in elegiac distichs, I am convinced that they sometimes took the form of pure hexameters such as we find in Xenophanes' later imitator Timon, author of a collection

that Xenophanes was primarily a reciter of Homer, and read his own poems only as an added attraction. But the *silloi* are well known to be full of mordant satire and scorn directed against Homer and Hesiod—a fact quite out of accord with the assumption that Xenophanes was a rhapsode. The easiest way out of this difficulty for Gomperz was to suggest that while the poet spent his days in the market-place reciting Homer and eulogizing him, he spent his evenings at the banquets of the rich and mighty (of which he has given us a detailed picture),¹⁴ where he voiced his own enlightened views and castigated the very gods to whom he was forced to render public allegiance in order to earn his daily bread.¹⁵

Examples of such double-entry book-keeping are by no means lacking in the history of later periods of enlightenment, but the age of Pindar and Aeschylus did not call it forth; and if there ever was a man with whose character such a game of hide-and-seek was incompatible, that man was Xenophanes. We must abandon any attempt to think of him as a rhapsode. He was not at all as Gomperz depicts him—a counterpart of Plato's rhapsode Ion, wandering through the cities of Greece solemnly attired in purple, with the plaudits of the crowd continually ringing in his ears; still less was he a man to sweep his listeners off their feet with counterfeit enthusiasm for Homer, only to unmask himself with cynical abandon in a small circle after his public performance. This bold champion, brusque to the point of intolerance, was himself and utterly himself. His sole enthusiasm was his championship of a truth which he saw emerging from the ruins of all previous ways of viewing the world; and this enthusiasm was genuine and natural. The only mistaken idea in this conception of him is the one which modern interpreters have erroneously read into it—the supposed rhapsode's professional relationship to Homer. For the chief business of the rhapsode was to maintain Homer's official classical prestige, and this is what Xenophanes attacks most vehemently. Only by his polemic against the *laudatores Homeri* can he really be understood.¹⁶

Xenophanes was an intellectual revolutionary. The earlier philosophers had presented their new conceptions of reality to their contemporaries as a plain, well-rounded whole. But Xenophanes was a man of an altogether different sort, who

These are words which catch men's fancy far more easily than those of Anaximander, despite the genius with which he first expressed this knowledge. For not only did Xenophanes choose to put his message in poetical form; he also consciously applied his philosophical insight to the whole world of the anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Hesiod—a world which had previously counted as plain historical fact, but which now was collapsing. In these two lines the bearing of the new knowledge upon the old divinities is made explicit for the first time, not only in its positive aspects, but also negatively and critically. The philosophical intuition of a single world-ground, of course, involves new riddles more difficult than those for which it provides an answer. Xenophanes himself points out in another context that even when one sees the truth, this knowledge can never give its possessor complete assurance of its validity; about the highest questions there must always be widespread doubt.¹⁹ This insight, which, though tinged with resignation, is still far removed from the thorough-going scepticism of later centuries,²⁰ inevitably appears whenever man first starts to reason about these problems. But one thing at least is certain for Xenophanes: the human mind is an inadequate form through which to comprehend that infinite, all-governing unity which the philosophers have recognized as the principle of all things. It never occurs to Xenophanes to suggest that God may be without form altogether. It is significant that in all the time that the Greeks gave their philosophical attention to these matters, the problem of the form (*μορφή*) of the Divine was one that never lost its importance. It always remained an essential part of the problem *de natura deorum*,²¹ and in the Stoic philosophy it acquired new impetus in the doctrine of God's immanence in the world, which was represented as a sphere.²² But Xenophanes does not express his views of the divine form in positive terms. He does not say that the world is God, so that God's form is merely the world's form; for Xenophanes is not to be dismissed with the word pantheist. He merely makes way for a philosophic conception by denying that God's form is human.²³

In other respects he retains the conventional Greek pluralism. For understandable reasons Christian writers have always tended to read their own monotheism into Xenophanes' proclamation of the One God; but while he extols this God as more

. . . ever abides
 In the selfsame place without moving; nor is it fitting
 For him to move hither and thither, changing his place.²⁸

Here Xenophanes is again criticizing the Homeric representation. In Homer the gods' quickness of movement is construed as a veritable token of the divine power.²⁹ Xenophanes, however, demands that his God be immobile, for he sees in this a mark of the highest dignity, as is clear from the words: 'Nor is it fitting for him to move.' (We meet the same religious intuition again in the contemporary statues and paintings which represent the gods as sitting in full majesty upon thrones, though naturally the artists had to express this insight in anthropomorphic terms.) Furthermore, the idea of God's absolute calm and immobility leads inevitably to an altered conception of his manner of acting upon things:

But effortlessly he sets all things astir
 By the power of his mind alone.³⁰

This conjunction of omnipotence and repose is of tremendous importance in paving the way for the idea of God that we meet in later years. We think at once of the Aristotelian unmoved mover, an idea which really originates here in Xenophanes. Aristotle's doctrine attempts, by adopting the Platonic formula *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρῶμενον*,³¹ to give greater plausibility to this noble conception of divine action upon the world. In Aeschylus we find much earlier evidence of the power and vigour of the idea, particularly in the great prayer to Zeus in *The Suppliants*. The poet depicts the divine dominion in a way that reveals not only the critical significance of Xenophanes' pioneering for a purer conception of God, but also its positive religious significance for his own time. The notion that God can sway the world merely by the power of his mind is shifted from the cosmic to the ethical sphere.

Down from their high-towered hopes
 He flings poor, wretched mortals,
 Donning no armour of might.
 For gods act without effort:
 High from their hallowed seats
 They somehow make their own thinking
 Come all at once to pass.³²

Aeschylus' expressive but almost prosaic 'somehow' (*πως*) shows

phanes' God has no need to nod his head like the Homeric Zeus to make Olympus quake with terror.³⁶ Only the phrase *νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει* betrays the unconscious persistence of the old Homeric tendency to humanize the sublime.³⁷

The fragments reveal further characteristic evidence of Xenophanes' critique of anthropomorphism. He finds his task easiest in the realm of ethics, where the way has already been prepared, largely by the progressive moralization of the gods during the sixth century.

. . . Homer and Hesiod say that the gods

Do all manner of things which men would consider disgraceful:

Adultery, stealing, deceiving each other.³⁸

Godhead must certainly be free from any moral weakness which even men consider blameworthy: this is a point on which Xenophanes and all his more thoughtful contemporaries would agree. But he is not content with so easy a victory. He launches another attack at the very root of the epic theogonies:

. . . But mortals suppose that the gods undergo generation;
They dress them with clothes like their own, as well as with voices
And figures.³⁹

The idea of the un-becoming and the unending, with which Anaximander characterized his divinity, the *apeiron*, put an end to such notions. Xenophanes merely works out some of the consequences of this philosophy in detail,⁴⁰ a process which must have brought him up against the problem of the origin of anthropomorphism:

. . . But if cattle and horses had hands, and were able
To paint with their hands, and to fashion such pictures as men do,
Then horses would pattern the forms of the gods after horses,
And cows after cattle, giving them just such a shape
As those which they find in themselves.⁴¹

Then there would be theriomorphic gods as well as anthropomorphic ones. Apparently Xenophanes was not aware that there were already just such animal-gods in Egypt, and man-made at that; but he would have found this only a little disturbing to his theory, which he proceeds to develop with further ethnological details:

. . . The gods of the Ethiopians are black with snub noses,
While those of the Thracians are blond, with blue eyes and red hair.⁴²
Thus each race apotheosizes its own type. The gods of the

and the problem of its legal order. This fact is clear from an elegy that has come down to us in its entirety, where he praises the cultivation of the intellect (*σοφίη*). Xenophanes considered himself uniquely equipped to propagate *σοφίη* in his new home in the west of the Greek world; and it is only because he saw in it the highest political virtue that he considered his own efforts justified.⁴⁶ Not until the fourth century, when the gods of the *polis* had died and the *polis* itself was losing its identity in the world-empire of Alexander, did the universalistic theology come into its own and emerge from the background of philosophy to cushion the impending collapse of all established authority.⁴⁷

We have already pointed out that while Xenophanes' utterances presuppose the new and profoundly disturbing experience of the Anaximandrian cosmology, they also contain something peculiarly his own. Anaximander's conception of the Divine was deduced by pure speculation about the idea of an absolute beginning, from which it acquired its attributes—its boundlessness and its property of never having become. But in Xenophanes we find a new motif, which is the actual source of his theology. It is nothing that rests on logical proof, nor is it really philosophical at all, but springs from an immediate sense of awe at the sublimity of the Divine. It is a feeling of reverence that leads Xenophanes to deny all the finite shortcomings and limitations laid upon the gods by traditional religion, and makes him a unique theological figure, despite his dependence on the views of the natural philosophers. Only as a theologian, indeed, can he really be understood. His religious motif—the demand for utter sublimity in the Godhead—is expressed with particular clarity in the assertion that it is not seemly for God to move hither and thither.⁴⁸ Unrest is not appropriate to the divine majesty. The word *ἐπιπρέπει*, which Xenophanes uses here, is not, as a matter of fact, repeated in any of the other fragments; but it reveals the criterion on which his entire criticism of anthropomorphism is based: all these human frailties are out of keeping with God's essential nature. The misdeeds of the Homeric and Hesiodic gods are incompatible with the moral elevation of the Divine; nor are clothing, speech, human form, and birth any more appropriate. In the concept of the appropriate, which here appears for the first time in the Greek tradition,

be light' as a far more satisfactory model.⁵⁸ Of course the conception of the Creation has little to do with Xenophanes; but clearly his philosophical theology has done more than anything else to smooth the way for accepting Judaeo-Christian monotheism.

Xenophanes' conception of the One God has always roused the interest of monistic philosophers (ἐνίζοντες) because he was the first, as Aristotle tells us, to teach the unity of the highest principle.⁵⁹ His conception seems to have a close connexion with Parmenides' theory of the One Being and consequently with the philosophy of the Eleatics. Inasmuch as he wrote an epic of the founding of Elea, the ancient historians of philosophy, who were on the watch for school successions, saw in him the father of Eleaticism. The One God of Xenophanes was thought to be an earlier version of the One Being of Parmenides, as if the religious intuition of the All-one had preceded the logical conception of the *ὄν*.⁶⁰ This view long dominated our own histories until it was vigorously upset by Karl Reinhardt's pioneer work on Parmenides.⁶¹ Reinhardt triumphantly demonstrated Parmenides' complete originality, and succeeded in showing that it was he and not Xenophanes who created the Eleatic theory of unity. His argument broke the traditional link between Xenophanes and the Eleatics, and allowed the problem of Xenophanes' position in history and his chronological relations with Parmenides to come up for fresh discussion. But Reinhardt also tried to give this problem a new solution by supplementing the direct fragments with the anonymous later work *On Xenophanes, Melissus, and Gorgias* as source material. Modern historians of philosophy, such as Zeller, Burnet, and Diels, had questioned the authenticity of this work so far as it dealt with Xenophanes' teachings, and accordingly refused to make any use of it. The little treatise was generally regarded as a product of the school philosophy of the later ancient period, and no one was ready to believe that its material came directly from Xenophanes' poems. It seemed much more likely that its author had taken Xenophanes' well-known assertions about the One God and his attributes, combined them with certain constituents of Parmenides' logic of Being, and thus tried to bring them into a strictly systematic dialectical form. But Reinhardt saw it all quite differently. Nothing seemed to him

Aristotle is still our most valuable source of information about the pre-Socratics, the weight of his testimony has been decidedly impaired during the last fifty years as we have become more and more clearly aware of his inability to grasp the ideas of his predecessors except in the fixed categories of his own system. But here we are dealing with facts that are almost unmistakable. Let us examine them briefly.

Aristotle reports that Parmenides thought of the One in terms of its λόγος or essence, while the Eleatic Melissus thought of it in terms of its matter, so that for Parmenides the One was limited, for Melissus unlimited. But Xenophanes, Aristotle continues, knew nothing of such a problem and did not aim at either the logical or the material One, but merely looked up at the whole heaven and said that the One was God.⁶² Now if we are to believe the author of the tract *On Xenophanes*, we must regard this account as false, for he says that according to Xenophanes the world is neither limited nor unlimited. If that is true, then Aristotle simply cannot have read Xenophanes; otherwise he could not have maintained that Xenophanes fails to distinguish between the logical and the material One, and therefore says nothing about whether it is limited or unlimited.⁶³ But it is really much more probable that the author of the late tract had not read Xenophanes at all. Instead he took his data from Aristotle and misunderstood it. After reading this good witness's statement that Xenophanes neither called the One limited nor called it unlimited, he drew the absurd conclusion that, according to Xenophanes, the One was neither limited nor unlimited. Out of Aristotle's merely negative statement he thus fashioned an utterly preposterous positive dogma, which he then proceeded to put in Xenophanes' mouth.⁶⁴ This is quite enough to prove the untrustworthiness of the author. It is undoubtedly true that all the arguments for the One which he attributes to Xenophanes actually point to the Being of Parmenides and not to the One God; but this fact merely proves that he has inserted Xenophanes' God into the Parmenidean ontology.

On the other hand, we can well understand how the author of the tract *On Xenophanes*, writing at a later period, can have come to devise this Eleatic *rationale* for the philosopher's idea of God. Evidently he felt that Eleaticism was precisely the

CHAPTER IV

THE SO-CALLED ORPHIC THEOGONIES

THE fewer the petrified remains of doctrine from which we can still hammer out the sparks of genius as we study the earliest thinkers, so much the more precious is a man like Xenophanes, who shows us how widely that genius radiated—from the edge of Asia, the birthplace of Greek philosophical thought, to the westernmost borders of Greek civilization. Xenophanes is by no means the only Greek poet of his time to be touched by the rising philosophy. The Sicilian Epicharmus, for example, the first writer of literary comedies, resident at the court of the tyrant Hieron of Syracuse, has left us some clever verbal fencing over the origin of things, in which one of his characters shrewdly criticizes the venerable Hesiodic *Theogony* because it speaks of Chaos, the ultimate beginning itself, as having come into being.¹ Clearly the playwright had had some acquaintance with the natural philosophers' conception of a first principle which itself has had no beginning. Epicharmus also bears witness to the whirlpool of doubt into which this conception had drawn the religious thought of the time. When we see the whole problem aired before thousands of listeners as a field for comedians' glibness, it is evident that the intellectual dispute which philosophy had stirred up had already begun to have an unsettling effect upon wider and wider strata of society.

Nevertheless, the old style of theogonic thinking is by no means dead, as this very discussion in Epicharmus shows. Even in its oldest Hesiodic form, theogony is a typical transition-product, not unconnected with the new philosophical spirit, an offshoot of a religious attitude which has already become more thoughtful; so it is hardly surprising to find it flourishing steadily with the quickening growth of philosophy throughout the whole sixth century in an imposing array of theogonic works, most of which still retain the poetical form of their model, Hesiod. The very closeness of this association shows us that these two types of intellectual attitude are sister branches of a single root reaching deep into the parent soil of religion. In the theogonies religious interest is focused directly upon the

placing the remains of these writings as an appendix at the end of his collection of the fragments of the pre-Socratics. The latest editor of this classical work has now shifted them back to the beginning, so that they are again at the starting-point of their wanderings.⁷ The truth is that the theogonic writers cannot be understood except in the light of their close reciprocal relationships with the philosophers of their own period who are connected with them by the common bond of theological speculation, no matter how much they may differ in intellectual type. We must make this fact especially clear. To neglect it would be to obscure the organic interconnexions of the development of religious thought, in which philosophy has played a role from the very beginning.

For the most part recent research in the history of religion sees in the sixth-century theogonies, as we have remarked, a branch of the great religious development we call Orphism. Generally speaking, the sixth century meant for Greece a renewal of the religious life which the wave of naturalism in the previous period had threatened to drown out. The devotions of the official cult of the *polis*-gods were always in danger of becoming merely external. They were largely under the control of an enlightened stratum of high-born patricians. This was a period when the individual was beginning to enjoy much greater freedom of movement; both in art and poetry old forms lost their rigidity, and naturalness became the supreme standard for the depiction of reality no less than for the conduct of life.⁸ But in the course of the social upheaval caused by the widespread class struggles which were then beginning throughout Greece and which were to reach their peak during the sixth century, the social and political rise of the lower classes was accompanied also by the penetration of their religious conceptions into the higher intellectual life, thus smoothing the way for decisive changes. This revolution was heralded by the mounting esteem in which the cult of Dionysus now came to be held. Even as late as the Homeric epics this cult had hardly been deemed worth considering; now, however, it began to spread from the plains to the cities, where it soon found a place in the public festivals and divine ceremonies. Originally the orgiastic character of the Dionysiac religion had been looked upon as something quite alien, an insult to all municipal

the body. The problem is complicated by the fact that in later antiquity the name of Orpheus was so comprehensive a symbol that it tended more and more to include everything in the realm of mystical literature and mystical orgies. Almost all the initiatory rites to be found anywhere in Greece came to be looked upon as having Orpheus for their founder, even when they were not at all similar to those we have described. We must steer completely clear of these latter if we hope to determine what could properly be called Orphic religion during the sixth century. On the whole our most reliable evidence comes from writers of the fifth and fourth centuries, but the information they give us is very scanty.¹⁴ Even the so-called Orphic hymns (which positively revel in the unions of the gods—a subject particularly dear to the Greeks of the later period) are of comparatively recent date.¹⁵ In late antiquity there was also a so-called Orphic theogony by Hieronymus or Hellanicus, the chief features of which we can still reconstruct from Neoplatonic sources. But the principal work of this type was the set of *Sacred Discourses* or *Rhapsodies*—a long poem in twenty-four cantos like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, on which it was obviously patterned.¹⁶ The poem must have been of post-Alexandrian origin at the earliest, for the division of the Homeric poems into twenty-four books by the grammarians goes back no farther than this. Even Lobeck, the shrewd and inexorable older critic of the whole tangled problem of Orphism, thought it possible to put the *Rhapsodies* in the sixth century B.C.; and in this he was long followed by more recent scholars, such as Kern and others. Kern, however, in his useful collection of the fragments of the Orphic writings, in which both earlier and later fragments lie peacefully side by side, has himself abandoned the early dating for this long work.¹⁷

A sobering critical blow was struck by Wilamowitz in the posthumous second volume of his *Der Glaube der Hellenen*.¹⁸ Whenever we used to find verses or phrases of Parmenides or Empedocles occurring in the *Rhapsodies*, it seemed obvious that these thinkers had made use of the Orphic theogony;¹⁹ now, however, we recognize the error fostered by an exaggerated notion of the influence of the Orphics on philosophy. So when we find anyone looking for Orphic theories in all the philosophers and seeking to trace the Orphic conception of sin in

would lend more prestige to the cosmic doctrines of the theogony than would that of some more commonplace individual; and when the name of Orpheus was utilized by adherents of the so-called Orphic rites, it did not mean that they had any connexion with the epics of the Pseudo-Orpheus. So we are not yet dealing with anything like a revelation in the Christian sense.

In modern works on the history of religion, however, these matters are handled quite differently. We read of an organized Orphic religious community whose tenets presumably came from the Orient. This community is supposed to have taught the first revealed religion; it is, indeed, a genuine Church with everything a Christian would consider appropriate. The initiates are its parishioners, the Orphic rites its sacraments, the mendicant priests its apostles; the later Orphic hymns constitute its parish hymnal and must therefore be of extreme antiquity. The dogma alone is lacking, and this is promptly found in the theogonies attributed to Orpheus. Onomacritus would be considered a dogmatic theologian, so to speak, the Origen of the Orphic church. But this attractive picture is drawn too closely after a fixed *a priori* pattern. This early precursor of Christianity is in fact merely a replica of the Christian religion projected back into the sixth century. The germ of the idea is already present in Erwin Rohde's famous book *Psyche*, and has more recently been worked out in greater detail, particularly in Kern's history of Greek religion.²⁵ Kern's attempt to solve the Orphic problem by approaching it with the yardstick of a specific religious type familiar to us in history, and correcting the Greek tradition to tally with it, leads me to remark on a few matters of principle that may not be irrelevant in the light of certain preconceived opinions which at present are rather widespread.

This reconstruction of the Orphic religion is based on the expressed assumption that theology and dogma are symptoms of a definitely oriental type of mentality.²⁶ If there is any probability that such a mentality is present in the Orphic faith of the Greeks, it depends on the hypothesis that that faith is of oriental origin. Kern thinks that all dogma, and therefore all theology in our sense of the word, is alien to the Greeks; but to make so sharp an antithesis between the Greeks and the

renewed endeavour to solve the problems of the origin of the world and the nature of the divine powers (which philosophy attacks with its own methods) without abandoning the forms in which the old faith conceived them, though more and more reliance is placed on the help of constructive intelligence. No speculation so unexacting can lead to any rigid theory. I grant that this is already theology, but it is theology without dogma. It is quite as unattached to any particular credal sect as the *Theogony* of old Hesiod himself. In spite of the fact that it makes use of a rich religious tradition, it is essentially a free, individual creation.

In no other way can we explain the peculiar variability of the views appearing in the remains of these older theogonies. That their authors should have taken over many features from Hesiod or from one another is only natural among the Greeks, where a poet's relation to his predecessors is often very close even in fields less bound by tradition. For that reason any departure from the earlier works usually indicates a conscious attempt at correction.³⁰ If we are not careful, many of these variants will look rather inconsequential at first glance, as when, for instance, Aristotle reports that 'certain old poets' made the world begin with Night rather than with Chaos.³¹ Eudemus corroborates this in his history of theology and expressly vouches for the fact that this doctrine belongs to a theogony ascribed to Orpheus.³² The very idea of Chaos obviously implies that the yawning empty space at the beginning of things lay in nocturnal darkness. In the parabasis of Aristophanes' *Birds*, the chorus of birds, who are to become the gods of the new kingdom, rehearse an amusing bird-theogony cleverly parodying an actual poem of this type—indeed an Orphic theogony of the very sort described by Eudemus and Aristotle.³³ Chaos and Night are actually named together as the origin of all coming-to-be; so, too, are Primeval Darkness and Tartarus. Night has already appeared in Hesiod, but only in a subordinate role and not at the beginning.³⁴ Perhaps one of the reasons why Night is introduced in Aristophanes' verse is that the word Chaos is a neuter, and he needs as the first mother for his genealogy a female who has existed even before Heaven and Earth and is obviously of cosmogonic importance. But the poet is also going back to certain venerable

procreative series and making him the first to be born from the world-egg that Night has hatched.⁴³ While the conception of the world-egg is not Hesiodic, we have evidence of its presence elsewhere on Greek soil. It is so closely in accord with the early zoomorphic feeling for nature that there is very little likelihood of its being derived from the Orient. For a moment it might seem that Aristophanes introduces the world-egg only in order that his Eros, who is a winged creature like the bird-gods descended from him, may be properly hatched. But since Eros had long been regarded as winged, it was very simple for the poets of the theogonies to hatch him out of the world-egg. That this is really an old conception is shown by the theogony written under the pseudonym of Epimenides and cited by Eudemus, which likewise involves a world-egg.⁴⁴ There is nothing specifically Orphic in this idea, but it was taken over by the later so-called Orphic theogony. In this recent poem the god Phanes originated from the egg. In the documents of later Hellenistic syncretism Phanes was identified with Erikepaïos.⁴⁵ It used to be thought that both these names could be deciphered in old Orphic documents (though these documents, the gold plates of Thurii, have not been preserved in a form earlier than the second or third century B.C.); but Diels has seen the erroneous nature of such an assumption.⁴⁶ There is therefore no evidence for the presence of Phanes in the sixth-century theogonies. Still less may we conclude from the discovery of a mystical papyrus of the third century B.C., containing the appeal 'Erikepaïos, save me!',⁴⁷ that the sixth-century Orphic theogonies provided the dogmas for a redemption religion.

The theogony of the so-called Epimenides, to which we have already referred, unfortunately remains no more than a name to us; but it is important that the testimony of Eudemus proves it to be old.⁴⁸ The little that we can gather from his account of it allows us to put it side by side with the theogony of the so-called Orpheus. In the beginning, according to Epimenides, were Air and Night.⁴⁹ As in the older philosophy, Air (*ἀήρ*) is thought of as the void.⁵⁰ Air thus takes the place of Chaos; and as the word *ἀήρ* is masculine, the neuter Chaos and feminine Night have now given way to a genuine male and female—Air and Night. We have here a correction of Hesiod similar to

places this author in the time of the Seven Wise Men; but as he must have known the philosophy of the Milesians, he can hardly have lived much before the end of the sixth century. Our records about him and our small collection of fragments have in recent years been supplemented with a comparatively long papyrus fragment that gives us a much clearer idea of his work. He wrote in prose, which at that time was still something new. Of course there was nothing epoch-making about this, as there was in the work of Anaximander, who was the first to put his philosophical doctrines in writing. Since Anaximander's time the process of converting the contents of the learned genealogical and theogonic poems into prose discourses had already begun; Hecataeus of Miletus, Pherecydes of Syros, and Acusilaus of Argos were the chief writers of this type. Pherecydes must have sought his originality largely in his stylistic form—a simple narrative art almost charming in its *naïveté*, though far less influential in the long run than the solemn pomp and already antiquated epic diction of the contemporary verse theogonies. But of course Pherecydes must have introduced a good deal that was new in content as well. In his writing there is nothing dry or impersonal like a pronouncement of dogma; the tone is quite conversational. He prattles away like this: 'Zas and Chronos and Chthonié always existed; but Chthonié came to be called Gē [Earth] because Zas gave her Gē as a *geras* [gift].'⁵⁸ Here not only the style but also the teachings of Hesiod have been abandoned, as we may perhaps infer to have been the case in a smaller degree with the less individual Acusilaus of Argos, who, as later authors report,⁵⁹ turned Hesiod partly into prose and partly improved upon him. Pherecydes' *diorthosis* goes deeper; it reminds us of the rationalistic way Hecataeus of Miletus goes about his criticism of the ancient myths.

But obviously Pherecydes does not base his criticism solely on what his common sense tells him is possible or impossible. When he says that Zas, Chronos, and Chthonié always existed, this is a correction of Hesiod, who had said that even Chaos had come into being. This correction was in the air at the time, as is clear from the criticisms of Xenophanes, who takes Hesiod to task for believing that the gods could have come into existence, as well as from the jibes of Epicharmus, who particularly

mysterious divine powers, when rightly interpreted, give the key to their nature.⁶⁴ But in Pherecydes the situation is reversed: the new names merely express the recent utterances of speculative thought. Even Aristotle includes Pherecydes among the mixed rather than among the pure theologians,⁶⁵ because he does not always put what he has to say in mythical form (*τῷ μὴ μυθικῶς ἅπαντα λέγειν*), and thus departs from what Aristotle describes in another passage as Hesiod's characteristic way of thinking (*μυθικῶς σοφίζεσθαι*).⁶⁶ Aristotle reads still more into our fragment: he holds that, unlike the older theogonies, Pherecydes preferred to have something perfect and good at the beginning of all things, rather than something essentially incomplete, such as Chaos or Night;⁶⁷ for the idea of the perfect and good has always been connected with the name *Zas*. This is also presumably true of the Milesian philosophers, who understand by their first principle something that 'governs all things and embraces all things'. The distinguishing feature of Pherecydes' theory is his assumption of an original dualism, for which the theogonic idea of a union between a male and a female divinity provides an appropriate symbolic expression.

Pherecydes depicts the sacred marriage in almost novelistic terms, and far more anthropomorphically than Hesiod;⁶⁸ but we may venture to suspect that this anthropomorphism is no longer naïve. It has, so to speak, assimilated the philosophical criticisms of anthropomorphism; and the representation of the Divine in human terms is already consciously allegorical. A great palace is built for *Zas* and *Chthonié*, and as soon as it has been fitted out with everything necessary—furniture and household servants—the wedding is celebrated. On the third day of the festivities *Zas* weaves a large and splendid tapestry, with *Earth* and *Ogénos* and the palace of *Ogénos* woven in. The tapestry is obviously to be his wedding-gift for *Chthonié*. *Earth* and *Oceanus* (of whose name the obscure form *Ogénos* is probably a variant) appear as figures embroidered on her gown. She herself, therefore, is more than these—the very essence of the depths by which they are all sustained. *Earth* and *Sea* are merely the adornment with which *Zas* the All-living has decked her out in token of his love. He now presents her with the garment and speaks to her as follows: 'As I wish that this

sect, but the mythopoeic fancy of a theologian—a new and interesting ‘mixed’ type of person, stimulated by the revolutionary ideas of philosophy. The philosophers’ way of looking at the world has impelled the more intelligent of their contemporaries to come to terms with their approach, particularly where religion is concerned. This extension makes for an extraordinary increase in the philosophical capacity of the religious consciousness and gives it an entirely new direction. The ability to construct theogonies is one that never dies out of Greek religion. Even in Hesiod many new creations appear (there are just as many, whether they are the work of Hesiod himself or merely a product of his times)—particularly the personifications of those ethical powers which imperiously crave admittance to Olympus in every period, such as Diké, Eunomia, Eirené, and others.⁷⁵ In Pherecydes the problem is not so much one of inventing new gods as it is one of reinterpretation on a large scale. He is led to create allegorical divinities representing certain cosmical forces, and to set up equivalences between the old names of the gods and the natural forces of the new cosmology. Such a naturalistic interpretation is later applied systematically to all the Greek gods and legendary figures; but the process begins in the sixth century. Both Anaximander and Anaximenes speak of their first principle as divine. From the spiritualization of nature, theogony draws new strength. At bottom, of course, this spiritualization is all mere fantasy of the same sort as that which has made the Greeks people tree, mountain, and spring with Dryads, Oreads, and Nymphs, and do homage to Helios and Selené as gods. Such a view of the world inevitably takes on the form of pantheism as soon as the idea of the All and its unity is pushed to the fore by philosophy. That this view does not begin in Hellenistic times with the Stoics, but as early as the sixth century, is made clear in the well-known lines of Aeschylus:⁷⁶

Zeus is the Ether, Zeus the Earth, and Zeus the Sky;
Zeus is the All, and what is higher yet than this.

By an unimpaired capacity for animizing the world pantheistically, the old gods are reborn in a new sense. The course of development leads from the divine personages of the old Greek folk-religion to the divine powers and divine Nature of the

CHAPTER V

ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL'S DIVINITY

THE Greeks (as one modern student has remarked) share with the Jews the honour of creating an intellectualized faith in God; but it was the Greeks alone who were to determine for several millennia the way in which civilized man would conceive the nature and destiny of the soul. Their ideas contributed much that was essential in forming the Christian world-view; and by becoming part of the Christian religion these ideas acquired in their turn the widest possible diffusion. We may think of this Greek conception of the soul as beginning to develop in the sixth century. Its roots may well reach deep into the prehistoric strata of human existence; but during the sixth century the belief that the soul was divine and had a metaphysical destination took on the intellectual form that enabled it to conquer the world, and this will always remain a decisive historical event. The Greek soul-myths were not a fruit of the philosophical spirit, but sprang rather from the religious movement which we have described briefly in our previous chapter. That movement, however, lay directly in line with philosophy. Its influence took the form not of the absorption of a complete religious dogma by philosophy, but rather of a free intellectual catharsis of the religious beliefs about the soul; in any case it implied that these beliefs provided a new point of orientation from which philosophical thought could set forth. It accordingly falls within the frame of our study.

But we must first consider the general forms that the Greek idea of the soul took, so far as we can know from our extant tradition. Since the appearance of Erwin Rohde's classic volume *Psyche*, which was for the philology of his time a supreme achievement of scholarly synthesis and artistic skill,¹ research has not been idle, and the Homeric conception of the soul has been particularly favoured as the subject of penetrating studies which undermine the basic assumptions of Rohde's treatment. Rohde had been much impressed by the theory of an animistic stage in the history of religion such as E. B. Tylor and Herbert Spencer had worked out; he accordingly attempted to bring

come to designate the man-like idol of the dead in Hades. It seemed to him that this disembodied double must have lived in the man during his lifetime, though without any assignable function to perform, for certainly none was evident in the state of waking consciousness. Rohde, however, was of the opinion that such an activity was really to be found in the dream-activity of the consciousness in sleep, which he interpreted as analogous to the final release of the psyche from the body at the moment of death, and different only in degree. He found support for this interpretation in a parallel passage from Pindar, which is actually very significant. The passage reads:

And all men's bodies follow the call
 Of overpowering death.
 And yet there still will linger behind
 A living image of life,
 For this alone has come from the gods.
 It sleeps while the members are active;
 But to those who sleep themselves
 It reveals in myriad visions
 The fateful approach
 Of adversities or delights.

Though the psyche is not directly mentioned, Pindar represents it as an idol or image of life, almost exactly as in Homer.⁷ He asserts the psyche to be the only thing remaining after the body's death. Accordingly Rohde saw all the more significance in Pindar's explicit statement that the idol of the living person is present in him even during his lifetime but asleep when he is awake. This explanation seemed the only way of accounting for the curious fact that Homer never speaks of the presence or activity of any such double housed in man's body as an invisible second ego. That this double should become active only in dreams—that is, in temporary emancipation from the body—was for Rohde the decisive point, for this seemed to give him the final proof that the whole conception rested on a logical inference of primitive man from the actual experience of dreaming and other similar phenomena, such as ecstatic conditions and fainting spells. This explanation coincided with the theory of animism.

At this point W. F. Otto made some effective criticisms in his little book *Die Manen*.⁸ For several decades Rohde's

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arious aspects of all that we summarily
oes not even ask what the particular

such a verb is formed from the stem $\psi\upsilon\chi$ - itself, show plainly that even in Greek the concept of psyche goes back to this sensory representation.¹⁹ As late as the time of Homer, when this origin is already becoming obscure, it is still often consciously felt. This is evident from expressions like 'his psyche flew out of his mouth' or 'out of his body'.²⁰ The idea of the flight to Hades, which is often connected with that of the psyche, combines rather badly with the abstract concept 'life' but quite well with the idea of breath, according to the old Greek ways of thinking. In the sixth-century Orphic epics we find the conception of the psyche entering man at birth, borne on the breath of the wind.²¹ This idea, to be sure, is not to be found in Homer; but it is the exact complement of the Homeric belief that the psyche escapes from the dying person by flying away. The Homeric conception must be extremely old. Even outside the sphere of literature we encounter it in the figure of the psyche fluttering about as a soul-bird or butterfly after quitting its human host.²² Whether the image of flying was originally meant in this literal sense or in the purely metaphorical sense of hovering in the air, which would be especially appropriate for the soul as breath, Homer still conceived it in perceptual terms.

The post-Homeric literature is known to us in such a fragmentary state that we cannot find out very much about its nomenclature for the soul. It is only natural that the poets imitating Homer should have retained his terms with their old significations.²³ The tradition has left us nothing to show how the language of daily life expressed itself. With the introduction of prose in the sixth century, the philosopher Anaximenes, in the one remaining fragment of his treatise, uses the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in the sense of soul, not in that of life. 'Just as our psyche, which is air, holds us together and rules us,' he writes, 'so do *pneuma* and air encompass the whole cosmos.'²⁴ When Anaximenes says that the boundless substance that underlies all Becoming is air, he does so chiefly because he looks upon air as the bearer of life. For him the primal principle itself is already animate and related to the visible corporeal world as the soul to the human body. In identifying the air with the soul, the philosopher apparently has no need to do more than take advantage of the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, for evidently anyone hearing it

and not from the two disparate Homeric ideas of life and ghost can we explain how the one word *ψυχή* could come to express them both. Only the word 'spirit' with its breath-connotation, like the analogous concepts in English and German, suggests both of the two widely different aspects here involved: on the one hand, life; on the other, the supernatural apparition of the ghost. This, then, is the original notion. There is no way of jumping from the psyche as life-in-the-abstract to the idol in Hades.

However, we have not yet really solved the problem of how the word *ψυχή* in Homer can mean both the impersonal concept 'life' and 'ghost of the dead' appearing in individual form. The double significance with which this word is conceived in Homer cannot have grown from a single conceptual root. Otto's hypothesis that the idea of the life that soars away from the body at death has been combined with the experience of 'seeing ghosts' does not, of course, suffice to explain how the word *ψυχή* can have been transferred to the idol in Hades; but the hypothesis that some such transference occurred strikes me as inescapable. It becomes much easier to understand if the original meaning of *ψυχή* was not merely 'life', as Otto assumes, and if this transference was not consummated in Homer, for whom the prevailing meaning of *ψυχή* was already 'life', but rather at an earlier stage, when the word still meant quite literally the 'breath-soul'. It was then fairly easy to think of the breath-soul that escaped at death as identical with what primitive belief held to be the one thing remaining from the dead person which could under certain circumstances become an object of human sense-perception—namely, the ghost. From this identification the concept of psyche acquired its contrast of meanings; and this contrast is not to be explained away, for the breath of life is essentially nothing individual, while the apparition from the realm of phantasms naturally resembles the dead person himself. It is worth our while to notice that it was obviously much easier for the word *ψυχή* to have its range of meaning widened to include this creature of the dead than to take in those conscious processes which it would pre-eminently denote later on. Consciousness and animal life are never originally conceived as a unity. Accordingly they are indicated by different words.²⁹ While this may seem curious

depended upon what each succeeding period felt man's highest excellence to be.³² But the shift in the meaning of *ψυχή* followed a different course. The idea of breath was not general enough to take on any new mental connotations at random. It could not be broadened to acquire the meaning of soul in anything like our present sense until that which had hitherto been called *θυμός* was understood to be dependent on the psyche, and sheer animal living accordingly recognized as fundamental for the higher life of consciousness. So we do not need to explain why the word *ψυχή* was bound to defeat the word *θυμός* in their rivalry to determine which would better suggest both the mere fact of living and the life of the soul in the fullest sense. In the end *ψυχή* entirely absorbed the meaning of *θυμός* as soul or mind. As a matter of fact, *θυμός* frequently shows a tendency in Homer to rise to this more general meaning and include animal life as well;³³ but in the living language *ψυχή* carries the day, and *θυμός* becomes more and more confined to the special meaning of 'courage'.³⁴

Now this complete coalescence of life-soul and consciousness in the conception of the psyche appears in the religious beliefs of the sixth-century Orphics and Pythagoreans as a presupposition of their doctrine of the so-called transmigration of souls. It is impossible not to see in this doctrine one of the most important causes of the diffusion of the un-Homeric meaning of the word *ψυχή* and its ultimate triumph. But it is certainly wrong to suppose that this comprehensive conception of psyche was confined exclusively to these late mystical groups, and to regard it as a foreign substance in the intellectual life of the Greeks. Of course if we should contrast Homer and the Orphics as representing two distinct types of belief about the soul, the gap between them might seem so unbridgeable that we might as well be dealing with the typical opposition of popular belief and mysticism or with the philosophical views of two opposing races,³⁵ Homer representing the Greeks, and the Orphic dualism the Orientals.³⁶ But we have already observed that the non-Homeric and pre-Homeric Greek conception of the psyche as the breath-soul possessed a native tendency to widen its meaning to include something like our present idea of the soul, and that out of all the Homeric words for indicating either the physical life or the life of the conscious soul, this was by far the

the beginning, that this divine ground should include both life and consciousness; at least this is how we have felt that the philosopher's words must be interpreted.⁴⁰ From such a standpoint death can be nothing other than the return of the individual to the primal ground and his entry into new forms. The distinguishing feature of the transmigration theory is the preservation of the identity of the ego both before and after this life. In contrast to the pantheism of the Milesian philosophy, a genuinely religious motif now appears in the permanence of the person as an intellectually and morally responsible agent, actively co-operating in his own fate, though immersed in the general natural processes of coming-to-be and passing-away, to which even man seems irresistibly subjected. By this contrast with the pantheistic and naturalistic conception of man, the religious anthropology of the transmigration theory acquires a dignity that lifts it well above the level of mere primitive mythology. Moreover, the idea of the permanence of the person is not one that emerges suddenly and unpreparedly. In the Greek mysteries, the pre-Greek origin of which is attested by many facts in the history of religion and even of architecture, a man was deemed blessed if he had witnessed the sacred pageantry of the epopts and come to share in the higher wisdom. Our authorities tell us that he had also some hope of a better lot after death, though they fail to indicate whether this promise involved the idea of a continuing personal life.⁴¹ Still less can we say whether it involved any continued existence of the soul as a conscious being separate from the body. Such a separation of soul from body was perhaps more likely to be intimated in the practices of the Dionysiac cult, which were designed to lead to ecstasy; for the devotee would then behold the god and become one with him. Yet even here we have no tradition of any special soul-theory, no matter how often the Orphic and Dionysiac cults were merged. So the Dionysiac religion can at most be regarded merely as a forerunner of the Orphic belief in the possibility of the soul's independent existence outside the body.

In expounding the Orphic soul-theory itself, recent scholars have, as in other cases, produced such a heedless mixture of views reported by the older writers and material from comparatively late sources that we are inevitably faced with the

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his soul, shall enter Kronos' lofty hall on the Islands of the Blest.

There the ocean breezes blow;
And golden flowers are blazing,
Some on the land in glistening trees,
While others are fed by the sea.
And the blessed ones weave them in crowns for themselves.

We find another no less exuberant and visually concrete description of the sorrows and joys of the beyond in a fragment from a lost Pindaric threnody.⁴⁴ In still another fragmentary series of lines we read of souls who must do penance there until the ninth year, when Persephone sends them back to the upper sun: from these come illustrious princes, men of swift strength and utmost wisdom, henceforth to be honoured as heroes.⁴⁵

With this eschatology the mystics associated a call for purity of life in accordance with certain specified rules. In particular this *βίος* required abstention from any form of bloodshed, including even blood-sacrifice and the eating of animal flesh⁴⁶—a prescription that led to a precise ritualistic regulation of diet. Man sees himself as responsible for the future fate of his soul in the beyond, and no longer feels fully at home in this world, whether he expects to obtain his salvation by mere adherence to outward ritual or rather by some ethical sanctification in the course of his wanderings. His soul, which has come from a higher and diviner sphere, is a transient guest in the house of the body. Only in dreams and in the hour of death, when released by the body, is it ever completely itself.⁴⁷ We must notice that Aristotle uses almost the same words with regard to the nature of the soul in a famous fragment of one of his early and still Platonistic dialogues.⁴⁸ He, too, speaks of the dream-vision and the intimations of the future at death as the only moments when the soul exists entirely by itself and reveals its true nature. The Orphic soul-theory is a direct precursor of Plato's and Aristotle's view of the divine nature of soul or mind, though they have stripped away all the material features still clinging to this conception. The passage from Aristotle that agrees so closely with the Pindaric fragment stands in a lengthy exposition of how the idea of God originated. This fact alone is enough to prove the significance of the Orphic soul-theory for Greek theology. In the teachings of Plato and

Socrates holds that the preservation of man's soul from harm is the thing most important in life, and that in comparison with this everything else must recede, his emphasis on the value of the soul,⁵³ so incomprehensible to the Greece of an earlier age, would have been inexplicable if the Orphic religion had not turned its attention inward with that faith which the watch-word of this *βίος* expresses: 'I, too, am of godly race.'⁵⁴

tole, all human beings strive. Nothing could be more false to the inner motivation of the heroic thinkers who meet us at the outset of Greek philosophy than to look on them as a company of pious doctrinaires or scholastics ambitious to demonstrate with the tools of the intellect what their feeling accepts on faith. An established confession of faith never played any part in the veneration accorded to the deities of the Greek cults. Their significance and their nature fluctuated with the universal change; and as life and human experience advanced from one stage to another, there were always new ways of discovering the divine presence in reality. For that very reason, however, we must take pains not to go to the other extreme and think of pure thought as something hermetically sealed and isolated, essentially opposed to religion and shut off from it with as sharp a cleavage as that with which modern science sometimes cuts itself off from the Christian faith. The Greeks were as yet unaware of any such autonomous realms of the spirit. Among the sources of those human experiences which helped in transforming the traditional mythical concept of the Divine, the rational investigation of reality was one of the most important; and just as religious inquiry itself had whetted the appetite for knowledge, so the philosophical speculation with which the Greeks were constantly aiming to grasp the totality of existence performed a truly religious function and gave rise to a peculiar religion of the intellect, reflecting in its structure the shift in the relationship between reason and feeling which confronts us in that new intellectual type—the philosopher. We have, I think, shown that it is impossible to follow Reinhardt (and here Reinhardt himself seems to vacillate) when he counts Anaximander and Anaximenes among the men of pure science but sets Xenophanes apart from all other thinkers as a radical theologian. For while Xenophanes clearly differs from them in the way he expresses his religious feelings, their rational style of thinking gives them a new conception of the world which is deeply satisfying to their own religious sense. And the very fact that Xenophanes was not originally a student of physics is all the more indicative of the latent religious force in the world-view of the natural philosophers.

Our problem is similar when we come to Parmenides. We need not ask whether his study of pure Being has a religious

The Hesiodic gods, to be sure, had since been supplanted in the Ionian natural philosophy by a single divine substance like Anaximander's primordial ground; but how could the Greeks, with their fondness for any sort of contest, have helped seeing in Parmenides' adoption of the verse-form of his venerable theological predecessor an avowed intention to compete with him on his own territory, however sharply the rigorous conceptual deductions of the Eleatic must have contrasted with Hesiod's fanciful *mythopoia*? That we need consider only the *Theogony* as Parmenides' model, and need not concern ourselves with the *Works and Days*, is evident upon closer comparison. The parallelism between Parmenides and Hesiod's *Theogony* becomes particularly evident in the second part of Parmenides' poem. There not only the cosmogonic Eros of Hesiod appears, but with it, if we may trust Cicero's philosophical source in the first book of his *De natura deorum*, a large number of allegorical deities such as War, Strife, Desire, &c., whose origin from Hesiod's *Theogony* cannot be questioned.⁵ But what prompted Parmenides to relegate these deities of Hesiod to the second part of his work, which is concerned with the world of mere appearance, and to contrast with it what he calls the Truth: his conception of eternal Being?

The *Theogony* had been introduced in the proem as a revelation from divine beings. By this time it had already become conventional for any epic to begin with a short invocation of the Muses; but Hesiod, the shepherd of Ascra, had quite deliberately developed this feature into a striking and detailed narration of his own personal experience: he told how the goddesses had appeared to him as he tended his flocks near his home at the foot of Helicon, their sacred mountain, and how they had inspired him⁶ with a mission such as no poet before him had ever received—the truly prophetic inspiration of proclaiming the eternally existing gods and expounding their origin. It must have been this emphasis on the gods' eternal existence⁷ that moved Parmenides to present himself as one who had followed in Hesiod's footsteps and beaten him at his own game. For it is again as a direct and unique divine revelation that he introduces his poem on that which exists eternally with a grandiose proem describing his heavenward journey.⁸ This proem used to be lightly laid aside as a pure matter of artistic formalism

And tossing their veils away from their heads with their hands.
 There stand the gates of the pathways of Night and of Day,
 And round about them a lintel and threshold of stone.
 The aethereal gateway is closed with immense folding doors,
 And the keys with their versatile changes are kept in the hands
 Of Diké, the manifold punisher. She, then, it was
 Whom the maidens persuaded with carefully coaxing words
 To be swift in pushing the bolt with its peg from the gate.
 And as it flew open, the gap of its doors gaped wide,
 While the bronze-fitted posts with their pivots and bolts
 Swung forward and back in their sockets. And there, driving
 straight
 Through the portal, the maidens conducted both horses and car
 In the travelled track of the wagons. And graciously
 Did the goddess receive me. Taking my right hand in hers,
 She addressed me these words and bespoke me: 'O youth, you who
 come
 To our house with your escort of deathless chârnoteers
 And these fine mares that have brought you, welcome and
 hail!
 It is no evil Moira that leads you to come by this road
 (For indeed it lies far from the pathways frequented by men),
 But Themis and Diké. And now you must study all things:
 Not only the unshaken heart of well-rounded Truth
 But also mortals' opinions, in which there is no true reliance.'

The concreteness with which the various details are depicted—the goddesses, the team, the chariot-ride, and the entrance gate to the upper world—must be attributed to the poetic medium. The language, indeed, with its sturdy compactness (which no translation can reproduce) is very far removed from the pallid allegory which the academic aesthetician traditionally expects of a philosopher's experiments in verse. But the thing which really justifies the presence of all this imagery at the beginning of a philosophical poem is its transparent double significance. Naturally it will not do to follow the source used by Sextus Empiricus, to whom we owe thanks for preserving this precious section of the lost work, and interpret the horse-drawn car Platonically as the chariot of the human soul.¹⁴ But it is quite plain that the chariot conveying the poet to his goal is driven by higher powers. The road that he takes is commended as 'far from the pathways of men'. No mortal can find

revival. Similarly Aeschylus, in the great speech where Prometheus boasts of being the *εὐπετής* of human *τέχνη*, borrows a number of intonations from this sphere of prophetic discourse, the influence of which can still occasionally be traced, though it is otherwise lost to us:

Seeing, they saw in vain;
Listening, they failed to hear.¹⁸

To Parmenides, of course, eyes and ears were precisely the organs by which men were led astray;¹⁹ so he could speak only in more general terms of 'wandering off the track' and 'roving about'.

Naturally we have no reason to suppose that Parmenides was trying to build up a case for any particular religious sect, or was even following some such prototype point by point in describing his remarkable experiences. If such a model may have helped him find suitable ways of expressing his own position, it was at any rate a highly original device for giving it intellectual form. It amounts to far more than mere metaphor. What Parmenides has done is to take over the religious form of expression and transpose it to the sphere of philosophy, so that in truth a whole new intellectual world takes shape. Indeed, the one thing that distinguishes the achievement of the major Greek philosophers from the so-called special sciences (which were already beginning to emerge at this time, sometimes alongside philosophy and sometimes directly out of philosophy itself) is this very ability not merely to assemble their facts or make out a case for their theories, but to build up a full-sized intellectual world. Throughout the history of Greek thought we shall notice again and again how the philosophical spirit constructs its own *kosmos* and *bios* out of concepts and forms taken over from the religious and political life of the community, and remoulded until they have become genuinely philosophical in character. These matters have often been regarded as irrelevant to the philosophical content; but from our standpoint, which is really no longer that of a simple history of dogma, their value is peculiarly enhanced. In the wider intellectual life of Greece the philosopher who devises new symbols is no less important than the man who arrives at new doctrines. They are (mostly) one and the same person. Often

The verses with which the main portion of Parmenides' poem begins are contained in fragments 2 and 3 (4 and 5 in editions previous to the fifth) of Diels's collection :

Come then, I shall tell you (and please listen well to my words)
Which ways of inquiry alone can be thought. The first
Maintains that *it is* and *cannot not be* ; and this
Is the path of conviction, which follows the truth. But the
next

Asserts: *it is not* and *this not-being must be*.

This latter path, I must tell you, cannot be explored.

For that which is not, you neither can know (for this

Is beyond our achieving) nor can you express it in words,

For thinking and being are one and the same.

The truth already proclaimed in the proem, from which the veil is now lifted for the first time, is so overwhelming in its simplicity that it comes as a shock to the listener, whom the solemn pronouncements of the goddess have prepared for some more pyrotechnic display. But this very simplicity reminds us of the actual experiences of the 'mystai' whose minds first had to be freed entirely from all confusing earthly entanglements so that they might be ready for the holy things that the initiation rites would reveal. The founders of the mysteries knew well that the deepest secrets are found only in things that are seemingly obvious.²⁵

The two ways—the right way and the way of error—appear again in the religious symbolism of later Pythagoreanism. There they serve as an emblem for the choice between a morally good life and a bad one—the choice confronting every man as a moral agent.²⁶ We meet a similar conception in the sacred two-branched Y on the gravestones of a later era, which seems to symbolize the dead person's membership in the sect as a decision rightly made, and holds forth a promise of eternal peace in the hereafter.²⁷ Unfortunately we do not know how far the idea of the two ways goes back. That it was already familiar in early times is clear from Hesiod's *Works and Days*, with its doctrine of the narrow path of *areté* and the broad highway of misery.²⁸ It is tempting to suppose that the image of the way was also employed in those pious doctrines of the other world which we have encountered in Pindar, for the

and Not-being at the outset as basic for his whole doctrine? And who are the 'men of two heads', the 'know-nothings' (*εἰδότες οὐδέν*),³² who serve as butt for the polemic of 'the man who knows'³³ because their failure to grasp the exclusiveness of this alternative has led them to think that they can go both ways at once? Let us begin by answering the second question—the question of the historical background of Parmenides' philosophy. It used to be rather widely supposed that Parmenides has a certain definite thinker in mind when he speaks of the men of two heads; for the view that the same thing both is and is not, and that one can always go both the way from and the way towards when dealing with anything that exists, seems quite exactly to fit Heraclitus and his doctrine of the unity of opposites.³⁴ I must add my own misgivings to the doubts that have recently been raised against this interpretation.³⁵ Parmenides' prophet-like invective against the men of two heads who wander in error, eternally dumb and blind, cannot be directed at any one ingenious person who has gathered a few aspiring disciples about him; it must rather be aimed at the whole race of mortals. To them Parmenides himself has given ear, even up to the moment when the goddess pronounces her revelation; for it is she, not he, who speaks these words. Naturally mankind has never expressed its naïve conception of reality in any form so epigrammatic as that of asserting that Being and Not-being are one and the same. It is only Parmenides himself who sums up in this paradoxical formulation the absurd consequences of a cosmology by which all men alike—the unscientific multitude no less than the philosophers of nature—are held in the bonds of a single error. That this naïve cosmology is the target of his attack is shown with particular clearness in the great fragment on the Existent (the eighth in Diels's collection), where Parmenides tries to deduce a number of the essential attributes of that which truly is. Starting with the concept of Being itself, he finds implied in it the constituent properties of never having come into being and never passing away; motion and multiplicity he rules out of it altogether. But these rejected properties are quite fundamental for that which is counted as genuine reality by the naïve man in the street no less than by the Ionian philosophers of nature. The nature with which they are concerned takes the form of an

of decisive importance. The verb *νοεῖν* does not mean at all the same to Parmenides as it will to Plato, who contrasts *νοῦς* sharply with sense-perception. Ever since Homer *νοεῖν* has always meant 'to become aware' of an object and identify it as the thing that it is.⁴⁰ Moreover, the object of *νοεῖν* that Parmenides is talking about—'the Existent', or 'that which is'—is something taken directly from human experience. Parmenides can have no doubts about the existence of this object, inasmuch as *νοεῖν* itself is never really *νοεῖν* except when it knows the actual. What the understanding or *λόγος* contributes is the all-important consideration that the Existent cannot be as our senses reveal it to us—namely, something manifold and in motion.

Parmenides' understanding compels him to be consistent, and this consistency leads him inevitably to a critique of human knowledge. The very fact that he uses the image of the two ways in expounding his theory⁴¹ shows how much he is dominated by this motif. This is also confirmed by the way he distinguishes the two sections of his work as dealing with 'truth' and 'appearance' respectively,⁴² thus putting both the metaphysics of the first part and the physics of the second in an avowedly critical epistemological perspective.⁴³ Parmenides' thought, with its amazing self-assurance, has an underlying necessity that makes it peculiarly compelling—the logical necessity inherent in the very concept of Being.⁴⁴ But Parmenides is quite innocent of our formal logic and does not yet think of the concept as a mere vehicle; he is convinced that his own logical reasoning will actually enable him to get a firm grasp of the Existent itself. To be sure, the Being that he approaches along this path is quite different from the things of whose existence the physicists have been talking. But it is significant that when he claims this Being to be the one true Being, he is definitely contrasting it with that of the physicists. So even when he seeks to vanquish the philosophy of nature, he has the same soil under his feet—the world of objective reality. And even when he faces the inevitable question of how the appearance by which all men have been victimized can have arisen at all, and how it can have obtained such universal respect, he cannot help putting his answer in the form of a physical system.

It has been maintained that the second part is a polemic against certain doctrines of the natural philosophers, possibly those of the Pythagoreans; and indeed there is much that reminds us of Pythagorean views. But it is impossible to show a complete correspondence between the Parmenidean $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ and Pythagoreanism; and to assume, as some have done, that the thinker's polemical zeal has driven him to burden his work with such a mass of extraneous matter is to miss the point of the whole structure.⁵⁴ Parmenides' attempt to explain the origin of the world of appearance is thoroughly original, however unsatisfactory we may find it. Without it we could hardly appreciate all the boldness of the first part, where the philosopher tears himself loose from the world of illusion and mounts upward towards the truth.

In recent years the problem of the relation between the two sections on truth and on appearance has been raised many times and has called forth various answers. One of the reasons for this lay in the feeling (which may perhaps betray too modern an approach) that Parmenides' Being was essentially empty. It appeared possible to overcome this difficulty by assuming a closer connexion between the worlds of Being and Becoming and seeking evidence for it in Parmenides' work. It was then decided that Parmenides must have intended his conception of the Existent to solve the riddle of the universe by performing the same function as the natural philosophers' doctrine of the one original principle. In this way Parmenides' Existent came to be looked upon as something closely akin to that principle: it became the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ or principle of the world of Becoming as such. The next step was to contrast it with Plato's abstract conception of the Existent, which is simply what remains when one ignores all the particular characteristics by which various kinds of things are differentiated. Comparison with Plato's abstraction made the Existent of Parmenides seem sturdier and more dense, with a solidity quite appropriate to the structure of forces holding the world of appearance together.⁵⁵ But this would mean that the Existent must have included the world of coming-to-be and passing-away all the while, which is quite out of accord with Parmenides' explicit statement that Diké, the force of law unchangeable, holds the Existent firmly in her bonds and never sets it free to become or to perish.⁵⁶ It

like a sphere⁶² (an obviously Pythagoreanizing comparison), this is, so to speak, its one last vestige of world-form which he has not succeeded in removing; and even in this passage he makes it plain that he is dealing merely with a comparison. His Existent is not to be approached by later conceptions such as that of matter.⁶³

It seems, indeed, far more like the pure form of that idea in which all the earlier philosophical research was rooted: the idea of eternal existence as the basis of all knowledge. The Milesians had found this eternal existence in their primal principle and claimed it to be divine. Similarly, Parmenides contrasts his Existent with the world of 'mortals' delusions' and proclaims its gospel as a revelation from the goddess of light—a purely theological figure introduced to emphasize the importance of true Being. Now if we are not mistaken, we have here a new stage in the approach to the same problem which the older thinkers had answered by equating their first principle with the Divine. Like them, Parmenides connects the knowledge of existence with the sphere of religion; indeed, he does so with peculiar effectiveness. On the other hand, he definitely fails to identify Being with God, even though in later times his theory of absolute Being and its predicates has been construed again and again as a philosophical theology. Therefore it may well be more in keeping with the character of his thought if we speak of his Mystery of Being. This will at least do justice to the form he has given his doctrine. A theologian will, of course, deplore the absence of a God in this mystery; but no one with a live religious sense will refuse to count his pure ontology as a genuine mystery and revelation; nor will he fail to be deeply stirred when he sees how much it meant to Parmenides to experience the nature of Being. To put it otherwise, the religious element lies more in the way the man has been affected by his discovery, and in his firm and decided handling of the alternatives of truth and appearance, than in any classification of the object of his research as divine.

In the long run, however, a Greek would feel that the real

CHAPTER VII

HERACLITUS

THE end of the sixth century and the first decades of the fifth mark a general renaissance of the religious spirit among the Greeks. In individual works of poetry and art this spirit manifests itself even more impressively than in the religion of the cult-divinities and the newly arisen sects that are usually cited as evidence for it. Along with poetry and art, philosophy now provides a peculiarly fertile soil for the emergence of the great religious personalities these new times bring forth. What is called religion in the narrower sense offers nothing comparable. The line begins with Pythagoras, who founds a sort of religious order. In Xenophanes we meet a person of a very different stamp. He is the bold herald of enlightenment, who attacks the Pythagorean transmigration-theory as mystification with the same ruthlessness that he applies to the gods of the popular religion and the poets; yet he wages his warfare inwardly confident that he has achieved a higher philosophical knowledge of God. Similarly it is in the form of a religious mystical revelation that Parmenides chooses to express his vision of true Being in which he shows the sense-world to be mere appearance; for he sees his new-found knowledge as the answer to the religious questions agitating the whole world about him. Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all belong to the new southern Italian culture resulting from the fusion of imported Ionian intellectualism with the social and religious background of the native stock. In Heraclitus, who appears at the end of the line, we see these same religious questions disturbing Ionia, the birthplace of philosophy. All these thinkers, despite their constitutional differences, possess a kind of prophetic fervour and eagerness to testify to their own personal experience that is especially characteristic of their period and puts them in company with the great contemporary poets Aeschylus and Pindar. This passionate emergence of the personality had not always accompanied philosophical thinking. In the Ionian naturalism of the old Milesians the spirit of observation and pure research had prevailed. We can hardly go wrong by assuming that in the writings of an Anaximander or Anaximenes the

standpoints, keeping as close as possible to the surviving fragments of the philosopher's work.⁵ This is what we, too, must do, though we cannot altogether dispense with the doxographic reports of later ancient authors when they do not merely express their own opinions but supplement our fragments with facts.

Let us begin by examining the peculiar stylistic form of the Heraclitean fragments. There is simply nothing with which their style can be compared: it resembles neither the didactic epic of Parmenides nor the *silloi* of Xenophanes, nor even the didactic philosophical prose style of Anaximander and Anaximenes, so far as we have been able to trace it. Heraclitus is the creator of a new philosophical style tremendously effective in its incisiveness and lapidary power of formulation.⁶ It is true that except for the opening passages we possess no extensive portions of his book, but only isolated sentences. Their terse and rounded phrasing, however, makes us suspect that it is not by accident that Heraclitus' teachings have come down to us in a surprisingly large number of sentences of this sort. Either his whole book was written in this form, or it must have been particularly rich in such utterances, so that those who made use of it later were tempted to convert this capital into small change. We are reminded of the collection of *Aphorisms* in the Hippocratic corpus; but unfortunately there is nothing original in the form of these as such. Many of them have been taken from other Hippocratic writings, where they appear in fuller contexts.⁷ Indeed, the author of the collection of *Aphorisms* may well have been impressed with earlier collections of individual sentences of this very type and accordingly was tempted to compile something similar out of Hippocrates. Perhaps it was Heraclitus himself who served as his model; the aphorism may indeed have been the form in which he wrote.⁸ One could hardly find a piece of connected writing made up entirely of mere sentences like the following: 'Character—man's demon' (B 119),⁹ 'Dry flash—wisest and best soul' (B 118), 'Way up and way down—one and the same' (B 60), 'Invisible harmony—better than visible' (B 54), 'One man—to me ten thousand, if he be the best' (B 49). The old gnomic wisdom had found its proper literary form in poetry, particularly in Hesiod's *Works and Days* and the collection of Theognis of Megara. Here again we meet long rows of apophthegms strung

opening sentence: what other men call 'waking', he insists, is so utterly devoid of any intellectual awareness of the way things actually happen that it is hardly to be distinguished from sleep. In this sharp contrast between the speaker who feels himself to be the sole bearer of the Word, and the whole body of other men,¹⁵ who fail to understand it even though everything in the world is ordered in accordance with it, we again detect the prophetic tone. To be sure, it is not the will of a god that Heraclitus is proclaiming, but rather a principle in accordance with which everything occurs. Heraclitus is the prophet of a truth of which he has intellectual cognizance, but this truth is not purely theoretical like Parmenides' revelation. Too little attention has been given the fact that while Parmenides always uses the words *νοεῖν* and *νόημα* when he wishes to designate the activity of the philosophical mind, Heraclitus favours the word *φρονεῖν*—the traditional Greek term for 'right thinking' or 'right intuition', with plain reference to man's practical conduct.¹⁶ The word is thus particularly appropriate in connexion with moral and religious cognition. In Aeschylus' prayer to Zeus in the *Agamemnon* the believer's insight into the tragic events under divine control is called *φρονεῖν*, and so is the conscious human attitude to which that insight gives rise.¹⁷ Similarly, the Delphic wisdom which calls for self-restraint in every human endeavour and instils a fear of any *ὑβρις* beyond man's province is called *φρονεῖν*. Heraclitus teaches men *φρονεῖν* in the light of his new knowledge of the universe; he also speaks of the 'words and deeds' that he intends to set forth,¹⁸ and says that men 'make trial' of these vainly because they lack insight into the true nature of things. It is evident, therefore, that his teachings are meant to influence men's practical conduct as well. This is clear also in other passages, where he describes wisdom as a speaking and acting according to the truth.¹⁹ We read elsewhere that men ought not to 'act and speak' as if they were asleep.²⁰ Heraclitus is the first thinker who not only wishes to know the truth but also holds that this knowledge will renew men's lives. In his image of the waker and the sleeper he makes quite plain what he expects his *logos* to contribute. He has no desire to be another Prometheus, teaching men new and more ingenious methods of reaching their ultimate goals; he hopes rather to make them

which is incomprehensible to men when they first hear it, but which will unite them in a common cosmos once they have come to understand it. Thus the self-emancipating thought of the philosopher, which seems at first to be simply one more example of the intellectual decadence of a society already thoroughly individualized, is for Heraclitus the bond by which these same individuals can be bound together in a new community.

It might therefore seem that the content of the *logos* is ethical and political in character; and in a certain sense this is true, as is proved by the repeated emphasis upon its being something common (*ξυνόν*),²⁷ quite apart from its connexion with the 'words and deeds' of men. We have no right to construe this unequivocally social conception in Heraclitus as a mere figurative device for expressing logical universality. Heraclitus is actually the first man to approach the problem of philosophical thought with an eye to its social function. The *logos* is not only the universal (*das Allgemeine*) but also the common (*das Gemeinsame*). But while this makes it akin to the law of the State by which all citizens are bound, it is still far more than the law of even the greatest and mightiest commonwealth, for the *logos* is that which is common to all things whatsoever (*ξυνόν παντι*).²⁸ Its organ is the mind or *νοῦς*. To speak 'with the mind' (*ξύν νῷ*) means for Heraclitus nothing else than 'with that which is common' (*ξύνῳ*).

'Those who speak with the mind', he tells us, 'cannot but strengthen themselves with that which is common to all, just as a city makes itself strong with its law [*νόμῳ*], and much more strongly than this. For all human laws are nourished by the one divine law; for this holds sway as far as it will, and suffices for all, and prevails in everything (B 114).

This is the first time that the idea of 'law' has appeared in philosophic thought; what is more, it is now regarded as the object of the highest and most universal knowledge; the term is not used in the simple political sense but has been extended to cover the very nature of reality itself.²⁹ This shift of meaning has already been foreshadowed by the designation of the world as an ordering-together or *kosmos*—a term which we have traced back to the older philosophy of nature,³⁰ and one which Heraclitus uses freely in an almost technical sense. Anaximander's

are in line with his introductory approach. Let us first hear what the ancient tradition has to say. Diogenes Laertius reports that Heraclitus' work was held together by the unifying theme of the theory of nature, from which it acquired its title. He adds, however, that it included 'considerations' (λόγοι) on three subjects—on the All, on politics, and on theology.³⁴ Though the title is naturally of later origin and there is nothing to guarantee its authenticity, we can infer from it that the groundwork of the whole was a cosmology, as Diogenes seems to intimate. But evidently either he or the writer from whom he got his information was struck by the fact that the title did not represent the contents in full. Our fragments confirm this; on the other hand, they rule out any clean-cut distribution of the cosmological, ethico-political, and theological elements into three distinct sections. When Diogenes refers to these as three *logoi*, it is either a rough way of putting a correct observation, or he merely has in mind three types of statement that can be distinguished in the philosopher's work, even though they are closely intertwined. So we really have no right to regard Heraclitus' theology as a separate part of his teachings. It must rather be thought of as forming with the cosmology an indivisible whole, even if we lay the chief emphasis on the theological side. I have elsewhere compared the relationship of these three aspects with that of three concentric spheres or rings: they are all held together by one and the same principle.³⁵ If in our discussion of this principle we begin with the cosmological side, we are quite in accord with what our fragments themselves suggest and also with the testimony of Diogenes. But while Diogenes speaks of the naturalistic or physical aspect as the thing that holds Heraclitus' work together, it is still worth mentioning that the grammarian Diodotus, who has likewise given some thought to the relationship of the physical and political elements in Heraclitus, stands for the view that in general the work does not deal with nature but rather with state and society, and that the physical element had merely a paradigmatic function. Evidently this struck Diodotus not as the main topic of the work but merely as a pattern for what he calls the 'political' factor.³⁶

Central in Heraclitus' thought is his doctrine of the unity of opposites. Here the relations between the different sides of

discovered the content of that divine law which, according to Heraclitus, is the foundation of all human laws and of the community that rests upon them.⁴² In another sentence he identifies this principle with God himself: 'God is day—night; winter—summer; war—peace; surfeit—hunger. He changes himself like fire, which, when mingled with various kinds of incense, is named from the fragrance of each' (B 67). He contrasts war with peace in an array of typical pairs of opposites from the cosmic, social, and somatic spheres; so it can hardly have the same comprehensive, symbolic meaning as in the sentence in which it is declared to be the father of all things. But this makes all the clearer what we are to understand by 'war' in the higher, symbolic sense: it is the constant interchange and struggle of opposites in the world, including even war and peace. In all these pairs there is a single something which underlies them, though it appears each time in a different guise and so receives different names among men. This one thing that keeps asserting itself in struggle and in change is what Heraclitus calls God. This God is to be found no less in night than in day, in winter than in summer, in war than in peace, in hunger than in surfeit—or, as we read in another passage, in poverty than in surfeit.⁴³ He is not to be thought of as merely the positive member of some pair of opposites with positive and negative values respectively, nor even as the common denominator of all positive members of all pairs of opposites. 'There is always one and the same herein: living and dead, the awake and the sleeping, young and old. For these by their changes are those, and those, changing back again, these' (B 88). This figure of reciprocal transformation is a device for showing how unity maintains itself in opposites which, since they follow each other in immediate temporal succession, seem distinct states to us. Heraclitus is tireless in finding new concrete images for expressing the unity of opposites. It is for this purpose that he coins the words *σύναψις*—a 'contiguity' or 'nexus', and *ἁρμονία* or 'harmony'—a fitting-together. When he speaks of 'contiguity' he is thinking of the unity as simply mechanical; 'harmony' is more dynamic. In one fragment he writes: 'Wholes and non-wholes, drawing together and drawing apart, concord and discord—these are contiguities. From all one, and from one all' (B 10). And in another fragment: 'They do not

any of the visual forms he uses for illustration. It is not without cause that he says of it: 'Invisible harmony—better than visible' (B 54). Because it is invisible it is hidden from the eye of man, even though it is actually the supreme power in accordance with which everything in the world proceeds. 'Nature likes to hide' (B 123). Heraclitus remarks elsewhere that 'In their knowledge of visible things, men are as easily fooled as Homer, though he was wiser than all the Greeks. For he was taken in by the boys who were killing lice and who told him, "The ones we have seen and caught, we leave behind; but the ones we didn't see and didn't catch, we take along" ' (B 56). Here we have a genuine riddle, symbolizing our own situation with respect to reality itself. To Heraclitus this is the greatest riddle of all. He thinks of the philosopher neither as the man who sets forth the nature of the physical world, nor as the discoverer of a new reality behind sense-appearance, but as the solver of riddles, the man who interprets the hidden meaning of all that happens in our lives and in the world as a whole:

Hier ergreift ohne Säumnis
Heilig öffentlich Geheimnis.

Hence comes the fondness of the 'dark' Heraclitus for a style which, like nature itself, does not reveal its inmost meaning at once, but often resorts to riddles; it is like the Delphic oracle, whose lord, he remarks, 'neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates' (B 93). Heraclitus also is struck with the philosophical significance in the language of the Sibyl: 'With her raving lips she utters things unlaughing, unadorned, unperfumed' (B 92). Do we not seem to hear in these words a most pregnant characterization of the philosopher's own language? This leaning towards the oracular, mystical, and enigmatic is in line with his whole prophetic bearing. 'Men contradict the *logos*, though they are dealing with it constantly; and the things which they encounter every day are strange to them' (B 72). Therefore a mediator and interpreter must appear. 'Wise it is for those who have listened not to me but to the *logos* [as I have proclaimed it] to agree that all things are one' (B 50).

Heraclitus always keeps coming back to this one point. The unity of all things is his alpha and omega. We have already observed the seriousness he attaches to his message, the high

everything would be destroyed by fire,⁴⁹ but that this theory was inferred from such sentences as: 'All things are exchanges for fire, and fire for all things, just as wares for gold and gold for wares' (B 90). This exchange, however, is always occurring in the world, as is clear from the following fragment: 'Fire's transformations: first sea; and half of sea is earth, half whirlwind' (B 31). Here the writer must be referring to the constant cycle of the elements. These fragments indicate that Heraclitus had given his theory of opposites a particularly conspicuous position even in his cosmology. While the older philosophers of nature, in line with their basic assumptions, tried to explain the emergence of the world from the one primal ground by resorting to purely physical hypotheses such as separating-out or rarefaction and condensation,⁵⁰ Heraclitus obviously is little concerned with the physical how, but is far more intent upon finding support for his fundamental notion that everything which occurs involves opposites, and that in these very opposites unity perpetually renews itself.⁵¹ Unity thus becomes the central fact; it is always fully present, even if the events themselves have all the impetuosity of a river that is no longer the same when one steps into it for the second time. 'In changing, it takes its rest' (B 84). The whole world itself is likewise subject to change, and fire is the opposite into which it transforms itself. Thus we can understand why Heraclitus is not satisfied with such formulae as 'All things have come from one', but declares: 'All is one', and 'From all one, and from one all'.⁵² The most important thing for him is that the order is always reversible.⁵³

Unlike Parmenides, Heraclitus makes no attempt to anchor unity to any rigid Being, but finds it in the incessant change itself. Thus with the same goal in view, he follows the opposite road. It has recently been suggested that this solution of the problem of unity is the more complex of the two and presupposes a knowledge of Parmenides—as if Heraclitus were frankly trying to save unity as an eternal principle without positing any immobile Being and without rejecting the apparent multiplicity of things.⁵⁴ To me this hypothesis seems improbable. To fixate unity in the Eleatic conception of the Existent was one possible course to pursue; but the way chosen by Heraclitus, which permitted unity to maintain itself even in the

himself for a single magnificent venture. Heraclitus thinks for himself as do very few others. He is no mere herald of enlightenment, despite his sharp and often cynical attacks on the popular religion.⁵⁶ Behind these is a world-view that is complete in itself and utterly his own—one that not only overturns the ideas of the past, but makes life subject to a new divine law. In Xenophanes we find no trace of this power of pervading life from a single centre and giving it form. There is, of course, one passage where he claims that he and the intellectual culture for which he stands promote the order of the state; but there he is fighting to maintain his place in society and contrasting his own wide knowledge with the athletic prowess which the Greeks of his time rated higher than intellectual achievement.⁵⁷ All this is a far cry from the rigour of the Heraclitean *φρονεῖν*. Heraclitus himself has shown us what he thinks of Xenophanes: 'Great learning does not teach insight. Otherwise it would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus' (B 40).

'Of all those whose teachings I have heard, no one has gone far enough to learn that the Wise is something apart from all things' (B 108). It is regrettable that this sentence, in which Heraclitus explains how he has outstripped all his predecessors, is not entirely clear. Just what is 'the Wise' that it should be 'apart from all things'? 'Apart from all things' can refer only to the things of the world of experience. The Wise, therefore, is something that is identical with none of them and present in none of them. It transcends them all. Man in particular is not entitled to this predicate. 'Human nature [*ἄθως*] has no insights',⁵⁸ we read elsewhere, 'but the Divine has them' (B 78). And again: 'One thing, the Wise alone, is unwilling and yet willing to be called by the name of Zeus' (B 32). Nowhere does Heraclitus make his attitude towards the popular religion clearer than he does here. On the one hand, he finds a number of customs and ideas that strike him as unworthy and shameful and stir him to merciless ridicule; on the other, he sees the religious idea of the highest God, whose name—Zeus—he regards as sacred because of the pure and lofty ideas it awakens.⁵⁹ Of course, his own idea of God is not to be equated with this anthropomorphized form of Zeus; but he feels that this name points in the same direction as that towards which his own

the supreme principle, which his conception of a single divine ruler implies. And he solves this dilemma by declaring that 'There is also law in obeying the will of one' (B 33). When God himself, in all his absolute perfection, is the ruler, then his will is actually the most salutary law for all.⁶³

had begun the process of liberating the religious consciousness from the anthropomorphism of the old beliefs. Since his time the germs of a metaphysical and religious interpretation of the new naturalistic picture of the world, already latent in the work of the Milesians, had developed more and more vigorously under the influence of the religious currents of the age. Over against the appearance of incessant coming-to-be and passing-away Parmenides had tendered his conception of a single, immovable Being, in which all the meaning of existence would be preserved; and virtually at the same time, but quite independently, Heraclitus had found in the unity of opposites the divine core at the heart of the world of Becoming.

Neither of these thinkers had either the desire or the competence to give a genuine explanation of nature after the Milesian pattern in the form of a complete cosmogony. But this side of the Ionian philosophy of nature—from which, indeed, all later natural science sprang—comes to life again in Empedocles, who takes a long stride forward in this direction. Hence it is quite natural for the later Greek philosophers after the time of Plato and Aristotle to refer to him repeatedly, and to think of him as the creator of the theory of the elements and therefore of physics itself in their sense of the word. From our point of view, however, it is more important that in Empedocles this physical type of thinking does not appear in its purest form, but is complicated by his efforts to interpret the natural facts of our existence in this world in metaphysical terms. This pronounced religious element in Empedocles, which could not help being echoed by the Neoplatonic mystics of the later ancient period, inevitably made serious difficulties for his modern expositors as long as they looked at him through the eyes of his enthusiastic admirer Lucretius¹ and thought of him chiefly as the materialist and student of nature. Even when they have not tried to eliminate the religious element as a disturbing feature alien to the real spirit of his work, they have at least cavilled at it as an inconsistency in his intellectual attitude. But the more striking the contrast between Empedocles the scientist and Empedocles the man of religion, the more remarkable a phenomenon he becomes for a history of the theology of the Greek philosophers.

On the surface the religious problem is by no means the same

of the two poems were a definite step forward in that they recognized the necessity of giving more attention to Empedocles' personality in its concern with both these worlds; for evidently this is where one must look to discover how two approaches so contrary can have been combined. Naturally this fact is of more than mere biographical significance. On the other hand, the problem of whether these two intellectual attitudes, which seem so antagonistic, can somehow have been reconciled in the philosopher's own mind is not really solved by assigning them to two successive periods in his life; the idea of temporal development merely parries the problem and serves to dull its edge. Indeed, the whole intellectual unity of Empedocles' personality has hereby been jettisoned without sufficient effort to see whether there is anything to justify thus breaking up his inner life into disconnected episodes. Perhaps the fault may lie, in part at least, in our very conception of religious experience, which modern psychology of religion often regards as including something temperamental, incalculable, and sudden. But even if this really were the nature of Empedocles' Orphic *katharsis*, can one seriously suppose that the firmly rooted physical conceptions of the poem *On Nature*, which served for so many centuries as the foundation for all scientific study of the natural world, should so soon have lost significance for their creator as to make him toss them lightly aside and abandon himself to new fervours of a radically different type? The first step towards a real understanding must be to restore the original antinomy in the problem of the juxtaposition and contraposition of Empedocles the student of nature and Empedocles the religious mystic, as Ettore Bignone has tried to do in his book on Empedocles⁴ (which is equally fascinating from the point of view of psychology and from that of intellectual history), and to reveal the unity behind this opposition.

Even in ancient times the importance of the philosopher's human personality for the understanding of his teachings was recognized, at least indirectly. There is no other pre-Socratic about whom such abundant biographical material is still available. In the ancient period Empedocles was decidedly more prominent than he is in our present-day histories of philosophy. Nowadays we are inclined to treat him as a straddler and compromiser, and, indeed, he does not seem to have the full integration

extraordinary breadth and inner tension. It shares with the imagination of the poet the plastic flexibility of response. Aristotle has expressed some doubt whether Empedocles' verse has anything but the metre in common with the epic of Homer,⁹ but we have no right to apply this rigid yardstick of perfection to his poems if we wish to treat them fairly.¹⁰ Only a true poetical genius could embrace the astonishing contrasts that appear in the thought of Empedocles, and only a born poet could possess an imagination ardent enough and versatile enough to entertain truths of such different orders, preserving each of them in all its absoluteness despite their basic incompatibility. In the poem *On Nature* every detail seems to be fitted into the frame of a single structure with the logical consistency of the true philosopher. But as soon as the first lines of the *Katharmoi* strike our ear, we find ourselves in a realm where a completely different, mystico-theological style and type of thought prevail. Neither of these two forms of thought seems to weaken the other in any way or to encroach upon its domain, and each of the two realms embraces the whole of reality in its own manner. The one thing they have in common is the fact that they are both poetical reality and take the form of poetry, which means for the Greeks that they appear in the form of myth.

From the very beginning we have stressed the fact that there is no unbridgeable gulf between early Greek poetry and the rational sphere of philosophy.¹¹ The rationalization of reality began even in the mythical world of Homer and Hesiod, and there is still a germ of productive mythopoeic power in the Milesians' fundamentally rational explanation of nature. In Empedocles this power is by no means diminished by the increasingly complex apparatus of his rational thought, but seems to increase proportionally, as if striving to counteract the force of rationalism and redress the balance. It is also the source of that inner compulsion which leads him to put his thoughts in poetical form and take Hesiod and Parmenides as his models. Empedocles' philosophy of nature is presented as a genuine theogony; and the mythical imagination of the philosopher-poet draws new vitality from the rich, sensuous content of the physical forces out of which he constructs his cosmos. The Greek consciousness requires no rational proof

And may not the flowers of glory and honour
 Given by mortals induce you to gather them
 At the price of making so bold as to utter far more
 Than is holy, and throning yourself on wisdom's peak.

We must be careful not to interpret as a mere poetic metaphor this expression of the piety that keeps him from following the path of his all-too-confident predecessor. It comes rather from the man's own innermost nature, which impels him to devote himself with understanding and reverence to the world about him and the interplay of its forces. Every word is a protest against that adamant logical consistency which would draw this foundation from under his feet; and so he begins with an admonition comparable to that with which Goethe counter-balances his own idealistic conviction that for man the centre lies within himself:²²

Den Sinnen hast du dann zu trauen,
 Kein Falsches lassen sie dich schauen,
 Wenn dein Verstand dich wach erhält.

It is true, of course, that in Empedocles' poem *On Nature* we find no contrast of the experience of the senses with the inwardness of man's moral world such as provides the point of departure for Goethe's admonition. When Empedocles urges us to trust our senses,²³ he does so merely to repudiate the distrust with which Parmenides regards them.²⁴ Nevertheless, the complexity of Goethe's feelings in contemplating the world with concern for both the inner and the outer is already present in Empedocles. He is well aware of the moral reality of man's inner daemon, as he reveals in his song of expiation. He might easily have combined this belief with the Eleatic denial of the sense-world. But the same inner sensitivity and readiness which enable him to experience all the anguish and turmoil of his inner soul as a world in itself and to recognize it as such, compel Empedocles to resign himself willingly to his senses and the impressions derived from them, and give them their just due. But each of them is to be trusted only so far as it makes clear assertions about its own specific field;²⁵ so in Empedocles, as in Goethe, the senses are subject to the examining check of the understanding. On the other hand, to be 'kept awake by the understanding' in this manner is something quite different from Parmenides' *elenchos*, which is for the *logos* alone to decide.²⁶

makes them the immutable substratum of all coming-to-be and passing-away as the only true Existents in the process of nature, and concludes first—as against the Milesians—that there is not one primal stuff but several, and second—as against Parmenides—that Being is not monistic but a plurality. In this way multiplicity and movement, which had been declared as unreal by the Eleatic school, have been saved; the world as a whole becomes a vast process in which the intermingling of a certain number of primal stuffs gives way in turn to the dissolution of the mixture thus achieved. Empedocles limits the number of these stuffs to four, corresponding to the primary opposites—wet, dry, cold, and warm—which he has doubtless met as basic categories in the physics of his predecessors. He maintains that each of the substances these men have put forward as basic—water, fire, air, and earth—represents in truth one and one only of the four primary opposing qualities; and he accordingly identifies the four primary qualities with the four substances respectively.³¹ In this peculiar theory of the elements the enduring truth of the older natural philosophy is ingeniously crossed with Parmenides' logic of Being. A number of verses directed against the older physical conception that 'something existent can come from something non-existent'³² betray Parmenides' influence in their dialectical sharpness. Even his words are echoed in the following sentence:³³

For in no way can anything come into being from that
Which is not; and for that which is, to become destroyed
Is impossible, not to be heard of . . .

Empedocles refers to the four principles or roots of all things as gods, and names them Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis.³⁴ This allegorical personification brings out very clearly the qualitative character of his pluralism as opposed to Democritus' purely quantitative theory of atoms. Empedocles' elemental principles are imbued with the very life-breath and essence of divine powers. The theogonical has here invaded the rational; but in this process the Hesiodic genealogical approach is now reduced to the construction of physical principles.³⁵ Only in the way the four primal beings are paired as Zeus and Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis, does it still operate as before.

But in those things which Empedocles calls ever-existent and

manifold forms—trees, men and women, wild beasts, birds and fishes, and the long-lived gods.⁴⁷

The cosmology of Empedocles shares with its predecessors, the cosmologies of Anaximander or Heraclitus, a feature characteristic of all Greek cosmological thought: the interpretation of natural processes by means of analogies taken from man's political and social life. In Anaximander it was the concept of a *diké* or *tisis* ruling the process of coming-to-be and passing-away which made the *physis* a true *cosmos* (i.e. a legal order). Heraclitus took over this conception; but he varied and expanded its application to nature by proclaiming a 'law' (*nomos*) of the universe corresponding but superior to all human law. In Empedocles we discover similar forms of interpretation of physical phenomena. When he places much emphasis on the fact that the primordial gods of his cosmogony are all equal (*ἴσα*) and of the same age (*ἥλικα γένναν*), though their honour (*τιμή* = *γέρας*, 'function') and character (*ἦθος*) differ individually, he is obviously attacking the tradition of the earlier Greek theogonies, most of all that of Hesiod. Hesiod had taught that when the oldest gods began to emerge from the yawning Chaos, Earth and Eros appeared first. Plato quotes this passage in his *Symposium* in the speech which Phaedrus makes on the nature of Eros, in order to prove that Eros was the oldest of all gods (*πρεσβύτατος*). In the religious and political language of the Greeks that meant that he was also the most honoured (*τιμιώτατος*). The words for 'old' and 'honoured' were used as synonymous throughout the history of Greek thought. The attempt to break up this divine hierarchy of age and honour is condemned as revolutionary in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, in which the Furies complain of being denied by the younger deities the honour due to gods of the older generation.

Thus when Empedocles proclaims that all his gods are 'equal and of the same age' he is not speaking of the equal quantity of his four elements existing in the universe, as has been assumed by some who try to understand the Greek philosophy of nature in terms of modern physics or chemistry. His words should not be referred to the four elements alone, as in Diels's translation of the fragment; they seem also to include Love and Strife.⁴⁸ The plea for the equality of the gods refers not only to the monistic cosmogonies of Thales, Anaximenes, or

The *Sphairos* is so called because of its spherical shape.⁵⁰ This concept is a conscious reminiscence of the Being of Parmenides, which was described as 'like to the volume of a well-rounded sphere'.⁵¹ In this form the four elements are held fast by 'Harmony', who prevents their distinctive features from appearing, just as Parmenides' Diké holds Being chained in her bonds and keeps it far remote from coming-to-be and passing-away.⁵² Empedocles also gives us a description of the *Sphairos* as 'equal on all sides', which is likewise appropriate to Parmenides' Being;⁵³ on the other hand, his emphasis on its infinitude is clearly a polemic against the finite Being of Parmenides.⁵⁴ Only the delight of the *Sphairos* in his solitude is out of keeping with this conception of the god—for that is what he is to Empedocles.⁵⁵ The word *μονή*,⁵⁶ which Diels would translate as 'solitude', must rather mean 'rest' or 'repose'. We find such an interpretation as early as Eudemus, who understood this line as indicating immobility;⁵⁷ nothing but the word *μονή* could have suggested such an idea. This derivation from *μένω*, 'to remain'—rather than from *μόνος*, 'alone'—seems to be further confirmed by a papyrus containing a new elegy by Tyrtaeus, where the word is used for the soldierly virtue of sticking to one's post.⁵⁸ Thus in the cycle of the Empedoclean universe the *Sphairos* assumes both the function of Xenophanes' God, who 'remains at rest in the selfsame place', and that of the Parmenidean *ὄν*.⁵⁹ But while the four primal elements or 'roots', despite their mixture and separation, remain really 'unmoved' in that they each persevere in themselves forever,⁶⁰ the repose of the *Sphairos* is confined to a specific phase of the cosmic process. In this way Empedocles retains the Eleatic Being as one stage in the cycle: it is the stage when the divine Love which keeps the world going has realized its dominion and become fully achieved.⁶¹ In the description of the blessed god *Sphairos*, the philosopher again follows Xenophanes' example and protests against anthropomorphic representation:⁶²

... For no pair of branches shoots up from his back;
No feet, no swift-moving knees, no engendering parts.
But he was a sphere, and everywhere like to himself.

... But when mighty Strife had grown great in his limbs
And had risen to honours, then, when that time should come round

several ages through which the world has passed is here revived: in the light of the doctrine of perpetual recurrence, Hesiod's conviction that he lives in the decadent Iron Age now becomes in Empedocles the belief that his own human existence is wedged in between a Golden Age of the past, when Love prevailed, and a brighter future when that Age shall come again, only to be vanquished by the reign of Hate.

This is what we must bear in mind if we are to understand why the Orphic beliefs are significant for Empedocles. His view of nature is by no means purely physical. It contains an element of eschatology such as always accompanies the idea of a paradise lost or divine primal state. It has already been correctly observed that the theory of the four elements, as it is generally called, is presupposed in the *Katharmoi* as well.⁶⁷ This is true also of the two powers, Love and Hate, which alternately rule the world.⁶⁸ In the religious poem, of course, the impassioned tone of proclamation does not spring from the discovery of these forces as such, as it does in the hymns on nature.⁶⁹ But their activity is fundamental even for this Orphic drama of the soul's destiny.

O friends of mine, who dwell in the mighty town
That slopes from the yellow Akragas up to the heights
Of the citadel, you who are busied with excellent works,
A haven to strangers, duly aware of their rights
And unwitting of evil, hail!
But I—I now walk among you, a god free from death,
No longer a mortal, and honoured by all, as you see,
With garlands and fillets and flowery crowns. When I come
Into flourishing towns with these people, both women and men,
I am revered as a god. And in myriad throngs
They pursue me, inquiring the path to their gain; and while some
Are hungry for oracles, others beg but to hear
In their manifold illnesses, too long pierced with distress,
A word that will bring them health . . .

In these words of his proem the philosopher presents himself⁷⁰ to his fellow-countrymen as a religious teacher and medical man surrounded by a crowd of faithful votaries seeking his aid; We have definite accounts of his achievements as physician;⁷¹ and the later histories of Sicily testify to his influence with the populace, telling how he overthrew the tyranny in Akragas as

the demon—when it becomes exiled from its divine home to this world of the corporeal and the corruptible:⁷⁸

There is a decree of Necessity, long since ordained
By the gods, eternal, and sealed with extensive oaths,
That whenever a demon who draws a long life for his lot
Shall sinfully soil his hands with murderous blood
Or forswear himself [in the service of Strife], he thrice
Must stray from the homes of the blest for a myriad years
And be born in time in all manner of mortal forms,
Changing the arduous paths of life. For the Air
By its might drives him into the Sea, and the Sea in turn
Spews him forth to the floor of the Earth; Earth tosses him up
To the rays of the glittering Sun; Sun pitches him back
Into the eddies of Air. One passes him on to another,
And all despise him. Now I am, too, one of these,
An exile from God and a roamer, putting my trust
In furious Strife . . .

We possess no other fragment of the *Katharmoi* revealing so clearly in what dimension of reality the mystical events described in the poem occur. That the soul here appears as a demon is more than mere poetical colouring. The Orphic conception is closely connected with Hesiod's old Greek belief that the spirits of the dead continue their existence as bands of demons roving unseen through the world.⁷⁹ In the Orphic myth of the soul this conception is bound up with the idea of the soul's pre-existence and transmigration through various mortal forms. The demon becomes involved in the same universal cycle which we have met in the philosophy of nature. He, too, undergoes a cosmic sequence comparable to that of the elements: from the Divine he sets forth on his wanderings through manifold forms, and to the Divine he returns. This theory has a twofold basis: first, a mystical certainty of the soul's essential kinship with the Divine; secondly, a consciousness that through some great transgression it is weighed down and kept far removed from its divine origin. All the other factors—the cycle, the purification, the return—follow from these assumptions. Empedocles sees in pollution of the hands with murderous blood the primal sin that has led to the demon's exile from the divine realm; hence his vigorous admonitions against the eating of animal flesh and his prohibition of blood-sacrifice.⁸⁰

regarded as a mere transient, non-essential wrapping—a conception just as strange to the Greek of Homer's time as it is to the Ionian philosopher, his intellectual kin. The soul puts its bodies on and off as a man changes his shirt. Empedocles envisages the soul as having to choose between bodies of many sorts, and he reflects upon the advantages of the various habitations it may consider:⁸⁵

... The best of all beasts [that souls may become]
Are lions that couch on the hills and rest on the ground;
And best of all fair-tressed trees are the laurels . . .

All this is no dispassionate dogmatic theory expounded with suitable detachment, but is described by Empedocles as his own personal fate. Statements in the I- and we-forms are common in the fragments of the *Katharmoi*. Among those fallen spirits tossed back and forth by the elements and then expelled again he includes himself:⁸⁶

... And I, too, am now one of these,
An exile from God and a roamer . . .

Earthly life loses all value to anyone who sees in it merely the rootless and unstable existence of the refugee driven from home. In the depth of passion with which Empedocles describes the fate of the soul flung hither and yon, the 'arduous paths of life', and the length of those endless periods for which 'it must wander far from the homes of the blest',⁸⁷ we see that the world of these conceptions, bizarre as it sometimes appears, has its source in profound human suffering. How much difference there is between the way a natural philosopher like Anaximander approaches reality when he depicts the emergence of living creatures out of a primordial principle objectively conceived, and the attitude of the man who shudders within as he tells us:⁸⁸

I have already been a boy and a girl, and a bush,
And a bird, and a dumb fish out of the sea . . .

Empedocles speaks of all these various forms of life with the loving inflexion of one who has felt their existence from within, and to whom none of these is any more remote than he is remote from himself. The universal animization taught by the Orphics⁸⁹ here includes something all-embracing, something that understands all things and is akin to all things. We discern

place (*ἀσυνήθεια χῶρον*) into a dark cavern; for there is undoubtedly a reference to the terrestrial world in the words 'We arrived in this roofed-in cave',⁹² which have come down to us torn from their context. We have strong evidence elsewhere that the conception of the world as a cave is Orphic. It is interesting that here, too, just as in the great fragment where the soul-demon is tossed back and forth by the elements,⁹³ the poet sees himself as one among many such spirits, and his own downward journey as one that all of them have made. His sense of solidarity with those who share this common lot is clearly expressed in his use of the first person plural.

The image of the 'joyless place' is also found in another fragment,⁹⁴ which describes it in greater detail. We learn from this that in the *Katharmoi* no less than in the poem *On Nature* Empedocles is a great mythologist, who understands how to give shape and body to the forces of his religious world. Following the allegorical style of the epic theogonies, he makes the demons of disaster here appear as a multitude of Hesiodic or Epimenidean gods peopling

... that joyless place

Where Murder and Rancour and hordes of calamitous sprites,
And parching Ills and Putrescence and Floods, rove here
And there in the darkness, over the meadow of Bane.

As soon as the soul arrives here below, it encounters these spirits, who receive it like those formidable demons who greet Aeneas at the gates of the lower world.⁹⁵ Empedocles, too, must have depicted the soul's descent into the terrestrial cave as a sort of journey to Hades. Whether he had any model for this besides the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey*, we cannot say; but it is tempting to think of Orpheus' journey to Hades in this connexion.⁹⁶ A *katabasis* of Orpheus would fit the Orphic religion very well; and, what is more, such a legend undoubtedly existed. If Empedocles was already familiar with this, its description of the underworld must have seemed particularly rich in allegorical figures as compared with the Homeric version, and in this respect it could very easily have stimulated his fancy.

Nevertheless, his description of the soul-demon's downward journey into the dark cave of the world is decidedly different from a mere journey to Hades, and is of far deeper import and inner reality. The peopling of this world with the hordes of

... there was no god War, no Battle-din,
 No kingly Zeus, no Kronos, nor any Poseidon,
 But Love alone was queen ...

When the further details of this picture are filled in, we can see what decisive significance Empedocles attaches to the problem of pure, bloodless sacrifice as the one true way of honouring the gods. In the right kind of devotion, indeed, he sees the chief yardstick by which the attainments of human culture are to be measured. The *Katharmoi* has much to say about sacrifice and other aspects of the cult, all which material is closely connected with the fundamental idea of the poem—the realization of the dominion of divine Love. The men of the Golden Age, he goes on,¹⁰¹

Sought to please her with reverent gifts, with paintings of beasts,
 With daintily fragrant salves, and oblations of myrrh
 Unmixed, and sweet-smelling frankincense; they poured
 Libations from golden-brown honeycombs over the ground.
 And yet with the pure blood of bulls no altar was wet;
 But to tear out the life and eat of the goodly limbs
 Was considered man's greatest defilement. ...

Then all creatures were tame and kindly disposed
 To mankind, the beasts and the birds alike; and the flame
 Of good-fellowship glowed.¹⁰²

... And among them there lived
 A man of rare knowledge, possessing the utmost riches of mind,
 And master of every sort of ingenious skill;
 For whenever he put all his wits to the stretch, he could look
 With ease upon everything that exists, having lived
 Ten and twenty lifetimes of men.¹⁰³

These lines have often been supposed to refer to Pythagoras. Such a presumption was especially congenial to the Neoplatonists, who revered Pythagoras as the divine founder of their religion and were always on the watch for ancient accounts of his personality. But despite the authority of Iamblichus, who presumably took this interpretation of the passage as one already accepted, we can hardly consider the reference to Pythagoras well established. On the other hand, the question of how Empedocles' ascetic doctrine is connected with that of the Pythagoreans is not to be evaded. Even in ancient times

Let us conclude by recapitulating Empedocles' theological position. On one side stands his philosophy of nature with its new vision of the cosmic cycle and the powers that there hold sway. Empedocles feels that he has revealed the true character of the divine powers active in nature, as we have shown. He is no more interested in giving a genuine proof of God's existence than any of his predecessors have been, for to all of them the presence of the Divine in the world is an immediate and absolute certainty. The problem of God for Empedocles is simply the problem of the divine form. And this is the angle from which he approaches it as a student of nature. What he finds in nature is no single form but a manifold revelation of the Divine, such as the Greek mind has found there all along. Empedocles discovers the Divine in three aspects of nature: first, in the imperishable primary forms of corporeal existence; second, in the forces of Love and Hate by which the corporeal world is moved, though their innermost nature can be grasped only with the eye of the spirit; third, in that all-embracing state of the world which arises when goodness and perfection reach their consummation in the cycle of these cosmic forces. Empedocles' ontological pluralism thus becomes in his theology a philosophical polytheism. The gods are here transformed into universal principles of natural existence and natural processes; to put it more correctly, they are like what Heraclitus calls 'the wise-alone'—'which is both willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus'—standing somewhere in the no-man's-land between individual personal beings that can be called by name and pure universal potencies. This shows that they still belong to the stage of allegorical theogony.¹⁰⁸ But the idea of unity, which we have met in Xenophanes and the Eleatics, has not failed to leave its mark on Empedocles. In the form of the *Sphairos* it asserts its claims as against the polytheism of the four gods of the elements; and this highest God is essentially akin to the single world-controlling intellectual God of Xenophanes, except in the fact that it never remains fully realized in the world. But the unrestricted dominion of the *Sphairos* shall return. Thus the theology of Empedocles' philosophy of nature is a synthesis of the monism of Xenophanes and the Eleatics with a polytheism that draws the consequences from his own physical pluralism. On the other side, in the

CHAPTER IX

THE TELEOLOGICAL THINKERS: ANAXAGORAS AND DIOGENES

NOT all the men who carry on the Milesian tradition come from regions outside Ionia ; several come from Ionia itself, though not from Miletus. By far the most important of these is Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. He is more closely akin to the original spirit of the philosophy of nature than Empedocles ; he has preserved its rational character in a purer form and has not contaminated it with alien elements drawn from religion. Anaxagoras is the pure scholar ; there is nothing of the fiery soul of the poet and prophet in his more limited nature. Empedocles is said to have ended his life by leaping into the crater of Mount Etna ; one can hardly imagine any such legend growing up about Anaxagoras. But in its very limitations his mind is more unified and consistent, and reaches full flower in his theoretical explanations of natural phenomena. Empedocles was constantly involved in the religious and political public life of his native Sicilian town. Anaxagoras spent his critical decades as a resident alien in Athens, far from his home in Asia Minor. There is even an anecdote which presents him as one of the first cosmopolitans.¹ On being reproached with neglecting his duties to his country and fellow-citizens he is reputed to have said, 'Watch your tongue, for I care very much for my country', pointing up to the sky. At the time of Euripides there is no reason why such an incident should not actually have occurred. Of course, this cannot mean that Anaxagoras was trying to say that the abode of the soul is in God, as Empedocles might have done.² Any such religious sense of being a stranger in this world is utterly remote from his sober turn of mind. When the man who holds the sun to be a mere glowing stone feels more at home in the heavens than in his own normal earthly surroundings, it is because he has found the real content of his life and all his satisfaction in dealing constantly with nature, particularly with the heavenly phenomena.

It is not easy to form an idea of Anaxagoras' views on nature in general ; for the remaining fragments of his prose work, which at the time of his Athenian sojourn was an inexpensive

other contemporary philosophers like Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia. But Empedocles' teachings are repudiated by some of the medical writers on the ground that in his effort to make medicine a genuine science he has introduced certain general theories more appropriate to natural philosophy; the situation with regard to Empedocles is just the reverse of that which we find in Anaxagoras.¹⁰ What the two men have in common is the fact that they both make their doctrines of basic elements and qualities the connecting link between medicine and the explanation of nature. In contrast to the quantitative atomism of Democritus, they hold that the ultimate underlying basis of nature consists in a number of qualities that cannot be traced back to anything simpler. Anaxagoras and Empedocles are both more decidedly oriented toward the organic world than are their predecessors. Now that Parmenides has shown the impossibility of an absolute coming-to-be and passing-away,¹¹ they both seek another means of explaining the phenomena hitherto designated by these words, by resorting to the idea of mixing and unmixing.¹² This conception is one that played a role in medicine even before their time. We find it first in the important physician Alcmaeon of Crotona,¹³ who was earlier than either of them; and our chief source for the history of this notion in later years is still found in the medical literature. From here it was taken over by philosophy.¹⁴ And there, if anywhere, we can grasp the significance of medical experience for the new philosophical study of nature.

Now that our attention has been called to the profound and fruitful unity of the investigations of natural philosophy and medicine during the fifth century, it is perhaps not out of place to raise the question of how far the theological inquiries of the natural philosophers have reverberated in the medical literature. The medical students of the Coan school whose own contributions have come down to us under the name of Hippocrates, were thoroughly familiar with the work of the natural philosophers.¹⁵ Even their practical thinking was affected, particularly in matters where the empiricism of the new medicine, based as it was on pure observation without any preconceived assumptions, had to come to terms with old religious conceptions such as that of the 'sacred disease', as epilepsy was then called. The author of the Hippocratic treatise *On the*

the concept of nature, and they also show the effects of this idea on the realm of religious faith and practical activity.

Let us now return to Anaxagoras and examine his theory of the elements, with which his theological views are closely connected. It is at this point, as we have remarked, that medical studies become of immediate significance for his philosophy; for it is from them that he borrows the concept of mixture, to supplant the older conception of becoming.²¹ For Anaxagoras there is no absolute coming-to-be or passing-away of things, but only mixture or separation of the stuffs which underlie natural changes. He assumes that in the beginning all things were together, infinite in number and infinitely small. As long as this state of affairs prevailed, none of these things could be clearly distinguished because of their tiny size. We must imagine that in this state everything was held down by vapour and ether, for these two are both infinite, and they predominate in the total mass both in size and in number.²² Anaxagoras now assumes that vapour and ether have separated themselves from the surrounding mass, and that in general the process by which the world originates is one of separating-out, which the rapid motion of the primal mass has occasioned. It is through this process that the things of our world arise.²³ These, like the primal mass itself, contain all stuffs and properties, though in such a way that in each of them certain stuffs and properties preponderate and impress their stamp on the object as a whole.²⁴ In saying this, the philosopher is attacking the view of Empedocles that there are only a certain few sharply distinguished basic qualities and stuffs underlying the whole of nature. Anaxagoras starts with the observation that the food we take into the body contains the germs of growth for all the stuffs and qualities it requires: no hair, he maintains, can come from that which is not hair, no flesh from that which is not flesh; on the contrary, hair and flesh must be contained in the bread we eat, and so must bones, sinews, veins, sperm, and so on.²⁵ In this way he arrives at the notion that everything consists of an infinite number of tiny portions of an infinite number of stuffs differing qualitatively among themselves, though bound together in various things by the most various types of mixture. And all these countless qualitative differences must have been contained in the primal mass at the outset.

something else, it would have a share in *all* things if it were mixed with *any*. For in everything there is a portion of everything, as I have said above; and if any other things were mixed with it, they would prevent it from controlling anything as it now does when it is alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest; and it has every kind of knowledge about everything, and the utmost strength. And Mind controls all things that have soul, both greater and smaller. And it was Mind, too, that controlled the whole whirling movement and made it possible for it to whirl at all. At first this whirling arose from a small beginning, but it is now whirling farther and will whirl farther still. And Mind knew all the things that were then being mixed and separated off and parted from one another. And Mind arranged all such things as were to be and were (that is, the things which now are not), and such as are at present; and it arranged this whirling, too, which the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the ether—as they separate off—perform. But it was this whirling itself that caused their separating-out. And the thick separates itself from the thin, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And many parts of many things exist. But no thing is altogether separated off or distinguished from anything else except Mind. And all Mind is alike, both the greater and the smaller. But nothing else is like anything else; on the contrary, each individual thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it contains the most.'

It has recently been pointed out that the verbal form of Anaxagoras' statements about *Nous* betrays a peculiar resemblance to the style of the hymn, of which it is evidently a conscious imitation.³⁵ We have already shown that Anaximander probably used a similar form in his own writings when he spoke of the *apeiron* as the Divine—that which guides all things and holds all things together.³⁶ Indeed, Anaxagoras is here following an established stylistic tradition which can be shown to have been followed by almost all the pre-Socratic philosophers with more or less individual variation.³⁷ This fact is particularly important in the case of Anaxagoras; for in none of the surviving fragments is there any direct evidence that he ever referred to Mind as the Divine. That this must, however, have been his doctrine appears now to be a certainty both from the hymn-like form in which the predicates of *Nous* are expressed, and even from the content of these statements. The epithets 'infinite', 'self-ruling', 'unmixed', and 'itself by itself'

original mixture gives rise. In the main this conception is a purely physical one. It has been compared with the divine causality which some modern astronomers felt they needed for setting the original mechanism of their cosmology in motion.⁴⁵ But Anaxagoras' theory includes a second motif besides that of physical kinetics: his *Nous* is that all-guiding knowledge which ever since the beginning has comprehended each and every individual process of mixture, separating-out and particularization in the world's development, in the past no less than in the present and future. *Nous* has anticipated the motions and revolutions of the stars and meteorological bodies like air and ether in their present form, and has ordered everything from the first according to a definite plan (*διεκόσμησε*).⁴⁶

The idea of this preconceived world-plan is quite worthy of the rational physics of the fifth century; it is peculiarly fitting in a period that ascribes decided significance to *τέχνη* in all realms of being and even finds it present in nature itself.⁴⁷ The mechanism of the creative vortical motion is the ingenious device by which Anaxagoras, like other of his contemporaries, tried to explain the formation of the world. The fact that he made the divine Mind guide the vortex in a specific direction gave his physics its new teleological aspect. This is what caught Plato's attention and gave Aristotle occasion for the celebrated remark that among the earlier thinkers Anaxagoras, with his theory of the world-creative Mind, seemed like a sober man among the drunk, even if he made no detailed use of this teleological type of observation in his physics, but employed *Nous* only in his cosmogony and in certain instances where he was at a loss for a mechanical explanation and had to fall back on it, if only as a *deus ex machina*.⁴⁸ Probably Anaxagoras would not have considered this a very serious objection. Certainly he must have felt that he had assured the rationality of his world-plan when he envisaged a mechanical process as automatic as possible, whether pre-established as a whole in all its phases within the divine Mind or merely anticipated by it.

The conception of the Mind as unmixed, which is so important in Anaxagoras' doctrine of the divine world-principle, also enables him to ascertain the place of mankind and even philosophy itself in the system of the world as a whole. All Mind is like unto itself, declares Anaxagoras, whether larger or smaller.⁴⁹

actually reached in fifth-century physics, for our tradition reveals a number of strictly teleological explanations of natural phenomena that apparently go back to a source from this period. The research of the last decades has shown with increasing certainty that the author of this system was Diogenes of Apollonia. Although he was rather second-rate as a natural philosopher, he gave us no small insight into the way in which the development of the Ionian natural science was affected by the interweaving influences of the times—influences peculiarly mingled in Diogenes himself.

Diogenes evidently lived for a long time in Athens, where the comic poets capitalized on his theories.⁵³ Like Anaxagoras, he was primarily a student of nature with an eye for specific facts. But these leanings were accompanied by a powerful drive for speculating about the world in general, not omitting theology.⁵⁴ In his doctrine of the first principle he turned away from Empedocles and Anaxagoras and back to Anaximenes of Miletus. While all the profounder minds of his time assumed a multiplicity of principles, he returned to the theory of a single primal substance, of which all other things are merely modifications. According to his view, even if it may appear that there are certain simple stuffs in nature, like water, fire, air, and so on, it would be impossible for these to combine with one another or to affect one another if they were not fundamentally one and the same.⁵⁵ Diogenes finds the real basic principle in the air,⁵⁶ which takes on the most various forms. In order to produce these modifications, nature requires a certain measure which it must keep. Summer and winter, night and day, rain, wind, and sunshine all depend on this measure. 'And as for the rest, one will find, if one is willing to reflect upon it, that it has all been arranged as well as possible.'⁵⁷ The purposeful arrangement which Diogenes, like Anaxagoras, finds in the world, compels him to assume that the distribution of forces and effects is a work of the thinking Mind.⁵⁸ He sees evidence for believing that air is the primal stuff, for he considers that it is not only the vital element which all things breathe, but also something which soul and mental power depend on so intimately that they vanish as soon as the breath leaves the body.

'And it seems to me that that which has the power of knowing

opposition between matter and Mind. Though he needed the Mind primarily as a cause of motion, he still conceived of it as something material, endowed with the power of thought. Hence it was easy for Diogenes to obliterate the distinction between Mind and matter once again, without abandoning Mind as a teleological principle of order.

Apparently Diogenes was the first to try to demonstrate the sway of a purposeful divine thought in nature by interpreting particular phenomena from this point of view—the method that was to play so important a role in the Stoic theology later on. Presumably it was by way of Xenophon that Diogenes' ideas reached the Stoa; for in more than one passage of the *Memorabilia* Xenophon attributes to Socrates certain theological speculations which evidently come from this source.⁶⁸ It may be true that Socrates and his companions had actually discussed some piece of writing like that of Diogenes. At any rate, Plato makes Socrates report in the *Phaedo* that he has examined the work of Anaxagoras with great eagerness to find out what he has to say about Mind as the cause of natural processes, and has found him disappointing.⁶⁹ We may assume that in all probability Socrates was interested in Diogenes, too, for the same reasons, and paid even more attention to him. Xenophon himself does not mention Diogenes by name. He makes Socrates converse with a young friend notorious for his indifference to the cult of the gods, and try to refute his deistic attitude—for while the young man believes in the gods' existence, he refuses to admit that they feel any concern for mankind.⁷⁰ Socrates accordingly maintains that the nature of man himself, both bodily and mental, reveals the providing care of a higher wisdom.⁷¹ The arguments that Socrates brings forward are undoubtedly not his own. We might easily have assumed that they were, in view of his partiality for teleological explanations of nature (so well attested by Plato), if we did not find the same and similar explanations in the zoological works of Aristotle. Aristotle certainly did not take them from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, but must have resorted to someone among the philosophers of nature who would count as particularly authoritative in such observations.⁷² We also find many similar traces in Attic comedy and in the tragedies of Euripides.⁷³

All this contemporary evidence suggests that at the time of

also had to try to demonstrate the presence of this same purposefulness in the course of nature as a whole and in the evident disposition of heavenly bodies according to some plan.⁷⁸ In fact we find this view clearly expressed (cf. p. 165) in a fragment that has come down to us under Diogenes' name.⁷⁹ But even in Xenophon, who has occasion to speak of this problem in several passages of the *Memorabilia*, it seems to be closely connected with the proof of the purposefulness with which human nature is arranged.⁸⁰ The earlier thinkers had raised the problem of the form (*μορφή*) of the Divine, on the frank assumption that while the existence of the Divine was a fact and needed no demonstration, its nature and form could not help being entirely different from the representations of the folk-religion.⁸¹ The line of thought struck out by Diogenes, however, begins with the 'works' (*ἔργα*) of the Divine. To determine the form of the gods is hard, Socrates explains in the fourth book of the *Memorabilia*; but their works lead us to a knowledge of their power, by which the All is imperceptibly ruled and preserved.⁸² In this way the whole point of the theological discussion is fundamentally shifted: the problem of the form of the Divine lapses into the background as insoluble, and the existence of the Divine as such becomes the real matter to be proved. The Divine can be known only indirectly, for it remains hidden behind its works, just as the soul guides the man without ever becoming visible to our sight.⁸³ The relation between soul and body corresponds exactly to that between God and the world; this analogy follows inevitably from Diogenes' identification of his principle—the air—with soul and Mind and the animization of the All.⁸⁴ That Xenophon's analogy between the invisible deity and the soul itself actually comes from Diogenes is rendered even more probable by the recurrence of the conception in that portion of the first book of the *Memorabilia* to which we have already referred—the section where we find the characteristic comparisons of the human organism with various technical implements.⁸⁵

The comparison of God and soul in this passage is connected with a kind of argument which makes particularly clear how much the inner point of departure of Diogenes' theology has come to differ from that of the earlier thinkers. They had approached nature with the exuberant consciousness that 'all

testimony of Theophrastus, who tells us, in the course of expounding Diogenes' theory of perception, that according to the views of this philosopher 'the inner air within is what does our perceiving, inasmuch as it is a tiny portion of the divinity'.⁹¹

Thus Anaxagoras and Diogenes added a new teleological form of argument to the earlier stages of natural theology. By this time the 'primal ground' presupposed in the Milesian physics has come to be conceived less dogmatically and tends more and more to become a mere abstract matter or stuff. As this process continues, it becomes increasingly paradoxical that this blind mass of matter should yet prove to be of service in so many works of nature artfully arranged and purposefully fashioned forth. All the greater, therefore, is the need for an additional, second force as a conscious creator of the world-order analogous to the human mind, regardless of whether it is to be distinguished sharply from the rest of the corporeal world as 'the purest and thinnest body', as in Anaxagoras, or thought of as immanent in the material basic principle itself and identified with it, as in Diogenes. In both cases it is by our experience of the world-order as a constructive and purposeful organization that we are able to grasp the nature of that divine intelligence which stands behind this world-order or is effective within it; and this new experience of the cosmos would be unthinkable if it were not for that peculiarly developed feeling for all kinds of mechanical and technical purposefulness which we find in the new era—a feeling that springs from the heightened technical knowledge and skills of the period. The rational purposefulness which underlies both man's activities and even his very existence has here attained its highest peak of development, particularly in works of art; and in this process it calls man's attention to the rationality of nature as well, and thereby shows him how he can, purely by sober interpretation of the reason that there prevails, and quite apart from any mythical apotheosis of natural forces, approach the secret of that power by which all nature is led: *ὅψις τῶν ἀδύλων τὰ φαινόμενα* (Anaxagoras).

divine persons of the cult-religion by the epithet 'God' are now collected and transferred to that primal ground which philosophical thought regards as involving the essence of supreme power over all existence, and therefore alone worthy to possess this predicate (for the Greeks always thought of the word 'God' as predicative). If we ask upon what this new evaluation is based, we find that the real motive for so radical a change in the form of the godhead lies in the idea of the All (*ὅλον, πᾶν*). The philosophers are continually speaking of the Divine as all-encompassing, all-governing, and so forth, on the assumption that its claim to the name of God is thereby directly established.² In the face of such thinking as this, nothing finite and limited has any right to the title of divinity. Accordingly, we find an unremitting intellectual struggle to grasp the nature of this All-divine. The course of its development leads all the way from the simple Boundless of the earliest hylozoists,³ out of which all existing things are produced, to the Mind that plays so great a part in the teleological views of nature in Anaxagoras and Diogenes.⁴

Hence the philosophical struggle which we have been examining has its place as an integrating factor in the development of Greek religion; yet we have usually set it apart as philosophy, as if it were something else altogether. The common element lies, as we have already indicated, in the fact that whenever the Greeks experienced the Divine, they always had their eyes on reality, and all their experiences were oriented in that direction. But at the earliest stage of the philosophy of nature they approached reality with entirely new intellectual powers and grasped it in entirely new forms. Accordingly, the achievements of this philosophy strike us at first as no more than the emergence of a radically destructive and fundamentally anti-religious force such as we often attribute to reason and to science. If one thinks of religion not as a form developing with a life of its own, but simply as a bare fact of history given once and for all, as is very plausible in the light of the Christian conception of a single and final revelation by God, this view is perhaps correct. But Greek religion is much richer and less restricted in its development. It does not consist in any revealed teachings reconcilable with rational thinking only to a limited degree; it springs rather from a lavish profusion of

a product of human nature in interaction with the world that surrounds it, and therefore as something natural in itself. It is only gradually and at a later period that the philosophical consciousness begins to look upon man's nature as part of the nature of the universe.¹⁰ Here the philosophers follow in the footsteps of the medical men, who are the first to draw the logical conclusions from the new conception of a single and unified nature governed throughout by universal laws, and to inquire into the laws of man's corporeal nature.¹¹ A second approach to the problem begins with the purely philosophical question of man's position in the cosmos, already raised by Heraclitus;¹² here the intellectual nature is involved quite as much as the corporeal. But the real fathers of rational anthropology are the fifth-century Sophists. In this respect they resemble the philosophers of the modern Enlightenment, who perform a similar function and have many close points of contact with them. Both in practice and in theory the Sophists base their activity as teachers upon the idea of the *physis* of man. According to their doctrine, all education is a product of *physis*, *mathesis*, and *askesis*.¹³ Over and above their interest in the natural disposition of the individual man, this insight inevitably leads them to consider the general laws of human nature—all the more so since the training in political virtue which they strive to inculcate presupposes a well-fixed concept of State and society and of the general natural conditions underlying them. But these conditions are nothing other than the laws of human nature, from which these forms of social life have arisen. The Sophist Protagoras of Abdera worked out his views of the nature of man's common life in the State in a special work with the title *On the Order of Things at the Beginning*. There he attempted to envisage the beginnings of the human race and to determine by a genetic approach the causes that had led to the development of the earliest civilization.¹⁴ Such attempts at analysis from the standpoint of sociology and the philosophy of culture cannot help bringing up the problem of the origins of religion as one of the most potent factors in man's social life. But this is not the only point at which the Sophists touch upon the religious problem; they also encounter it in connexion with the problem of knowledge and certainty, which likewise was treated by Protagoras. Moreover, they are really the first

for men in a more anthropomorphic sense, by adducing man's own religious endowments as a sign of it.¹⁸ The art of divination is here mentioned as a particularly impressive example.¹⁹ As is well known, this argument gave rise to a whole literature in Hellenistic philosophy; we need only recall Cicero's tract *De Divinatione*, which follows a pattern quite familiar in Hellenistic philosophical literature. In Xenophon we are still very near the beginnings of the argument based on divination; and therefore our more extreme critics have felt that both this passage and all the rest of this theological chapter should be bracketed as a later Stoic interpolation. But Aeschylus' Prometheus had already boasted of inventing the arts out of his love for men in their helpless subjection to natural forces; and among these arts he included mathematics, astronomy, grammar, and divination.²⁰ We have here a direct precedent for Xenophon's argument. The difference is merely that he or his model formulated everything in somewhat broader terms, replacing the one god Prometheus, the traditional helper of suffering humanity, by the gods in general.²¹ In Xenophon Socrates considers the question whether divination may not sometimes be deceptive, and replies that the collective experience of untold generations is a more reliable criterion than individual intelligence. Socrates points out that states and nations, the longest-lived and wisest of all human institutions, are also the strongest religious forces in the world, just as older men, who by reason of their years may be supposed to have superior insight, are more god-fearing than younger ones.²² The problem of the truth and certainty of religion is here thrust into the background in favour of a new kind of attitude that makes practical experience rather than critical intelligence the real yardstick. This situation reminds us of that which we meet in the third book of Cicero's *De natura deorum*, where Cotta, the Roman Pontifex Maximus, while not denying the competence of philosophical understanding in religious matters, sets up against it the *auctoritas* of the religious tradition and religious experience.²³ The concept of *auctoritas*, however, which is later to be of such decisive importance for the attitude of the Church in questions of faith, is entirely missing in Greek thought. In its place we find Xenophon referring to the wisdom vested in the religious institutions of States and peoples by virtue of their immemorial age.²⁴ This

how such unimaginable power and wisdom may fittingly be honoured, he receives the thoroughly consistent reply that the best way is to follow the established usages of the State religion, just as the Delphic oracle recommended when plied with similar questions. The Delphic oracle is here introduced in order that even this practical problem may be solved in conformity with wisdom old and tried.²⁸

The Sophists' attempt to reveal the teleological basis of religion by reconstructing the earliest stages of human society inevitably leads to the question of how the idea of the existence of divine beings can ever have entered the mind of man. The first man to raise this question thinks of it more in universal than in historical terms. The problem is that of the permanent psychological causes of the idea of God. Two theories have come down to us, each of them arising in the time of the Sophists. One of them comes from Prodicus of Ceos, and will steadily find adherents later on, particularly among the Stoics. As far as I know, the earliest traces of its influence upon his contemporaries are to be found in the *Bacchae* of Euripides, where it appears in speeches arguing for and against the divinity of Dionysus.²⁹ Prodicus teaches that those things in nature which are wholesome and nutritive for mankind have been looked upon as gods by the earliest of men and honoured accordingly. This rather general formulation, which comes from an Epicurean source utilized by Cicero in his *De natura deorum* as well as by Philodemus in his tract *On Piety*,³⁰ is amplified with further details in a parallel account by Sextus Empiricus. Sextus tells us that according to Prodicus, sun, moon, rivers, springs, and indeed all things wholesome and useful for men were regarded as gods by the people of ancient times, just as the Nile was worshipped by the Egyptians. Accordingly bread has been looked upon (*νομισθῆναι*) as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, water as Poseidon, fire as Hephaestus, and so on with everything else that is useful to man.³¹ In another passage Sextus includes meadows and lakes in this same group, and thus treats the origin of the belief in nymphs and similar deities of nature.³² The mention of agriculture in connexion with Demeter encourages us to suspect that Prodicus tried to derive the mystery-religion with its initiatory rites from this root, and there is confirmation for this belief in Themistius. The mystery-religion

from the surfaces of actual things and stimulating human sense-organs.³⁶ We need not here discuss the physiological aspects of this hypothesis. Democritus thought of these images as having either good or baneful effects, and believed in their significance as portents; but he explained all this as a purely natural process. And it was to this process, as Sextus reports, that he ascribed the rise of the belief in gods among the earliest peoples.³⁷ Thus he did not deny the gods altogether, but relegated them to a twilight realm of materialized psychical phenomena, where even though divested of their own peculiar power and significance, they could still bring about good fortune or bad. He described these images as great and far exceeding human stature and hard to destroy, though not absolutely indestructible.³⁸ Thus Democritus recognized eternity and imperishability as properties really belonging to the gods, or at least as claims approaching reality, though he robbed them of their proper significance. He even went so far as to retain prayer as the most fundamental way of expressing one's faith in the reality of the Divine. But prayer, too, had come to mean something rather different, for the philosopher could bring himself to admit only one kind as reasonable—the wish 'to encounter propitious images'.³⁹ He had no faith in the idea of life after death as taught in the mysteries, for he held that everything that nature brings forth is subject to decay or, more strictly speaking, to dissolution. 'Some men who know nothing of the dissolution of mortal nature, but are well aware of the badness of their own ways of life, wear themselves out all their lifetime with troubles and anxieties, while they invent lying myths about the time which comes after death.' These words have come down to us as a fragment from Democritus' ethical work *On Tranquillity*.⁴⁰ Here the philosopher departs from his theory of images, declaring that certain types of religious conceptions are merely the unreal offspring of a bad conscience—obvious fictions, unwittingly compensatory, a source of lifelong self-inflicted torment for the human mind. Retribution, in truth, does not come in the hereafter but in man's own inner life, which constitutes his actual Hell.⁴¹ This idea does not spring from the cynicism of a pure student of nature utterly cold to the ethical side of the problem. It comes rather from the interplay which results when psychological and physiological

appearance.⁴⁵ This derivation of religion from the sense of fear or awe really touches one of its strongest roots. Perhaps we may also venture a similar approach to Prodicus' theory that man has apotheosized those bounteous powers of nature which he finds to his advantage; for if we divest this theory of the rationalistic teleological form in which it is clothed and substitute a more psychological explanation, it would mean that man has come to revere the Divine because of his feeling of gratitude for the things in this world that seem to him good. This approach is not only an admirable supplement to Democritus' fear-theory; it is also a necessary one.

Apparently Democritus, like his townsman Protagoras in Plato's myth,⁴⁶ did more than treat the origin of religion as an abstract psychological problem. He even gave it a place in his concrete sociological theory of how culture arose—the subject of his principal work, the *Mikros Diakosmos*. At least, this seems to be the best place to put the beautiful fragment which Clement of Alexandria has preserved for us: 'Some of the wise men lifted their hands towards that place which we Hellenes call the abode of Air, and said that Zeus holds converse with himself about all things, and that it is he who knows all things, and gives and takes away, and he is king of all.'⁴⁷ Obviously this refers to that memorable moment in the dark primeval age when the idea of deity first dawned upon men's minds. Democritus is quite in accord with the spirit of his own enlightened era when he thinks of religious ideas as originating not by the flickering-up of a vague feeling among the many, but rather by the act of a few heroic souls who step before the multitude with solemn gestures, raise their hands in prayer to heaven, and speak these words, which seem like a manifest confirmation of Democritus' fear-theory, and show that in this fear the germ of reverence is latent. These men are venerable, men of wisdom, what the Greek calls *λόγιοι*—the name Herodotus gives to the sages of the ancient Asiatic peoples. Here we are reminded of the form and concept of the philosopher as such, and tend thoughtlessly to read it back into the pre-Socratic period as Plato and Aristotle might have done, though the word 'philosopher' did not as yet have this significance, if it even existed at all. Indeed, Democritus here has in mind the type of philosopher or *λόγιος* on whom the intellectual development of Ionian culture has

displayed a profound susceptibility even in the late ancient period, the Sophists found themselves forced to consider another source of religious assurance, of which Democritus was already conscious when he explained the belief in the hereafter. This is the world of morals. As we have already remarked, the Sophists were the first to make a careful theoretical study of the nature of State and society in connexion with their claim of training men in political ἀρετή. That they studied the problem of the validity and origin of the accepted moral standards and the laws of the State is plainly illustrated by a fragment from a lost work *On Truth* by Antiphon the Athenian, which was recovered several decades ago. The author considers that the distinguishing of a twofold justice—the natural and the conventional—is a discovery of the first importance.⁴⁹ This distinction, which is known to be much older, and has already been applied by Parmenides and Empedocles to certain cosmical and ontological matters, becomes of the greatest practical significance when it is used by Sophists like Antiphon, Hippias, and the 'Callicles' of Plato's *Gorgias* to demonstrate that the prevailing laws and accepted social *mores* are a product of mere convention and arbitrary human decisions.⁵⁰ Antiphon defines justice as conformity with the laws of the State in which one lives.⁵¹ By such a definition he makes room for his conviction of the relativity of the laws of the State, which he opposes to the conception of natural justice. According to his theory, the laws are shackles with which the lawgiver binds the individual, and are quite inimical to nature.⁵² The man who acts naturally has only one standard for his actions—namely, that which he finds agreeable or disagreeable, productive of pleasure or of pain.⁵³ Antiphon concludes, therefore, that man will obey the law only under compulsion, and will repudiate it as soon as that compulsion disappears. Moreover, he speaks of the presence of witnesses as a decisive factor in human conduct.⁵⁴ The fact that the average man will not act in the same way before witnesses as he will when none are present strikes Antiphon as an argument for his thesis—the distinction between natural and conventional morality and justice.

The presence or absence of witnesses plays an important role in the Sophistic and Platonic discussions of ethical problems, as I have shown in that section of my book *Paideia* where I

fixed order. To compel law-observance among the contending sons of nature, punishments were introduced for any transgressions of which they might be convicted. But in order to secure obedience even in the absence of witnesses, the wise lawgivers hit upon the device of inventing an ideal witness who sees all things and hears all things and instils in men the fear of his punishment. In short, they invented God. Just as the sages of Democritus step forward from the ranks of primitive men and point to the phenomena of the heavens, so does Critias' wise and cunning statesman mount the stage, presenting God to men: 'There exists', this person tells us (for he is speaking in the style of the natural philosophers),

'A demon who abounds with deathless life,
Hearing and seeing with his mind, replete
With wisdom, holding everything together,
And moving godly nature in its course.
And he will hear all things that mortals speak,
And he can watch all things that they may do ;
And if you plan some secret deviltry,
This never will escape the gods, for theirs
Is sapience immeasurably great.'
These were the words with which he introduced
The sweetest of all teachings ; but the truth
He kept concealed with fraudulent discourse.
He said the gods resided in that place
Which men would dread the most, that place from which,
As he well knew, mortals have been beset
With fears or blest with that which brings relief
To their tormented lives—there, high above,
In that great circuit where the lightnings flash,
Where thunder's baleful tumult may be heard,
And heaven's starry countenance is seen
(That lovely work of Time's skilled joinery),
Where molten stones of stars descend ablaze,
And wet rain starts its journey to the earth.
Such were the consternating fears he sent
To men, and such the means by which the gods
Were settled in their proper dwelling-place
(A pretty trick, accomplished with a word) ;
And thus he quenched out lawlessness with laws.

We need hardly remark that this long *rhesis* is entirely made

that the beneficial things in nature have been looked upon as gods by the earliest of men. The Greek expression which he uses—*νομισθῆναι*—is connected with *νόμος*;⁶⁸ behind this lurks the thought that these conceptions of divine beings are really based on *νόμος* alone and not on *φύσις*—an idea which the verb *νομίζω* occasionally expresses elsewhere.⁶⁹ Even when a Sophist regards religion with as positive a practical attitude as that of Protagoras in Plato's myth, there is always a conscious and fundamental theoretical doubt of its absolute truth. Protagoras' treatise *On the Gods*, which was publicly burned in Athens, began with the words: 'When it comes to the gods, I am unable to discover whether they are or are not, or even what they are like in form. For there are many things that stand in the way of this knowledge—the obscurity of the problem and the brevity of man's life.'⁷⁰ The words 'or even what they are like in form' are missing in some of the authors by whom this famous sentence is quoted, and they have been questioned by many critics.⁷¹ It is clear, however, that the statement is a reference to the two chief problems that have occupied the pre-Socratic philosophers with regard to the gods—the problems of the existence and the form of the Divine. In the light of what we have seen already, it is self-evident that the latter reference is here indispensable.⁷² Only so can we clearly see what Protagoras is opposing. He is backing away from the whole previous philosophical treatment of the problem of the Divine, by denying that there is anything certain about it. Such an opening note might seem to leave nothing more to be said, as has often been remarked. If, in spite of this, Protagoras could still devote an entire treatise to the problem of the belief in God, he must have been satisfied with a somewhat lesser degree of certainty as his work progressed. In that case, however, he could hardly do more than apply the standard of human opinion; and that would be most fitting for the man who had declared that 'Man is the measure of all things'.⁷³ In this way we can also understand the meaning of the 'I am unable to discover' in the first sentence of his treatise *On the Gods*, and we can see for what he is here preparing the way. With these words he restricts the scope of his sentence about the impossibility of knowing the gods, and makes it an expression of an individual opinion.⁷⁴ This must have seemed the only standpoint which would enable him to

NOTES

THE following are the works most frequently referred to in the Notes:

- Diels, Hermann, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5. Aufl., hrsg. v. Walther Kranz. Berlin: Weidmann, 1934-5. (All references to the fragments of the pre-Socratics are made from this edition.)
- Diels, Hermann, *Doxographi Graeci*. Berlin: Reimer, 1879.
- Jaeger, Werner, *Aristotle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.
- Jaeger, Werner, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. Vol. i, 2nd ed., N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1945 (the 2nd ed. of this volume has not yet appeared in England); vol. ii, N.Y., 1943; Oxford: Blackwell, 1944; vol. iii, N.Y., 1944; Oxford: Blackwell, 1945.

CHAPTER I

THE THEOLOGY OF THE GREEK THINKERS

1. Cf. Aug. *Civ. Dei* vi, *praef.*
2. Although the demonstration of the total or partial agreement of the Greek and Roman philosophers with Christian doctrine begins in book vi of the *Civitas Dei* with the analysis of M. Terentius Varro's doctrine of the gods, it reaches its climax only in book viii, where St. Augustine states that Platonism even 'transcends' the Stoic philosophy of Varro in approaching the truth. As for the general idea see viii *praef.*, second half. On the subordination of the pre-Socratic thinkers as forerunners of Socrates and Plato see *ibid.*, ch. ii, where St. Augustine briefly treats Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Archelaus. In this chapter he apparently follows an historical handbook. Similar doxographic surveys of the theology of the Greek philosophers from the Epicurean and Stoic points of view are to be found in Cic. *De nat. deor.* i and ii. That Augustine used this type of history of Greek philosophy is clear from his congruencies with Hippolytus' *Philosophoumena* (see R. Agahd in Fleckeisen's *Jahrbücher*, 1898, pp. 93 ff.). Cf. also his reference to the division of the pre-Socratic period into an Italic and an Ionian school, which we find in the same context in Diog. L. *praef.* 13. Diog. L. *praef.* 1 speaks also of the wisdom of other nations: the Persians, Babylonians and Assyrians, Indians, Celts, Phoenicians, Scythians, Egyptians, and Libyans. In the *Civ. Dei* viii, ch. ix, where St. Augustine refers for a second time to the division of the pre-Socratics into an Ionian and an Italian school, he adds the *sapientes aliarum gentium* as well, and enumerates exactly the same nations as does Diogenes, with the single exception of the Phoenicians. Indirectly, Diogenes and St. Augustine go back to the same source (Sotion's *Diadochai*), but St. Augustine followed directly a more recent work which had used the same tradition (a Latin translation of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*? See Agahd, *op. cit.*, p. 106, n. 2).
3. Aug. *Civ. Dei* vi, ch. v, reveals the systematic structure of Varro's theology in that work. See what he says in his characterization of Varro's work in the preceding chapters, ii-iv. The *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum*

- polemic opposed to the pagan gods was not directed against the religion protected by the State but against those patriots of the old school who thought that Rome and her destiny were identical with her old gods; see Aug. *Civ. Dei* i, ch. xxxvi. On the similar attitude of Isocrates and the Athenian conservatives in the 4th century see my *Paideia*, iii, p. 117.
7. Aug. *Civ. Dei* vi, ch. iv (p. 250, 20, Dombart): 'Vera autem religio non a terrena aliqua civitate instituta est, sed plane caelestem ipsa instituit civitatem. Eam vero inspirat et docet verus Deus, dator vitae aeternae, veris cultoribus suis.' A similar universalistic attitude towards the particular gods of the states (ἔθνη) is taken by Ps. Plato's *Epinomis* 984a and by Aristotle; cf. my *Aristotle*, p. 141.
 8. Aug. *Civ. Dei* vi, ch. vi (p. 255, 27, Dombart) says in addressing Varro: 'Quanto liberius subtiliusque ista divideres, dicens alios esse deos naturales, alios ab hominibus institutos.'
 9. Philodemus *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* (p. 72, Gomperz): παρ' Ἀντισθέnei δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεοὺς κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἕνα. Cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 13, 32, who says literally the same. (They follow a common source: Phaedrus the Epicurean's book *Περὶ θεῶν*. Cf. Diels's *Doxographi*, p. 127.)
 10. A passage such as the one quoted above in n. 8 makes it highly probable that Augustine opposed his dichotomy of *dei naturales* and *dei ab hominibus instituti* to the trichotomy of Varro, not merely as an improvisation of his own but with full awareness of the existence of such a dichotomy in the philosophical tradition. Antisthenes' famous division (cf. n. 9) is quoted expressly by some of the Latin Christian Fathers before St. Augustine; see Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 19, 8, and Lact. *Inst. div.* i. 5, epit. 4. Other Christian authors refer to Antisthenes' theology of the one invisible and shapeless God without mentioning the dichotomy; cf. E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, ii. Teil, 1. Abt., 5. Aufl., p. 329, n. 1. Since Minucius Felix in his *Octavius* and Lactantius in the first book of his *Institutiones divinae* likewise used Varro's *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* as a source (cf. R. Agahd, op. cit. in n. 2, pp. 40 ff.), it appears that all three took Antisthenes' dichotomy from Varro; for he probably mentioned it in the first book of his *Antiquitates* in connexion with the trichotomy which he preferred to it, because he wished to safeguard the independent validity of the gods of the Roman state. In order to reconcile both divisions, St. Augustine tried to subordinate Varro's three *genera theologiae* to Antisthenes' bifurcate scheme by reducing the *genus mythicon* to the *genus civile*; cf. *Civ. Dei* vi, ch. vii: 'revocatur igitur ad theologian civilem theologia fabulosa theatrica scaenica.' Dramatic poetry was recited at the festivals of the gods of the State. Augustine adds the words *theatrica scaenica* to *fabulosa* in order to connect mythical theology with the State.
 11. Aug. *Civ. Dei* vi, ch. v, cites *genus physicon* and *genus mythicon* several times directly from the text of Varro. But he says (p. 252, 23, Dombart): 'secundum autem (genus) ut naturale dicatur, iam et consuetudo locutionis admittit.' One may conclude from these words that the latinized term *theologia naturalis* must have been introduced before Augustine's time by some other Latin philosopher. It was probably he who directed St. Augustine's attention to Varro's theology (Marius Victorinus?).
 12. On the following see my *Humanism and Theology* (The Aquinas Lecture 1943, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee), pp. 46 ff.

with the ideas of the Greek philosophers on the nature of religion as a general phenomenon. Actually it deals with physics and ethics and includes their development up to the Hellenistic period. It discusses at length the meteorological views of individual thinkers in the pre-Socratic period. Clifford Herschel Moore's *The Religious Thought of the Greeks* (Cambridge, 1925) is of wider scope than the present book, as the word 'religious' implies. The poets are in the foreground, and the philosophy of the pre-Socratics is excluded, with the exception of Pythagoras, who is treated along with Orphism and the Mysteries. Moore apparently considers the other pre-Socratics as mere physicists, in Burnet's sense, who deserve no place in his scheme. A different and more appreciative attitude towards the pre-Socratics is to be found in a more recent monograph by R. K. Hack, *God in Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates* (Princeton, 1931). Étienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven, 1941), does not deal with the pre-Socratic philosophers explicitly, though the author recognizes their importance for his subject.

24. In O. Gilbert's book (see n. 23) the physical views of the pre-Socratics are taken into account throughout, but they tend to overshadow the religious aspect rather than put it into a clearer light.
25. Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (v. i, London, 1906), and John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (4th ed., London, 1930), are the most characteristic representatives of this type. The unilateral emphasis on the physical side of pre-Socratic philosophy in their works is a product of 19th-century scientism and its horror of everything metaphysical. Eduard Zeller, who belonged to the older German school and who was in reality the founder of 19th-century history of philosophy, was originally inspired by Hegel's thought, which was largely based on a philosophical interpretation of the history of ideas. Consequently, in spite of his increasing interest in the scientific element of pre-Socratic speculation, Zeller was much more aware of its metaphysical implications than his modern successors, even though in his first volume on the pre-Socratics he did not escape Hegel's dialectic construction of intellectual progress.
26. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, ii, pp. 207-12 and 243-58.
27. See Arist. *Metaph.* A 3, 983^b27. He is probably referring to Plat. *Theaet.* 181 b. For other Platonic passages see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, i, p. 130.
28. οἱ πρῶτοι θεολογήσαντες (Homer and Hesiod) are contrasted with ἡ νῦν γένεσις, *Metaph.* A 3, 983^b28. οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες (Thales, &c.), *Metaph.* A 2, 982^b11 and A 3, 983^b6, are also contrasted with the philosophy of Aristotle's own age. The present philosophy can obviously be compared with both the πρῶτοι θεολογήσαντες and the πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες: it is the continuation of both.
29. Arist. *Metaph.* B 4, 1000^a4 and 18. The words μυθικῶς σοφίζεσθαι refer to what Aristotle had said before about the type of Hesiod's theological thought.
30. See n. 28.
31. *Iliad* xiv. 201 and 302, 246. See n. 19, the words ἐν μύθῳ σχήματι and μυθικῶς προσήκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν.
32. The story of Oceanus and Tethys told in *Iliad* xiv. 201 ff. shows the same keen interest in the genealogical background of the Olympian gods which we find in Hesiod's *Theogony* and later epic poems of the theogonic type. Wilamowitz, *Die Ilias und Homer*, p. 317, says that the poet of *Iliad* xiv had lost the

49. See Plato, *Symp.* 178 b, who briefly surveys the repercussions in early Greek thought and literature of Hesiod's idea that Eros was one of the oldest deities.
50. Hesiod's relationship to the older mythical tradition resembles that of the Christian theologians to the tradition of the Bible. Although he applies his reason to the interpretation or reconstruction of the myths, their objective authority remains unshaken as the starting-point of his thought. Aristotle and even Plato seem not to have understood this when they used a phrase like ἐν μύθου σχήματι as almost equivalent with what we should call subjective and arbitrary. Arist. *Metaph.* B 4, 1000^a9, says that Hesiod and all the other θεολόγοι have thought only of how to satisfy themselves (μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτούς), apparently referring to the mythical form of their thought in general.

CHAPTER II

THE THEOLOGY OF THE MILESIAN NATURALISTS

1. The oriental origin of some of Hesiod's religious ideas is postulated by R. Reitzenstein in Reitzenstein-Schaefer, *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus. Aus Iran und Griechenland* (Leipzig, 1926), p. 55 f. See also Ed. Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (Stuttgart, 1921), Bd. ii, p. 190.
2. In the juridical language of the Attic orators τὰ ὄντα often occurs in the sense of a man's property, as an equivalent of the noun οὐσία, in phrases like τῶν ὄντων ἐκβάλλειν or ἐκπίπτειν τῶν ὄντων. In the broader sense of all that 'exists' the word must have been used from the very beginning of Greek natural philosophy. It meant then, speaking from the Platonic point of view, that which our senses perceive in the world without. Plato therefore found it necessary to differentiate the being of the invisible world of *noumena* from the ὄντα in this pre-Socratic sense and called it τὸ ὄντως ὄν. We find τὸ εἶν and τὰ εἶντα in the earliest pre-Socratic philosopher of whom we possess coherent fragments, Parmenides of Elea, and this may lead to the misunderstanding that τὰ ὄντα was from the beginning a metaphysical term; for some of the interpreters have given the word in Parmenides a meaning similar to that which it has in Plato: a 'being' of purely intelligible character. But Heraclitus, Melissus, and Empedocles used τὰ ὄντα in the sense of all natural existence, and it is more than probable that in doing so they were only following the example of their Milesian predecessors. Parmenides obviously took the word from them and analysed its logical implications with a view to revolutionizing the naive, sensual concept of existence as adopted by the Milesians. The term τὰ ὄντα in the so-called fragment of Anaximander, where it means all existing individual things, in all probability reflects the true language of this early thinker. He and the other Ionian philosophers of nature simply followed Homer and the usage of epic language. Homer and Hesiod speak of τὰ εἶντα as that which exists at present and contrast it with τὰ ἐσσόμενα and τὰ πρὸ εἶντα, things as they will be in the future and as they were in the past. This very opposition proves that the word originally pointed to the immediate and tangible presence of things. Homer's εἶντα did not exist in the past and will not exist in the future. They did not yet exclude γένεσις and φθορά, as Parmenides taught they did. In this regard the oldest thinkers were quite Homeric.
3. Thucydides i. 21 calls the tradition of the ancient poets and logographers incapable of disproof and for the most part changed by time into the fabulous

full of gods', Aristotle, in another passage of the *De anima* (i. 5, 411^a7, Thales A 22), explicitly derives the view that Thales thought the whole universe animated. Thus Aristotle seems to try to combine that apophthegm with the tradition of Thales' theory of the magnet in order to prove his interpretation that Thales thought the whole world to be animated, even its inorganic part. Modern historians of philosophy have mostly accepted Aristotle's theory as dogma and built their reconstruction of Thales' philosophy on this basis. Even the later ancient authors who followed the lost *Φυσικῶν δόξαι* of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus speak in rather dogmatic terms of the soul of the world which Thales assumed and interpret it as the spirit of the world (*νοῦς τοῦ κόσμου*, Aëtius; *mentem*, Cicero; see Thales A 23) in the manner of contemporary Stoicism. This 'spirit' they predicate as God. But obviously all this is mere conjecture, and we know nothing about Thales' concept of God. We have only the one sentence which Aristotle took as his point of departure: 'everything is full of gods'. Plato quotes it without mentioning Thales (see n. 7), whereas Aristotle ascribes it to him. In reality it matters very little whether Thales coined the epigram or not: the spirit of the early Greek philosophy of nature finds its genuine expression in these words. See J. Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

11. Arist. *De part. anim.* i. 5, 645^a17 (Heraclitus, A 9).
12. Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 50, n. 2, thinks the anecdote a mere variant of Thales' apophthegm. There did, indeed, exist a variant according to which Heraclitus and not Thales said that everything is full of gods (see Diog. L. ix. 7: [Heraclitus said] *πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη*). But the story told by Aristotle refers rather to Thales' well-known phrase and wittily applies it to the present situation.
13. Aëtius, *Plac.* i. 3, 3 (Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 277, Anaximander A 14); Simplicius, *De caelo* 615, 13 (Anaximander A 17).
14. Burnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 ff. Cf. Rodolfo Mondolfo, *L'Infinito nel Pensiero dei Greci* (Florence, 1934). In his article 'L'Infinità divina nelle teogonie greche presocratiche' (*Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni*, ix, 1933, pp. 72 ff.) the same author has tried to trace the idea of infinity in the post-Hesiodic theogonies which are an important witness for it. I do not discuss them at this point, but I have devoted a separate chapter to them because I am convinced that the picture of the historical development of the earliest natural philosophy has been increasingly confused in the last generation by the unwarranted assumption that all theogonic thought is pre-philosophical, even in the chronological sense. The wholesome deflation which our ideas of the Orphic religion of early Greece have lately undergone offers one more reason for caution in interpreting the beginning of purely rational thought in Ionia against a hypothetical background of Orphic speculation.
15. Simplicius, *Phys.* 24, 13 (Anaximander A 9): *τῶν δὲ ἐν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἄπειρον λεγόντων Ἀναξίμανδρος μὲν Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητὴς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. Hipp. Ref. i. 6, 1-7 (Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 559, Anaximander A 11): *Θαλοῦ τοίνυν Ἀναξίμανδρος γίνεται ἀκροατής. Ἀναξίμανδρος Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος. . . οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦνομα καλέσας τῆς ἀρχῆς*. I have quoted the passage from Hippolytus along with that in Simplicius because it will be of some importance for the discussion of Simplicius' text.*
16. Arist. *Phys.* iii. 4, 203^b6 (Anaximander A 15): *ἅπαντα γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ ἐξ ἀρχῆς*,

25. Burnet, op. cit., p. 57, n. 1. See the text of the passage from Simplicius above, n. 15.
26. A glimpse at Kranz's Index to Diels's *Vorsokratiker*, s.v. ἀρχή, especially the section ἀρχή = *Prinzip*, is very instructive. Most of the passages are so-called A-passages, i.e. taken from doxographic sources. Only a few seem to prove that ἀρχή occurs in this sense in B-passages also, i.e. direct fragments. But in the passage taken from Empedocles the term ἀρχή does not belong to the text of the fragment but rather to the words of the late author who quotes it. Diels wrongly spaces the word as if it were Empedoclean. The passages taken from Philolaus do not prove anything, since the book that exists under his name is as apocryphal as the rest of the 'Pythagorean' literature. It is a late product and belongs after Aristotle.
27. See Burnet, op. cit., p. 54, n. 2. I repeat here the text of Theophrastus in both forms. *Simpl. Phys.* 24, 13: Ἀναξίμανδρος . . . ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. *Hipp. Ref.* i. 6, 1-7: οὗτος μὲν οὖν [Anaximander] ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦνομα καλέσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. Burnet construes Simplicius' words as meaning: 'Anaximander said that the *apeiron* is the *arché* and element of all things, being the first to use this name (*scil. apeiron*) for the *arché*.' But should we not expect in this case πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα καλέσας τὴν ἀρχήν? The κομίσας of Simplicius seems to make it clear that it must mean: 'he was the first to *introduce* this name of *arché*,' referring thereby to the preceding words ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον. One might object and ask why he makes this statement of priority only with regard to ἀρχή and not to στοιχεῖον. But Simplicius had already made a similar statement about στοιχεῖον, *Phys.* 7, 13 (see n. 24), saying that that concept was introduced by Plato; so the reader does not expect it to be repeated here, where we are interested only in what Anaximander said. The word emphasized is ἀρχή; the words καὶ στοιχεῖον were added by Theophrastus only in order to make clear that in this context the principle is to be understood as the material cause. Hippolytus omits τοῦτο, though it may belong to the true text of Theophrastus. By doing so and by replacing κομίσας by καλέσας, Hippolytus wanted to exclude any interpretation other than this: 'Anaximander was the first to use the term *arché*.' In this he was quite correct; see n. 28.
28. *Simpl. Phys.* 150, 23, πρῶτος αὐτὸς [*scil.* Anaximander] ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον. τὸ ὑποκείμενον here is the Peripatetic word for the *apeiron*, which Aristotle elsewhere also calls ὕλη in his own terminology. The words unmistakably mean: 'he gave it the name ἀρχή', and so they were correctly understood by Usener and Diels. They are almost literally the same as those in *Simpl.* 7, 13 about Plato: στοιχεῖα πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὀνόμασε τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχάς. Thus we cannot translate them as Burnet does: 'Anaximander named the substratum as the material cause.' The sense of ὀνομάζειν is in both passages simply 'give the name of'.
29. See n. 24.
30. See n. 16.
31. Melissus B 4: ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τέλος ἔχον οὐδὲν οὔτε αἰδίων οὔτε ἀπειρόν ἐστιν.
32. Melissus B 2.
33. See n. 16.
34. Anaximander A 9.

ξύμπαντα as a stereotyped element of their solemn theological language and interprets it as meaning *τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὄλον*. He thus agrees with Aristotle, who says that they took the *apeiron* for the *ὄλον* (= *τὸ πάντα περιέχον*). See n. 42.

44. (A) The word *τὸ θεῖον*. There is no doubt that the word *τὸ θεῖον* occurred in the philosophical language of pre-Socratic thinkers, even though our fragmentary tradition has preserved but little evidence. In the two quotations from Empedocles (B 133) and Heraclitus (B 86) the word *τὸ θεῖον* or *τὰ θεῖα* occurs, but Diels seems to think that it does not belong to the text quoted. However, something like it must have been said in the text, and Kranz in the Index refers to the passages, s.v. *θεῖον*. Since no direct testimonia are available, the imitation by contemporary authors must serve as a substitute for us. Critias, in the long Sisyphus fragment preserved by Sextus Empiricus ix. 54 (Critias B 25), visualizes his wise man (*σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ*, v. 12), who invents religion, as a sort of pre-Socratic philosopher. He says of him that he introduced the idea of the Divine (*τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο*, v. 16) and equipped it with the predicates of immortal life, the power of seeing and hearing with its mind, and of moving divine nature (*φύσιν θείαν φορῶν*). All these features are obviously taken from the language of pre-Socratic theology. He says explicitly that these are the statements (*λόγοι*) which the wise man made about the Divine (v. 24). The rest of his description of the Divinity makes the origin of his picture from the cosmological philosophers and their *λόγοι* even more evident. It reminds us of Democritus' famous words about the wise men of old (*λόγιοι ἄνθρωποι*) who raised their hands towards the upper air and said: 'Zeus speaks everything and knows everything and gives and takes away, and he is King of all' (Democr. B 30). Cf. Critias l.c. vv. 27 ff. The bold identification of *τὸ θεῖον* with *ἡ φύσις*, which is characteristic of pre-Socratic thought, is to be found also in the medical literature of the Hippocratic age. The author of the book *On the Divine Disease* rejects the old but superstitious idea of the divine character of epilepsy by pointing out that the cause of this disease is as natural as that of any other, and that everything in the nature of our diseases is divine and everything is human. They all start from the same influences: cold, sunshine, changing winds, and weather. These physical factors are the forces which are the cause of all things (Hippocrates, ed. Littré, vi. 394). In this sense it is true *μάλιστα τὸ θεῖον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν αἴτιον εἶναι* (*De natura muliebri*, Littré, vii. 312). From passages like this it becomes clear that in using the concept of the Divine, pre-Socratic natural philosophy made a statement about the primary cause, since traditional religious thought traced everything that happened back to the gods (*αἰτιασθαι τὸ θεῖον*).

(B) *καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον*. With these words Anaximander (A 15) proceeds to identify his *apeiron* with *τὸ θεῖον*. His *modus procedendi* is quite natural. He cannot begin with the concept of God or the Divine, but starts with experience and the rational conclusions based on it. Having arrived in this way at the conception of a first cause, the predicates of which are equal to those which earlier religious belief used to attribute to the gods, he takes the last step, which is the identification of the highest principle with the Divine. This method was followed by ancient philosophers of later centuries. It is only natural that our main evidence should come from later times, since our direct fragments of the works of the pre-Socratics are scarce. But Aristotle's report on Anaximander and the other philosophers who stated the existence of the *apeiron* as the first cause must be authentic in this respect also. The most obvious argument for this is the grammatical form of his sentence, the *oratio obliqua*: *καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον*, which gives the derivation of the divine

form, if the words of the latter, as reported by Aristotle, are not ~~too~~ poor a reflection of the original.

Now we turn to the later philosophers and trace the same phenomenon in the tradition of post-Socratic philosophy. By that time the language of the philosophers had lost much of the original power of expression which it had possessed during the pre-Socratic period, when even a second-rate mind like Diogenes' aspired to a high level of diction (cf. his statement on style, frg. B 1). The form of argumentation became more stereotyped in the philosophers of later times, but at this stage it still reflected the influence of their predecessors upon them in form and content. Aristotle, in his lost dialogue *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* (frg. 23, Rose, Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 15), wanted to prove that the stars have a soul and reason, and he ended his argument with the words 'ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda'. The same is proved by pointing to the voluntary movement of the stars, frg. 24. A number of similar identifications of θεός with mens = νοῦς, *mundus* = κόσμος, *primum movens*, *caeli ardor* = αἰθήρ, *caelum* = οὐρανός, are quoted by Cicero and Philodemus from Aristotle's *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, book iii (frg. 26, Rose). Aristotle seems to have followed earlier philosophical theologians in all the passages concerning the existence of God which occur in his dialogues. An example which comes especially close to Anaximander's form of expression and argument is preserved by Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's *De caelo* (289, 2, Heiberg): λέγει δὲ περὶ τούτου ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας· καθόλου γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τι βέλτιον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἄριστον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὐαῖν ἄλλο ἄλλου βέλτιον, ἔστιν ἄρα τι καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ εἶη ἂν τὸ θεῖον (Arist. frg. 16, Rose). Here Aristotle first concluded from the hierarchy of perfection in nature that there must exist a 'most perfect being', and this he identifies with τὸ θεῖον. The teleological argument is his own, but the form in which he puts it is inherited from earlier philosophers, who approached God from their specific principle (Anaximander from the *apeiron*, Anaximenes and Diogenes from the air, &c.). Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. dogm.* iii. 20, has preserved Aristotle's explanation of the origin of religion from dream-vision and from the regular movements of celestial bodies. Both arguments begin with the observation of natural phenomena and end with the conclusion εἶναι τι θεῖον or εἶναι τινα θεόν (frg. 10, Rose).

The same form of theological argument was used by the Hellenistic philosophers. The Stoics (frg. ii. 1016, Arnim) are represented by Sextus, *Adv. phys.* i. 114, as trying to prove that the cosmos has an intelligent nature which is moved by itself in a certain orderly way: νοερὰν ἔχει φύσιν . . . ἥ τις εὐθέως ἐστὶ θεός. The conclusion that the intelligent nature which moves itself in orderly fashion is God seems, from their point of view, to follow εὐθέως. This word also throws light on the pre-Socratics who argued in the same or a similar way. See the same identification made by some of the Stoics in Sextus, *Adv. phys.* i. 118, where the nature of the cosmos is called *κρατίστη*, because it is the cause of order (*διακόσμησις*) in the entire universe. From this it is concluded that it is intelligent (*λογικὴ τέ ἐστι καὶ νοερά*) and eternal (*ἀίδιος*), and then the author whom Sextus is quoting adds: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ θεῶν, 'a nature like this, however, is identical with God'. See also Sextus, *op. cit.* i. 100, where we find οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶ θεός at the end of a demonstration that the universe is the product of the supreme intelligence of a demiurge. Cleanthes (frg., i, 529, Arnim) argues, quite in the Aristotelian manner (Sextus, *op. cit.* i. 88 ff.), that there must be a most perfect living being which is higher than man's virtue and wisdom and is not susceptible to failure; then he adds: τοῦτο δὲ οὐ διόλπει θεοῦ (cf. Sextus, *op. cit.* i. 91). See Sextus, *op. cit.* i. 76: ἔστι τις ἄρα καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτοκίνητος δύναμις, ἥ τις ἂν εἶη θεία καὶ ἀίδιος, and at the

- of Plato's *Timaeus*. They have not an eternal but only a long life (*αἰών*), like Anaximander's worlds, and from the viewpoint of later philosophers their deity is vulnerable by the same argument which Cicero's Epicurean source launches against Anaximander's *nativi dei*: 'sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui possumus?' The deity in the strict sense of Anaximander's *apeiron*, which is really without beginning and end, is here used as criterion for the deity of his own minor gods. Nothing could prove more clearly that from Anaximander's own point of view there was no contradiction in his two different ranks of cosmic deities. Under the rule of the one eternal God, the *apeiron*, he established the innumerable company of long-lived gods, the *κόσμοι*, who were its offspring.
53. See Simpl. *Phys.* 24, 13 f. (Anaximander A 9). The information given by the Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle is taken from Theophrastus' work on the history of natural philosophy (frg. 2, Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 476).
54. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, i (Leipzig, Kroener Verlag), p. 429. Erwin Rohde, *Psyche*, 7.-8. Aufl. (Tubingen, 1921), ii, p. 119, n. 1.
55. Erwin Rohde, loc. cit. (see n. 54).
56. Arist. frg. 60, Rose: εὐθὺς φύσει συνέσταμεν καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ τὰς τελετὰς λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ πάντες; . . . ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἀμαρτημάτων. The penalty which we are paying by living our present life is obviously the punishment for a crime which we committed in or by a former life.
57. Anaximander A 9. See Burnet, op. cit., p. 54.
58. See my interpretation of the famous passage in *Paideia*, i², p. 159 f. with notes. Cf. Heraclitus B 62. R. Mondolfo, *Problemi del pensiero antico* (Bologna, 1936), p. 23 f., has given an elaborate *epikrisis* of the various interpretations of the fragment of Anaximander, including my own in *Paideia*, i² (see Mondolfo, op. cit., p. 27 f.). To him I refer the reader for a complete critical survey of the situation with regard to this difficult problem.
59. From our Greek text-books, it is true, we learn that *τάξις* means 'order', and so Diels understands this passage. But in Greek we say the judge *τάττει δίκην* or *τάττει ζημίαν* or *τιμωρίαν*; for instance, *τάττει θάνατον*; that fits the situation best, since it is with the penalty (*τίσις*) which things have to pay for their *ἀδικία* that the fragment of Anaximander is concerned. *τάξις* must therefore have the meaning 'ordinance' here and cannot mean 'order'. In this old juridical sense the noun is used by Plat. *Laws*, 925 b; *τάξις* is, more generally speaking, every rationing or assessment. See the passages referred to in *Paideia*, i², p. 455, n. 50.
60. On Time as judge, see Solon, frg. 24, 3 Diehl, *ἐν δίκῃ χρόνον*; cf. also frg. 3, 16; 1, 16; 1, 28; 1, 31, for *diké* and *timé*, with my remarks in *Berl. Sitzb.* 1926, p. 79. On the permanent character of Solon's *diké*, see my interpretation, loc. cit. and *Paideia*, i², p. 144.
61. See the contemporary poet Mimnermus, frg. 2, Diehl, and Semonides of Amorgus, frg. 3 and 29, Diehl.
62. Anaximenes B 2. Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides* (Bonn, 1916), p. 175, expresses doubt with regard to the authenticity of this fragment. He seems to think that it is rather a formulation by Aëtius, our doxographic source, or of the authority he followed (Theophrastus), of what he supposed to be Anaximenes' view on the relationship of air and world. No one can refute such doubts

3. Diog. L. ix. 18 (Xenoph. B 8).
4. Ath. xii. 526 A (Xenoph. B 3).
5. Ath. *Epit.* ii. 54 E (Xenoph. B 22).
6. Diog. L. ix. 22 (Xenoph. A 18) describes Hesiod, Xenophanes, Empedocles, and Parmenides as philosophers who wrote in poetic form (*διὰ ποιημάτων φιλοσοφεῖ*). But that does not mean that they all used the same poetic form, the didactic epic. Apuleius, *Florida*, c. 20 (Xenoph. A 21), expressly contrasts Empedocles' didactic epics with the poetical form of Xenophanes, the satires or *silloi*: 'canit enim Empedocles carmina, Plato dialogos . . . Xenocrates satiras.' Casaubon's emendation *Xenophanes* for *Xenocrates* is evidently correct. Diels preferred Rohde's conjecture *Crates* only because both believed in the existence of an epic poem *Περὶ φύσεως* by Xenophanes, but philologically this emendation has very little probability. The philosopher who was famous for writing in the form of *σilloi* (*satirae*) was Xenophanes, and the translation of the word *σilloi* by *satirae* is perfectly proper.
7. Diog. L. ix. 18 (cf. n. 2) distinguishes among Xenophanes' works poems in hexameters (*ἐν ἑξαμετροῖς*), elegiac poems, and iambics. The latter belonged to the *σilloi*, but this group also contained poems in dactylic and elegiac metres. Diogenes' learned source did not mention an epic by Xenophanes on nature, the existence of which most modern scholars have assumed (see nn. 10, 11). As greater epic poems of Xenophanes he mentions only the *Κολοφῶνος κτίσις* and *τὸν εἰς Ἑλέαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀποικισμὸν* (ix. 20) in 2,000 lines. This information goes back to an Alexandrian source. Sotion's *Diadoché* is quoted in the same paragraph. But Sotion's ultimate source must be some pinacographic work of Callimachus' school, in which the exact number of the lines was indicated, as is done in many other passages derived from the same learned tradition. Mimnermus of Colophon, who wrote before Xenophanes, had also dealt with the *κτίσις* of his city in a smaller elegiac poem, of which a fragment is preserved (see Mimn. frg. 12, Diehl).
8. Strabo xiv. 643 (Xenoph. A 20): *Ξενοφάνης ὁ φυσικός ὁ τοὺς Σilloi ποιήσας διὰ ποιημάτων*. Note that Strabo, who is using for his work the learned grammatical literature of the Hellenistic period, here mentions the *silloi* of Xenophanes in close connexion with his title *ὁ φυσικός*. The words *διὰ ποιημάτων* recall Diog. L. ix. 18, who says that Parmenides, like Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Empedocles, *διὰ ποιημάτων φιλοσοφεῖ*. Obviously the words *διὰ ποιημάτων* mean only 'in poetical form' and do not prove that they all used exactly the same poetical form, that of the didactic epic. Xenophanes, according to Strabo's source, wrote satires in poetical form. He was famous for them. Proclus, who disapproves of Xenophanes' satires 'against all other philosophers and poets' (*In Hes. op.* 284, Xenoph. A 22), obviously considers them the characteristic form of his philosophical utterances. Schol. ABT to *Iliad* ii. 212 (Xenoph. A 23) assert that Homer and not Xenophanes was the inventor of the *σilloi* and quote the Thersites scene of the *Iliad* to prove it. But there *σilloi* does not mean the literary form used by Xenophanes, but simply 'slander'.
9. See the pure hexameters in B 11, B 12, B 15, B 16, and the alternation of hexameter and iambic trimeter in B 14. The fragments of Timon's sillographic poems were collected by H. Diels, *Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1901), p. 184 f. See Timon's praise of Xenophanes, Diog. L. ix. 18.
10. Diels lists fragments B 23-41 under the title *Περὶ φύσεως*. See also K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides* (Bonn, 1916), p. 94 f. Recently K. Deichgraeber has

to natural history at all. See the similar statement by Galen, *In Hippocr. De nat. hom.* xv. 25 K. (Xenoph. A 36). Sabinus, a commentator on Hippocrates, had ascribed to Xenophanes the theory that the earth was the element from which everything originated and thereby put him on the same level with Thales or Anaximenes. But Galen correctly points out that Theophrastus did not list this view at all in his *Phys. opin.* The δόξα goes back to Xenoph. B 27, ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ, which has indeed nothing to do with natural philosophy.

13. T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (London, 1906), p. 155. See the passage in Diog. L. ix. 18 (Xenoph. A 1) quoted in n. 2, in which Xenophanes is said to have recited his own poems (καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρραψώδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ).
14. See Xenoph. B 1.
15. This is the somewhat bold picture of Xenophanes which Gomperz, loc. cit., tried to make plausible. But the grammatical foundation of it is weak. The words ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρραψώδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ (see n. 2) are not opposed to the works of Homer, but only to the preceding γέγραφε δὲ ἐν ἔπεσι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἰάμβους, 'he wrote hexametric poems, elegies, and iambics, but he also recited them in public himself'. The word ἐρραψώδει lent itself quite naturally to that unusual kind of performance, but it does not imply that in order to be able to recite his own poems he had to be a Homeric rhapsode. Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Solon.* 8 on Solon's elegy Αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον, which he recited himself in the marketplace.
16. Plat. *Ion* 536 d calls the rhapsode Ion 'Ομήρου δεινὸς ἐπαινέτης; see also 542 b. Ion is represented as a specialist who knows his Homer thoroughly (but nothing else) and who teaches Homer as the source of all wisdom.
17. Plat. *Rep.* 606 e. Herodian, *Περὶ διχρ.* p. 296, 6 (Cr. *An. Ox.* iii, Xenoph. B 10).
18. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 109 (Xenoph. B 23).
19. Sextus, *Adv. math.* vii. 49. 110. Plut. *De aud. poet.* 2, p. 17 E (Xenoph. B 34).
20. Later Greek doxographers, and especially the sceptic school, used to interpret these words in the sense of dogmatic agnosticism. (See Sextus, *Adv. math.* vii. 48, who lists Xenophanes as the first of οἱ ἀνελόντες τὸ κριτήριον.) But obviously the awareness of the uncertainty of his ideas did not prevent Xenophanes from pronouncing them. We find a similar thought expressed by the Hippocratic author of *On Ancient Medicine* in the proem of his book (c. 1); but there it is said to be the advantage of medical science that it rests on verifiable experience, whereas natural philosophy is rejected because its views can never be confirmed by facts.
21. Cicero divides the inquiry *De nat. deor.* ii. 1 into the following topics: (1) *esse deos*, (2) *quales sint*, (3) *mundum ab his administrari*, (4) *consulere eos rebus humanis*. The question *quales sint* implies the problem of the true form or shape of the gods; see *De nat. deor.* ii, c. 17.
22. See Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii, c. 17 ff.
23. I follow in this the direct fragments, especially B 23, where it is said that God's δέμας does not resemble that of mortal men. According to the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Xenophane Melisso Gorgia* (977^b1 = Xenoph. A 28 (7)), Xenophanes taught that his God was spherical in shape; but this is obviously due to a later interpretation of frg. B 23 under the influence of Parmenides, who calls his Being (Parm. B 8, 43) εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίκιον ὄγκω. This is not the only example of such a Parmenidean interpretation of

recalls the description of Zeus in Homer (*Iliad* i. 530), μέγαν δ' ἐλέλιξεν "Ολυμπον. But the universe (πάντα) now takes the place of Olympus.

38. Xenoph. B 11, B 12.
39. Ibid. B 14.
40. We find the same criticism of the theogonic idea that the gods were born and therefore not eternal in Epicharmus B 1. See ch. iv, p. 55.
41. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 110 (Xenoph. B 15).
42. Clem. Alex. op. cit. vii. 22 (Xenoph. B 16).
43. Goethe, *Gott, Gemüt und Welt*, vv. 23-4 (Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Bd. iv, p. 4).
44. See Aug. *Civ. Dei* viii, especially c. 11.
45. The new philosophical God is related to nature and to the universe, not to the *polis*, as were the old gods of the Greeks.
46. Xenoph. B 2, 11-22. In this poem he praises his own σοφίη as the foundation of εὐνομίη in the *polis* and contrasts it with the *areté* of the victors in the Olympic games. They are overpraised by human society, for they are unable to contribute anything to the common good. Here Xenophanes refers his new philosophical religion to a new rational concept of the best social order. See *Paideia*, i², p. 173.
47. See Friedrich Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1942), pp. 163 and 168 f.
48. Xenoph. B 26, 2: οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαι μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ.
49. Max Pohlenz, *Göttinger Gel. Nachr.*, 1933, pp. 53 ff., has given a survey of the development of this concept. But the *θεοπρεπές*, discussed in the text hereafter, is omitted from his survey.
50. On the concept of τὸ πρέπον in Greek rhetorical and poetical theory, see J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi* (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 28, 31, 35, 78. On its influence on Greek medicine, see W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 47-50. The word ἀρμόττον is used as synonymous with πρέπον.
51. See line 1345 in Euripides' *Heracles*, δαίται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς θεός, οὐδενός—if God is 'truly God', i.e. if his nature corresponds to the correct idea of God. This idea implies that he cannot be in need of anything. What is behind this concept of a θεός who is ὀρθῶς θεός is the claim of Xenophanes that our idea of God ought to be in harmony with what befits God. Euripides' rationalism made him fond of Xenophanes. This is shown by such obvious imitations as his criticism of the uselessness of athletic strength in the first edition of his *Autolycus* (see Ath. x. 413 c, Xenoph. C 2). The whole passage in the *Heracles* also seems to be borrowed from Xenophanes, as Diels observed; it attacks the idea of the gods committing adultery or dominating over one another, an idea which we found in Xenoph. B 11, B 12, A 32. Even though we do not find the idea that God is not in need of anything in the preserved fragments of Xenophanes, it obviously had its origin in his thought.
52. Plat. *Rep.* 378 c ff. criticizes the way in which the poets represent the gods, and he sets up τύποι θεολογίας for the education of the guards in his ideal State. The poets have to follow these rules if they want to be admitted to his republic. Plato's words recall those of Xenophanes when he refers to enmities and fights among gods, gigantomachies, and theomachies; cf. Xenoph. B 1, 21-4, B 11, and B 12.

nor unlimited. Simplicius reproduces this immediately after quoting what he found in Theophrastus; obviously he did not notice that the two reports do not agree, but understood Theophrastus in the sense of the author of the *De Xenophane Melisso Gorgia*, i.e. he misunderstood him completely. What Theophrastus really meant to say is what Aristotle said in the *Metaphysics*, and nothing more.

65. This *diadoché* is to be found first in Plato's *Sophist* 242 c-d, where the Elean stranger says that the various schools of thought had taught either three, or two, or one kind of Being. The Eleatic tribe, he says, starting with Xenophanes 'and even earlier' (he obviously means Homer or the Milesian school), assumed the unity of all things. This is of course a playful and half-ironical way of speaking. The next step is taken in Arist. *Metaph.* A 5, 986^b18 ff. There we find Plato's combination laid down as historical fact. Parmenides became a pupil of Xenophanes, 'as they say', because Xenophanes was the first to stress the unity of Being (ὁ πρῶτος ἐνίσας). But even Aristotle admits that the two thinkers did not have the same thing in mind, and the factual basis for establishing a teacher-pupil relationship between them is very slight indeed. But once it was stated in book i of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which was the bible of Theophrastus and the later ancient doxographers, the *diadoché* was accepted by all text-books on the history of philosophy as an established fact.
66. See nn. 11 and 12.

CHAPTER IV

THE SO-CALLED ORPHIC THEOGONIES

1. See Epicharm. B 1:

—ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοι θεοὶ παρῆσαν χυπέλιπον οὐ πώποκα,
τάδε δ' αἰεὶ πάρεσθ' ὁμοῖα διὰ τε τῶν αὐτῶν αἰεί.
—ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὰν Χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι τῶν θεῶν.
—πῶς δέ κα; μὴ ἔχον γ' ἀπό τινος μηδ' ἐς ὃ τι πρῶτον μόλοι.
—οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμολε πρῶτον οὐθέν;—οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον
τῶνδ' ἔ γ' ὦν ἄμες νῦν ὦδε λέγομεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τάδ' ἦς.

Diels, Reinhardt, and other scholars believe in the authenticity of this fragment. From the viewpoint of language and style this seems not unlikely, and the content seems quite possible for Xenophanes' time. Epicharmus may have been influenced by the criticism of his famous contemporary.

2. See ch. iii, n. 19.
3. Diog. L. viii. 83 (Alcmaeon B 1): Ἀλκμαίων Κροτωνιάτης τάδε ἔλεξε Περὶ θου υἱὸς Βροτίνῳ καὶ Λέοντι καὶ Βαθύλλῳ· περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων [περὶ τῶν θνητῶν] σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. Zeller and others thought the words περὶ τῶν θνητῶν a gloss which had crept into the text, whereas Diels defends them by saying that Alcmaeon's book dealt both with ἀφάνεα and θνητά. But the antithesis of ἀφάνεα and θνητά is strangely illogical, and the words περὶ τῶν θνητῶν disrupt the structure of the sentence. One should not defend this syntactical harshness by saying that it is due to the archaic style.
4. *On Ancient Medicine*, c. 1.
5. See p. 43, where we have shown that even Xenophanes, though he attacks the

19. See O. Kern, 'Empedokles und die Orphiker', *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* i (1888), 498.
20. I have shown *supra*, p. 34, that this 'Orphic' interpretation of the fragment of Anaximander goes back to a period when the correct text of the fragment had not yet been discovered by H. Diels in the Simplicius manuscripts. Nevertheless, the old interpretation is maintained by some, although its textual basis has been destroyed. A leading representative of the mystical interpretation of the pre-Socratics was K. Joel, *Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik* (Jena, 1906); see the same author's *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie* (Tubingen, 1921), pp. 149 ff.: 'Der mystische Geist und seine Klärung zum Logos.'
21. See Kern *O.F.* 27, Arist. frg. 7, Rose (where the reference to the *De anima* should be i. 5, 410^b28 and not 1410^b28). Kern questions the Aristotelian origin of the view that Onomacritus was the author of the poem. He writes *φασίν* instead of *φησίν* in frg. 7 R. of *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, which is taken from Philoponus' commentary on the *De anima*; Guthrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff., leaves this question undecided. According to Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 38, 108, Aristotle had stated in the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* that 'a poet Orpheus never existed'. Philoponus (who confirms the fact that according to Aristotle the 'Orphic poems' were not written by Orpheus) takes this to mean that only the *δόγματα* stemmed from Orpheus, not the poems, which were written by Onomacritus. In my *Aristotle*, p. 129 (cf. 136), I have followed Philoponus, according to whom Aristotle denied the authorship of Orpheus but not his historicity. But Guthrie's treatment of the fragment, *loc. cit.*, has made this doubtful. I conclude that the Orphic poem mentioned by Aristotle had theogonic content from the fact that he quoted it for the view of its author that the soul originated from the (*pneuma* in the) universe and came into the body carried by the winds. Aristotle refers to the so-called Orphic *ἔπη* again in *De gen. an.* ii. 1, 734^a 16, for a similar detail regarding the origin of the human body. Both opinions on the origin of soul and body were evidently part of a cosmogony in the 'Orphic poem'; and the cosmogony was no doubt put against a theogonic background and not treated in a purely abstract and scientific manner, even though it may already have been influenced by the contemporary theories of natural philosophers. This epic seems to be different from the redaction of the *Oracles of Musaeus* (*Χρησμοὶ Μουσαίου*) ascribed to Onomacritus by Herod. vii. 6 (see n. 23).
22. Herod. vii. 6.
23. See H. Diels, 'Über Epimenides von Kreta' in *Ber. Berl. Ak.*, 1891, pp. 387 ff. The *Oracles of Musaeus* must have been interpolated (if they contained any older tradition at all) by Onomacritus, who inserted 'prophetic' references to events of the time when the Persian war was imminent; see Herod., *loc. cit.*
24. This, if anything, is made clear by O. Kern's collection of testimonia in *O.F.*, pp. 1 ff.
25. For this picture of the Orphic Church see O. Kern, *Religion der Griechen*, ii (Berlin, 1935), 148. The idea, however, that the theogonic epics contained the dogma of the Orphic religion is not restricted to Kern alone but goes back to Erwin Rohde's *Psyche* and is widely held.
26. See O. Kern, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
27. See my 1943 Aquinas Lecture, *Humanism and Theology* (Marquette University Press, 1943), especially pp. 36 ff., 58 ff., 82 ff. There I have traced the origin of the concept of theology in Greek philosophy and outlined its reception by the early Christian Church. See also the first chapter of the present book.

others were derived. The children of Zeus and Hera are the fifth generation in this series. If we assume that Uranus and Gē were only the first *couple*, but must have originated from Chaos or some other primordial deity (see n. 51), we have indeed the six generations which we need; for it is hard to go beyond the sixth, the children of Zeus and Hera, who are the last ones listed by Plato. It may be well to remember that there were six generations of gods also in the Neoplatonic version of Orphic theogony. This is important for the interpretation of the six *γενεαί* in the Orphic poem quoted by Plato, because it confirms that the number six was firmly established in theogonic tradition. See Orph. B 12, with Diels's footnotes (*Vorsokratiker* i).

39. Aristoph. *Birds*, 690 ff. (Kern, *O.F.* 1).
40. See *supra*, p. 34.
41. See in Aristoph., op. cit. 696, the words *περιτελλομένας ὥραις*, which are a poetic paraphrase of *χρόνος*.
42. See *supra*, pp. 15 ff.
43. Aristoph., op. cit. 695 ff.
44. See Damasc. *De princ.* 124 [i. 320, 17 Ruelle]; Epimen. B 5 Diels (Eudem., frg. 117, Spengel).
45. See Damasc., loc. cit.; Orph. B 12 Diels (Eudem., frg. 117). Cf. Diels's footnote *ad loc.*
46. See H. Diels in *Festschrift für Theodor Gomperz* (Vienna, 1902): 'Ein orphischer Demeterhymnus', p. 1 and especially pp. 13 ff.
47. The words *Ἰρικεπαίγε σῶισοι με* are to be found in a mystery papyrus of the third century B.C., discovered in the Egyptian village of Gurob and first published by J. G. Smily, *Greek Papyri from Gurob* (Dublin, 1921), n. 1. (See Kern, *O.F.* 31, lin. 22.)
48. The fragments of Epimenides' *Theogony* or *Χρησμοί* are collected in Diels's *Vorsokratiker*, i. See the excerpt from Eudemos, *supra*, n. 44.
49. Epimen. B 5.
50. See J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (4th ed.), pp. 109, 186, etc.
51. According to Eudemos, the *Theogony* of Orpheus made Night the beginning (Orph. B 12); Aristoph. *Birds* 693 also begins his parody of an Orphic *Theogony* from Chaos and Night. See *supra*, p. 64.
52. Hom. *Iliad* xiv. 201.
53. This is how we may interpret the words of Eudemos *ap.* Damasc. 124 (Epimen. B 5): *ἐξ ὧν [scil. Ἀέρος καὶ Νυκτός] δύο Τιτᾶνες . . .* Eudemos does not say who these 'two Titans' are, but if we look up the catalogue of the children of Uranus who are called Titans in Hes. *Theog.* 129 ff. (see vv. 207 ff. and 630), it seems possible that Oceanus and Tethys are to be understood by the *δύο Τιτᾶνες* of Epimenides, for they are the only ones who form a traditional couple that could and did play a part as *ἀρχή* in the oldest theogony, i.e. in Homer (see n. 52). Philodemus, *De piet.* 47 a 2, p. 19 (Gomperz), compares the Homeric variant, Oceanus and Tethys, with Epimenides' first couple, Air and Night; and Epimenides may have felt obliged by this famous tradition to incorporate the Homeric version somehow into his new genealogy by making Oceanus and Tethys, 'the Titans', the children of Air and Night, thus giving them the second instead of the first place. His reason for any such correction must have been that he wanted to make the genealogical myth agree with the

68. See the long fragment discovered in a papyrus, Pherecyd. B 2.
69. Damasc. *De princ.* 124 (Eudemus, frg. 117), Pherecyd. A 8. Porph. *De antr. Nymph.* 31 (Pherecyd. B 6) says that Pherecydes distinguished in his cosmology various *μυχοί* and that he used the words *ἄντρα*, *βόθροι*, *πύλαι*, and *θύραι* as synonyms of *μυχοί*. Hence the title *Πεντέμυχος* (see Damasc. loc. cit.). Suidas has the variant *Ἑπτάμυχος*, which he seems to take from Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* (Pherecyd. A 2). The variant shows that the title was added by later writers, probably the grammarians of Alexandria, who did not agree on the interpretation of Pherecydes' cosmological scheme. Damascius explains *πεντέμυχος* as *πεντέκοσμος*.
70. Damasc. loc. cit. (= Eudemus) says that Chronos made—out of his own (?) *γόνος*—fire, *pneuma*, water . . . and distributed them in five *μυχοί*, and from them he derived a numerous lineage of gods. In the lacuna of this text two other elements are missing. Kern conjectures *αὐτοῦ* instead of *ἑαυτοῦ* and understands the *γόνος* to be that of Zās. Cf. Pherecyd. B 7, where the word *ἐκροή* is ascribed to him. But the 'emanation' which this synonym for *σπέρμα* or *γόνος* seems to suggest must have indicated something physical and quite different from the later spiritualistic use of the term.
71. Orig. *Contra Cels.* vi. 42 (Pherecyd. B 5).
72. Orig. loc. cit. (Pherecyd. B 4).
73. Aesch. *Prom.* 351–72, Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 15–28.
74. See my note in *Paideia*, i², p. 454, n. 31.
75. There seems to me an urgent need to reinterpret Hesiod's *Theogony* and his entire thought from this point of view and to make a serious effort to distinguish Hesiod's own theological ideas, which are new, from the merely traditional elements of his speculation.
76. Nauck, *Tragic. graec. fragm.*, Aesch. frg. 70.

CHAPTER V

ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL'S DIVINITY

1. Erwin Rohde, *Psyche—Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, 7.–8. Aufl. (Tubingen, 1921).
2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 4. Even though Rohde insists that it is not correct to say that death is the end of everything in Homer, that which is left, the Homeric *ψυχή*, is not a soul in our sense of the word.
4. Hom. *Iliad* i. 3–5, xxiii. 105. Different is xxiii. 244.
5. Rohde, op. cit., pp. 4 ff.
6. Ibid., pp. 46–7.
7. Pindar, frg. 131 (Schroeder). See Rohde, op. cit., p. 6. The Greek words of Pindar which we have translated by 'image of life' are *αἰῶνος εἶδωλον*.
8. W. F. Otto, *Die Manen oder Von den Urformen des Totenglaubens* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 4 ff.
9. W. F. Otto, op. cit., p. 6, has observed this rightly. I remember that, even before Otto's book was published, I had frequent discussions on the problem

25. Diog. L. ix. 19 (Xenoph. A 1).
26. Arist. *Phys.* iv. 6, 213^b22 (*Pythagor. Schule* B 30).
27. See n. 21. Cf. the parallel results of the previous chapter concerning the influence of natural philosophy on the theogonic epics of the sixth century.
28. See n. 24. Diogenes of Apollonia, who followed the doctrine of Anaximenes closely, certainly thought of his air-principle as animated and 'knowing much' (πολλὰ εἰδώς, see frg. B 8). Similarly the author of the Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease* says (c. 19), τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν ὁ ἀὴρ παρέχεται.
29. See Bickel, op. cit., pp. 260 ff.
30. See *Iliad* xi. 334; *Od.* xxi. 154, 171.
31. On Anaximenes' concept of ψυχή see n. 24.
32. I have traced this development of the concept of *areté* throughout the history of the Greek mind in my *Paideia*; on the etymology and meaning of the word see vol. i², p. 5 and p. 418, n. 10.
33. For instance, *Iliad* xiii. 671, ὦκα δὲ θυμὸς ὤλετ' ἀπὸ μελέων (θυμός = ψυχή), *Od.* xi. 221, xv. 354.
34. On the historical development of the Greek concept of ψυχή see John Burnet, 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul', in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1915-16, pp. 235 ff.
35. See W. F. Otto, op. cit., p. 1, on the two basic conceptions of soul, the Homeric, which he identifies with the old popular belief, and the mystic.
36. This is the opinion of Otto Kern, *Religion der Griechen*, ii (Berlin, 1935), p. 147.
37. See *supra*, p. 82.
38. This antithesis of body and soul which occurs so frequently in later times did not yet exist in Homeric thought. When the ψυχή is opposed to the body in Homer, the corpse or body is generally called 'the man himself' (αὐτός); see n. 4, where an exception to this rule is noted.
39. See F. M. Cornford, 'The Invention of Space', in *Essays in Honour of Gilbert Murray* (London, 1936), p. 223. See also J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (4th ed.), pp. 109, 186, 194, 229.
40. See *supra*, p. 79, and nn. 24 ff.
41. C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i, pp. 69 ff.
42. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 63 ff. and frg. 129-33 (Schroeder).
43. See Wilamowitz, *Pindar* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 248-52. Wilamowitz rightly observes that it was not necessary for Pindar to be initiated in order to be able to describe Orphic eschatology as he does. But Wilamowitz seems to underrate the impression which that faith must have made on the poet to enable him to write his verses.
44. Pind., frg. 129-30 (Schroeder).
45. *Ibid.*, frg. 133 (Schroeder).
46. For abstinence from animal food as a characteristic of the Orphic βίος see passages referred to *supra* p. 216, n. 11.
47. See Pind. frg. 131 (Schroeder).
48. Arist. frg. 10 (Rose). On this fragment see my *Aristotle*, p. 161.

15. Hermann Diels, in the introduction to his *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (Berlin, 1897), has analysed the motive of revelation in the proem of Parmenides' poem and has linked it with the history of early Greek religion.
16. Diels, op. cit., has assumed Orphic influence, and others have followed him in this. On the Orphic question in general see *supra*, p. 58.
17. Parm. B 6, 6.
18. Aesch. *Prom.* 447. On traces of prophetic speech in the language of Heraclitus see p. 112.
19. Parm. B 7, 4 (formerly B 1, 35).
20. Parm. B 1, 2-3: ὁδὸν . . . ἣ κατὰ πάντ' ἄσση φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα (πάντ' ἄσση N, πάντ' ἄση L, πάντα τῇ Es). See the attempts of modern scholars to restore the text of this passage listed in Diels's *Vorsokratiker*, i⁵, ad loc.
21. See *Od.* i. 3, πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω.
22. On the metaphor of the way in early Greek thought see Otfried Becker, *Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken* (Einzelschriften zum *Hermes*, Heft 4, Berlin, 1937). The author has traced the use and meaning of this metaphor throughout early Greek literature and devotes a special chapter to Parmenides (pp. 139 ff.).
23. In my *Paideia*, i², p. 460, n. 149, I have suggested the emendation of the corrupt word ἄσση (Parm. B 1, 3) into ἄσση: the 'way' of truth leads the 'knowing man' (εἰδότα φῶτα) unscathed (*incolumem*) wherever he goes. Similarly, the religious language of Aesch. *Eum.* 315 says of the 'pure' man (καθαρός), i.e. of him who keeps his hands free from pollution, that 'he goes through life unscathed' (ἀσση δ' αἰῶνα διοικνεῖ). This strikes the note required by the context of Parmenides' proem. After I had advocated this restoration of the text I noticed that Meineke had anticipated it, which seems to prove its correctness. My suggestion was accepted by O. Becker (see n. 22), p. 140, n. 5.
24. Parmenides received his 'revelation' not by an act of personal grace but as the 'knowing man' (εἰδὼς φῶς). See B 1, 3.
25. Goethe's words on *heilig öffentlich Geheimnis* are an attempt at expressing the nature of true mystery.
26. See *Cebetis tabula*, cc. 12 and 21. The later ancient material on the two ways was collected by A. Brinkmann; see p. 620 of his article quoted in n. 27.
27. See A. Brinkmann, 'Ein Denkmal des Neupythagoreismus', *Rheinisches Museum N.F.* 66 (1911), pp. 616 ff.
28. Hes. *Works and Days*, 286 ff.
29. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 77. On the two ways which the souls of the good and the bad have to wander after death, see Plat. *Gorg.* 524 a and *Rep.* 614 c.
30. On the myth in Plato's *Republic* and his conception of *paideia* as preparation for the choice of the right βίος in the next life, see *Paideia*, ii. 370. Plato follows an 'Orphic' pattern, into which he introduces his idea of *paideia*. On *paideia* as the 'road' (ταύτη πορευτέον), see also *Epin.* 992 a. Cf. Plato's similar reinterpretation of the 'islands of the blessed' as the philosophical *paideia*; *Paideia*, ii. 300, 319.
31. Parm. B 6.
32. Ibid. B 6, 4 ff.
33. Ibid. B 1, 3, εἰδότα φῶτα.

50. Parm. B 10, B 11.
51. Ibid. B 16.
52. Ibid. B 1, 9-10.
53. Ibid. B 8, 56 ff., and B 9.
54. Burnet, op. cit., pp. 184 ff., thinks that Parmenides in the second part of his poem took Pythagorean views as his point of departure. Diels (see n. 49), p. 63, assumes that this part formed a kind of doxography in the later Peripatetic manner and that it listed the views of previous philosophers. Against both views see Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 28, n. 1.
55. See Kurt Riezler, *Parmenides* (Frankfurt, 1934), p. 50.
56. Parm. B 8, 13 ff.: τοῦ εἶνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδῃσιν. Diels translated this passage: 'Drum hat die Gerechtigkeit Werden und Vergehen nicht aus ihren Banden freigegeben, sondern sie hält sie fest.' He took the infinitives γενέσθαι and ὄλλυσθαι as object of ἀνῆκε. But the object of Δίκη ἀνῆκε is τὸ εἶναι, which must be supplied from what precedes here as well as in ll. 22 and 26. (Kranz in the fifth edition of Diels's *Vorsokratiker* has adopted the correct interpretation.) I find ἀφῆκε construed in exactly the same way with the *accusativus cum infinitivo* by Gregory of Nyssa (Migne, *P.G.* xlv, 1273 D). He seems to transfer a thought of Parmenides to Christian theological speculation. See H. Fraenkel, *Parmenides-Studien* (Gott. Gel. N., 1930, p. 159), who first rightly criticized Diels's interpretation of these lines.
57. Parm. B 8, 21.
58. This interpretation would make the first part of Parmenides' poem correspond with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the philosophy of Being as Being (ὄν ἢ ὄν), and the second part with Aristotle's *Physics*, the theory of Being as moved (ὄν ἢ κινητόν).
59. In other words, Parmenides' procedure is exactly contrary to what we should expect from the modern point of view.
60. These properties he calls 'sign-posts' (σήματα) on the road to truth, frg. B 8, 2.
61. J. Stenzel in *Handbuch der Philosophie: Die Metaphysik des Altertums* (Munich and Berlin, 1929), pp. 34, 36, 47.
62. Parm. B 8, 43-4.
63. Burnet, op. cit., p. 182, rightly points to the fact that Parmenides' concept of Being determined the three most influential theories of the material foundations of the universe which were set forth by later pre-Socratic thinkers: Empedocles' four elements, Anaxagoras' homoeomeries, and Democritus' atoms. But I cannot follow Burnet when he infers from this that therefore Parmenides' Being itself must have been 'matter', and that this was its real meaning. What happened to Parmenides' Being the moment one of his pupils interpreted it as material is shown by Melissus of Samos, who quite logically dropped one of its main characteristics, its finiteness, and made it like Anaximander's material ἀρχή, the *apeiron*, again.
64. Parm. B 1, 3.
65. Ibid. B 8, 4.
66. The road which leads to the knowledge of this Being is called 'far from the path of mortals', frg. B 1, 27. The man who goes this way and reaches its end, which is truth, is praised because of his blessed lot. The Christian concept,

- use of *ἑών* (= real, true) in Hipp. *De vet. med.*, c. 1. There medicine is called a τέχνη ἑοῦσα. With τοῦ λόγου ἑόντος ἀεί, cf. τοῦ λόγου ἑόντος ξυνοῦ (Heracl. B 2). For the content see B 34: ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εἰκόασιν φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι. Cf. also B 72. This style, though consciously rhetorical, takes its colours from old religious *Prophetenrede*.
12. Similar is B 50: οὐκ ἔμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας.
13. διαιρέων, not = διαιρούμενος, cf. Herod. vii. 16, where it is said of a γνώμη (οἶον ἐγὼ διαιρέω).
14. Heracl. B 89, 'the waking have one and the same cosmos'. Cf. also the contrast of waking and sleeping in B 21, B 26, B 73.
15. See Heracl. B 1, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους.
16. See νοεῖν, νόημα, Parm. B 7, 2; B 2, 2; B 3, B 6, 1 and 6; B 8, 8, 17, 36, &c. (but Parm. B 16, 3, φρονέει); Heraclitus uses φρόνιμος, φρονεῖν, φρόνησις in B 2, B 17, B 64, B 112 (?), B 113, B 116. On the practical meaning of φρόνησις see my *Aristotle*, pp. 81-4. Heraclitus says that τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη (B 112). (Kranz prefers the variant σωφρονεῖν.)
17. See Aesch. *Ag.* 176.
18. Heracl. B 1, ἔπη καὶ ἔργα.
19. Ibid. B 112, σοφίη (*scil.* ἐστὶ) ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν.
20. Ibid. B 73, οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.
21. Ibid. B 1.
22. See n. 14.
23. Ibid. B 2.
24. Ibid. B 113.
25. See *supra*, p. 95.
26. See *ibid.* B 29, B 104. Cf. also B 49.
27. See *supra*, p. 114.
28. Heracl. B 113.
29. See my essay 'Praise of Law: The Origin of Legal Philosophy and the Greeks' in *Interpretations of Legal Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound* (N.Y., 1946), p. 359.
30. See *supra*, p. 36.
31. The Erinyes avenge every violation of what we should call the natural laws of life. Cf. Hom. *Iliad* xix. 418.
32. See *supra*, p. 31.
33. We had to make a similar statement about the meaning of Anaximander's *diké*. See *supra*, p. 36.
34. Diog. L. ix. 5 (Heracl. A 1): τὸ δὲ φερόμενον αὐτοῦ βιβλίον ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνέχοντος Περὶ φύσεως, διήρηται δὲ εἰς τρεῖς λόγους, εἷς τε τὸν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ θεολογικόν.
35. See *Paideia*, i², p. 183.
36. Diog. L. ix. 15 (Heracl. A 1) quotes among the commentators on Heraclitus the grammarian Diodotus, ὃς οὐ φησι περὶ φύσεως εἶναι τὸ σύγγραμμα, ἀλλὰ περὶ πολιτείας, τὰ δὲ περὶ φύσεως ἐν παραδείγματος εἶδει κεῖσθαι. The words 'to have a merely paradigmatic function' used in the text seem to me the best

43. Ibid. B 65. Here the opposites are called *χρημοσύνη* and *κόρος*. In B 67 they are *κόρος* and *λιμός*. Scholars have suspected that these are only variants of one and the same fragment, but apparently Heraclitus used to repeat and inculcate his principles, as is clear from other instances (cf. B 32 with B 41 and see Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 62, n. 1). This was due to the character of his prophetic language, and well expresses his attitude as a teacher of the 'sleeping'. The words *κόρος* and *λιμός* seem to point only to the human experience of hunger and surfeit, but the variant *χρημοσύνη* and *κόρος* in B 65 shows that it is a principle of wider application. On the interpretation of both fragments see Gigon, op. cit., p. 49 (see n. 10). Gigon rightly understands the words as referring to a principle of cosmic universality. Also, the 'war and peace' which precede 'hunger and surfeit' (B 67) clearly have the same cosmic character, though man experiences them first in human life. There he comes to understand them first of all from within.
44. On Heracl. B 51 see Gigon, op. cit., p. 23.
45. Heracl. B 8. Gigon, who on the evidence of B 51 denies that Heraclitus' theory of harmony has anything to do with musical harmony (see op. cit., p. 23), must of course regard B 8 as suspect (pp. 25, 117) because its words about the *καλλίστη ἀρμονία* obviously refer to musical harmony as a product of strife (*eris*), the tension of the chords. But was not this coincidence of 'strife' and 'harmony' naturally the classical example for Heraclitus, which he then expanded into a symbol of cosmic universality? It was the same principle of strife and tension, according to him, that created the lyre and the bow, instruments of the arts of both peace and war.
46. Arist. *Eth. Eud.* viii. 1, 1235^a25 (Heracl. A 22).
47. Gigon, op. cit., p. 117, questions the authenticity of the opposites *ἄρρεν: θῆλυ*, which Aristotle expressly ascribes to Heraclitus (*Eth. Eud.* viii. 1, 1235^a26-7). Gigon's argument is not made quite clear. He only says (p. 117): 'im Rahmen der bisher dargestellten heraklitischen Lehre lässt sich gerade *ἄρρεν: θῆλυ* kaum unterbringen.' Aristotle, *De gen. an.* i. 18, 724^b9, also gives the mating of male and female as an example of *γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων*.
48. Heracl. B 60.
49. See K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides*, pp. 169 ff., who, following Schleiermacher and others, has proved with irrefutable arguments against Zeller that Heraclitus did not anticipate the Stoic theory of the *ἐκπύρωσις* of the world.
50. Anaximander (A 9) taught that things came into existence by a process of *ἀπόκρισις* of the *apeiron*; Anaximenes (A 5) said that they originated through *πύκνωσις* and *μάνωσις* of the primal substance, Air.
51. Thus it can in fact be stated that Heraclitus had no elaborate cosmology in the sense of the Milesian school, as Reinhardt remarks, op. cit., p. 173. Theophrastus, in the excerpt of Diogenes Laertius (ix. 8), obviously knows only what he takes from B 90 (*πυρὸς ἀμοιβήν τὰ πάντα*). Thus fire was the *στοιχείον* of Heraclitus; that he derived *τὰ γινόμενα* from this principle by *πύκνωσις* and *ἀραίωσις* must be Theophrastus' own interpretation, and he adds resignedly: *σαφῶς δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκτιθεται*. But this can be explained easily if we keep in mind that Heraclitus' entire thought was directed towards the unity of things.
52. Heracl. B 10, B 50.
53. Ibid. B 51, B 59, B 60.
54. See K. Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 64 ff. He has thus reversed the traditional

in Heraclitus' thought a symbol of the language of nature (B 93), and so does the prophetic figure of the Sibyl (B 92). He reinterprets the myth of the heroes, who after their death became guardians of the living (B 63).

57. Xenoph. B 2, 19 ff. See *supra*, p. 49.

58. Heracl. B 78: *ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει*. Diels, Gigon, and others translate *γνώμας* by 'insight', and I have kept this in the text; but the word needs interpretation. In Theognis 60, *γνώμαι* are 'norms' or 'standards'; cf. *ibid.* 693: surfeit has ruined many silly men, for it is hard to know the measure when good fortune is present. *γνώμη* is just this *γνώμαι μέτρον*; therefore (*ibid.* 1171) it is called the best gift which the gods can give a man because 'it has the (knowledge of the) limits of everything'. These words are obviously a mere paraphrase of Solon's frg. 16 (Diehl), where he says that it is hardest to see the invisible measure of *γνωμοσύνη*, which has the limits (*πείρατα*) of everything. In *Paideia*, i², p. 452, n. 73, I have used these parallels to show that Clement of Alexandria must be wrong in referring the *γνωμοσύνη* in Solon's lines to God. Solon must be talking of a human quality, but one which is very rare. One could add Theognis 895: *γνώμης οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἀνὴρ ἔχει αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδ' ἀγνωμοσύνης, Κύρν', ὀδυνηρότερον*. But Heraclitus does say what Clement makes Solon say: that human nature does not possess *γνώμη* at all, and that only divine nature truly has it. Even a grown-up man is *νήπιος* compared with God (B 79). The divine *σοφόν* is in fact *πάντων κεχωρισμένον* (B 108) and therefore called *ἐν τῷ σοφόν* (B 32 and B 41). If *γνώμη* is to know the measure (*μέτρον*), it is easier from this to understand why Heraclitus speaks so much of measure with regard to the things divine: the sun will not exceed its measures (B 94); the cosmos is *πῦρ ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα* (B 30). See the phrase *μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* (B 31), used with regard to *θάλασσα* and its transformations. Likewise, the permanent mutual exchange (*ἀνταμοιβή*) of fire and 'all things' (B 90) presupposes the idea of a measure to which it is subject.

59. See n. 56.

60. It can hardly be said that in calling and not calling his God by the name Zeus, Heraclitus 'made a concession to popular religion' (Gigon, *op. cit.*, p. 140).

61. Anaximander A 15. See *supra*, pp. 29, 31. Cf. Gigon's remarks on the text of Heracl. B 41; but whether we read *ὁπότε ἐκυβέρνησε* (Diels) or *ἡ κυβερνᾷται* (Bywater) makes little difference. On the divine *γνώμη* see *supra*, n. 58. *πάντα διὰ πάντων* is a religious formula which occurs in similar forms many times.

62. *τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός* (Heracl. B 64). *οἰακίζειν* is the activity of the pilot (from *οἶαξ*); it is like *κυβερνᾶν, οἶακα νωμᾶν*, &c., used frequently in a figurative sense of the activity of the wise ruler or king. The fire or (in the mythological language) the 'thunderbolt' in B 64 takes the place of the divine ruler.

63. It should be remembered that in the experience of the Greeks law was mostly the work of one man, the lawgiver, who is a sort of embodiment of the highest human wisdom. Plato in his *Laws* (645 b) derives the wisdom of the lawgiver from the *λόγος*, which he calls divine. If we keep this in mind, it is easier to understand Heraclitus' thought in saying that *νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἐνός* (B 33). It does not mean tyranny in the sense of Prometheus, who calls Zeus (Aesch. *Prom.* 186) *τραχὺς καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων*.

23. Emp. B 3 (4), 9 f. Empedocles wants us to trust our senses, though only so far as they give us clear instructions.
24. See the polemic of the preceding lines, *ibid.* B 3 (4), 1-8.
25. *Ibid.* B 3 (4), 10-13.
26. Parm. B 7, 4-B 8, 1 (formerly B 1, 34-6).
27. *Ibid.* B 8, 12 ff.
28. Emp. B 8, B 9.
29. Cf. Arist. *Phys.* i. 4, 187^a20 (Anaximander A 16).
30. See Simplic. *Phys.* 24, 26 ff., and 149, 32 (Anaximenes A 5).
31. Arist. *Metaph.* A 3, 984^a8 ff. (Emp. A 28). Cf. also the following testimonia in Diels's *Vorsokratiker* 15.
32. Emp. B 11.
33. *Ibid.* B 12: ἔκ τε γὰρ οὐδ' αὖτ' ἐόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι καὶ τ' ἐὼν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον. The whole thought of these lines is Parmenidean. The words ἀνήνυστον and ἄπυστον are taken from Parm. B 2 (formerly 4), 7 (where it is written ἀνυστόν) and B 8, 21.
34. Emp. B 6. What Aristotle later called the elements (στοιχεῖα) of Empedocles, he himself called 'the roots of all things' (ρίζωματα πάντων).
35. The first step in this direction had been taken by the post-Hesiodic theogonies of the sixth century, with their increasing tendency to substitute allegoric deities, which clearly stand for physical principles, for the older Olympian and pre-Olympian gods of Hesiod's *Theogony*; see *supra*, pp. 55-72.
36. Emp. B 17, 13, calls them 'always existent' and 'unmoved in the cycle' (cf. B 26, 12). They are becoming and passing away in so far as they unite to bring things into existence and part in dissolving them again; but in so far as they never cease changing they are eternal and remain unmoved in the cycle. The subject of this whole paragraph can be supplied from the solemn repetition of the first lines, B 17, 1-2, in B 17, 16-17 (in B 17, 18 Empedocles expressly names fire, water, earth, and air). The neuter and masculine forms are used *promiscue* throughout the passage: 6, ἀλλάσσοντα; 7, συνερχόμενα; 8, φορεύμενα, &c. (*scil.* the elements); but 13 (cf. also B 26, 12), ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι (!) κατὰ κύκλον (*scil.* θεοί). Yet elements and gods are the same for Empedocles. Needless to say that he uses ἐὼν and ἀκίνητον deliberately as categories of Parmenidean thought (cf. Parm. B 8, 26). Simplicius (*Phys.* 1124-5) understands the word ἀκίνητοι (Emp. B 17, 13 and 26, 12) as referring to the eternal sameness of the change (μεταβολή) and not to the elements themselves, but cf. also Emp. 35, 14: the formerly immortal elements become mortal when they come together and form the things of nature.
37. See Parm. B 8, 6, ὁμοῦ πάν, ἐν, συνεχές; B 8, 38, οὐλον; B 8, 42 f., τετελεσμένον, πάντοθεν ἴσον.
38. Emp. B 17, 7-8, 19-20; B 18-B 22, B 26. Instead of Φιλίη she is called also Φιλότης or Στοργή. Another word for Φιλίη is Γηθοσύνη. The word Νεῖκος is varied by Ἔρις, Κότος. See n. 39.
39. See Ἀφροδίτη, Emp. B 17, 24; B 22, 5; B 66; B 71, 23; B 86-B 87. She is called Κύπρις B 73; B 75; B 95; B 98, 3. The gods of the Greeks took a special pride in the many names (πολυωνυμία) by which they were invoked. Therefore Empedocles gives his elementary gods more than one name.
40. See *supra*, p. 15. Both Love and Hate in Empedocles are figures taken

53. Emp. B 28, ἀλλ' ὁ γε πάντοθεν ἴσος (έοῖ) καὶ πάμπαν ἀπείρων. Cf. Parm. B 8, 44, and especially B 8, 49, οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσων. Hence P. Maas supplies έοῖ in the lacuna in Emp. B 28 (έην, Diels).
54. In making his Being (έόν) infinite like the *apeiron* of Anaximander, Empedocles may be following the younger Eleatic school, for Melissus of Samos had reinterpreted the finite Being of Parmenides in the same way. He wrote probably a few years before Empedocles composed his poem *On Nature*.
55. Simpl. *Phys.* 1124, 1, expressly states that Empedocles (B 31) called Sphairos a god.
56. Emp. B 27, 4 (cf. B 28, 2), Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονή περιηγεί γάων. Empedocles' stereotyped phrase μονή περιηγεί γάων, which stresses the divine personality of the Sphairos, is a deliberate imitation of similar phrases in Homer, such as κύδει γάων.
57. See Simpl. *Phys.* 1183, 28 (Eudemus, frg. 71, Spengel): Εὐδημος δὲ τὴν ἀκινήσιαν ἐν τῇ τῆς Φιλίας ἐπικρατείᾳ κατὰ τὸν Σφαῖρον ἐκδέχεται.
58. Tyrtaeus, frg. 1, 15 Diels. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed., p. 210, n. 3, had denied the possibility that the word μονή could mean 'rest' and understood it with Diels as 'solitude'.
59. Xenophanes (B 26) says of his god, αἰὲ δ' ἐν ταύτῳ μέμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν, | οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαι μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ. Cf. Parm. B 8, 29, on true Being: ταύτόν τ' ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται | χούτως ἐμπεδον αὖθι μένει.
60. See *supra*, n. 36.
61. See Hippol. *Ref.* vii. 29, p. 247, 34; Simpl. *Phys.* 1124, 1.
62. Emp. B 29. Cf. Xenoph. B 23, 2, οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος οὔτε νόημα. For the predicate of the Sphairos πάντοθεν ἴσος ἑαυτῷ (see also n. 53), we again find the model in Parmenides B 8, 49, οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσων, where the οἱ equals ἑαυτῷ (Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 176, 49, wrongly takes it to be the relative pronoun, not the reflexive). Cf. also Parm. B 8, 57, ἑαυτῷ πάντοσε ταυτόν.
63. Emp. B 30.
64. Ibid. B 35.
65. Heracl. B 53. See *supra*, p. 118.
66. See the description of Strife in Emp. B 17, 8, and B 26, 6, Νείκεος ἔχθει; B 17, 19, Νείκος οὐλόμενος; B 115, 14, Νείκεϊ μαινομένῃ; B 20, 4, κακῆσι . . . Ἐρίδεσσι. Cf. B 22, 8: Strife keeps things separate from and unfamiliar with each other καὶ μάλα λυγρά. λυγρός is in Homer the usual epithet of 'ruin' (ὀλεθρός).
67. See *ibid.* B 115, 9-11.
68. On Strife see *ibid.* B 115, 4 and 14; on the realm of Love see B 128, 3.
69. Ibid. B 35, 1.
70. Ibid. B 112.
71. Empedocles' medical theories are discussed by M. Wellmann, *Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte* (Berlin, 1901), pp. 15, 21, 23, 35 f., 45, 49, 69 f., 104 f. See the tradition on Empedocles as a physician in Emp. A 1, § 58, 60 f., 69 A 2 A 3. Cf. also Hipp. *De vet. med.* 20 on his influence on contemporary medicine.
72. On Empedocles' political career see the reports by Aristotle (frg. 66, Rose in Diog. L. viii. 63, and by the historian Timaeus, *ibid.* 64 f. (Emp. A 1).

- 100. Ibid. B 128.
- 101. Ibid. B 128.
- 102. Ibid. B 130.
- 103. Ibid. B 129.
- 104. See the rule forbidding the eating of beans, *ibid.* B 141.
- 105. Ibid. B 2. On man's limited experience see also B 39, 3.
- 106. Ibid. B 129. 6.
- 107. Ibid. B 115, 13 f. (cf. B 124).
- 108. See *supra*, p. 71, for what we have said on the position of allegorizing theogonic poetry after the time of Hesiod, and its relationship to Ionian natural philosophy.

CHAPTER IX

THE TELEOLOGICAL THINKERS: ANAXAGORAS AND DIOGENES

- 1. Diog. L. ii. 7 (Anaxag. A 1).
- 2. This consciousness of his form of life (*βίος*) is expressed in another anecdote, Diog. L. ii. 10. When asked what he was born for, Anaxagoras answered: 'For the contemplation (*θεωπία*) of sun, moon, and heaven.' But this story is also told of Pythagoras.
- 3. Plat. *Apol.* 26 d (Anaxag. A 35).
- 4. See Plin. *N.H.* ii. 149; Plut. *Lys.* 12 (Plutarch takes his information from Daīmachus' *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*), and other later ancient authors quoted by Diels (Anaxag. A 11-A 12).
- 5. On the sun as a glowing stone, see Diog. L. ii. 8 (Anaxag. A 1); on the meteoric stone of Aegospotami, see the passages quoted in n. 4.
- 6. On this empirical trend, see T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, i, pp. 307-15; *Paideia*, iii, p. 17; Hugo Berger, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen* (Leipzig, 1903), p. 51.
- 7. On the constructive spirit of early Greek *ταροπία*, see *Paideia*, i², p. 157.
- 8. The classical representatives of this methodical attitude in Greek medicine are the Hippocratic authors of *On Ancient Medicine* and of the first three books of the *Επιδημιαί*. See *Paideia*, iii, pp. 17-19, and T. Gomperz, *op. cit.* i, pp. 310 ff.
- 9. Anaxagoras' methodical principle is formulated in B 21 a: *ἄφες γὰρ τῶν ἀδῆλων τὰ φαινόμενα*. Accordingly, his theory of *homocomeries* is based not on mere speculation but on the observation of certain phenomena. We get a hint as to the methodical point of departure of Anaxagoras' physics in B 10. There it is stated that he wondered how out of the same sperm the most diverse parts of an organic body (such as hair, nails, veins, arteries, sinews, and bones) could develop if these substances were not all contained in the sperm from the beginning. Of course, there were other observations taken from colours or from mechanics by which Anaxagoras tried to support his conclusion. But that he started from the problem of the nourishment and growth of organic bodies

- the medical cure of an illness by which the physician tries to restore a disturbed balance. See *Paideia*, iii, p. 6, with n. 11. The notions of sin and punishment are entirely absent from this conception of a *δίκη* and *τίσις* in nature.
20. See *supra*, pp. 29, 31, &c.
21. See *supra*, p. 157, with n. 12. Cf. Arist. *Phys.* i. 4, 187^a26 ff. (Anaxag. A 52).
22. Anaxag. B 1.
23. On the separating-out (*ἀποκρίνεσθαι*), see *ibid.* B 2, B 4, B 7, B 9, B 12, B 16.
24. *Ibid.* B 12 (last sentence).
25. See n. 9.
26. See *ibid.* B 10.
27. The fact as such was observed by Plato, *Phaedo* 97 b, and Arist. *Metaph.* A 3, 984^b15 (Anaxag. A 47, A 58).
28. See *supra*, p. 130.
29. Anaxag. B 11.
30. See *supra*, p. 159.
31. *Ibid.* B 12, *fin.*; cf. B 11: *ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι πλὴν νοῦ, ἔστιν οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἐνι.*
32. *Ibid.* B 12, *init.*: *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δὲ . . . μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστιν.* Evidently the idea contained in B 11 that *νοῦς* exists in some things (see n. 31) does not contradict this statement. Even in them the *νοῦς* is not 'mixed'. This Anaxagoras concludes from the very fact that *νοῦς* is to be found only in some things. All other things are mixed with everything else.
33. *Ibid.* B 12.
34. Diels translated *ἄπειρον* by *unendlich*. K. Deichgraeber, *Philologus*, lxxxviii, p. 348, rejects this interpretation because he thinks it does not strictly fit the antithesis. If 'the other things' are all mixed with one another, the *Nous* must be unmixed. Deichgraeber understands *ἄπειρον* in this unusual figurative sense (= *πεῖραν ἔχον οὐδενός*). He compares the sophist Antiphon (B 10), who says of God: *οὐδενός δέεται οὐδὲ προσδέχεται οὐδενός τι, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος καὶ ἀδέητος.* There the antithesis is a similar one, and the new interpretation appears quite plausible at first sight. Anaxagoras obviously wanted to attribute to his *Nous* a predicate which in the theological speculation of other pre-Socratics belonged only to God. Deichgraeber points this out very convincingly. The question is only whether this is not an argument that could also be used in favour of *ἄπειρος* = infinite. Quite apart from the fact that Anaxagoras himself uses the word exclusively in this sense in other passages (see A 43, A 45, A 50, B 1, B 2, B 4), it had always been used so in connexion with the divine principle of the universe by his philosophical predecessors (see *supra*, pp. 28 ff.). Aristotle discusses this predicate in the sense of 'infinite' in his theology (*Metaph.* A 7, 1073^a5 ff.), and he evidently does so not because he approves of it himself but because the tradition of Greek philosophical theology offered him this category as one of the fundamental predicates of the Divine, like *ἀπαθές*, *ἀναλλοίωτον*, &c. Furthermore, Deichgraeber's argument that if *ἄπειρον* were equivalent to 'infinite' it would not give us the required logical antithesis to the preceding words (*τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει*), and that therefore *ἄπειρον* must mean 'unmixed, unadulterated', is vulnerable, because the

53. Certain features of Diogenes' philosophy of nature, especially his natural theology, which proclaimed his cosmic principle Air as the god who rules the universe, were parodied by Aristophanic comedy, as modern scholars have been able to demonstrate; see H. Diels in *Ber. Berl. Ak.*, 1891. See also the comic allusion to Diogenes' theology in Philemon frg. 91, Kock. There the god Air makes his personal appearance and proves his divine nature by his omnipresence.
54. We find a similar trend towards philosophical speculation in some of the greatest exact scientists of our age, such as Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Otto Schroedinger, Svante Arrhenius, and others.
55. Diog. B 2.
56. Ibid. A 5, A 7, A 8, A 9. Cf. B 5.
57. Ibid. B 3.
58. Ibid. B 3: οὐ γὰρ ἄν, φησὶν, οἶόν τε ἦν οὕτω δεδάσθαι ἄνευ νοήσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν. The criteria of the presence of a creative mind in the universe are measure and perfection (μέτρα ἔχειν and διακεῖσθαι κάλλιστα).
59. Diog. B 5. Notice, as in Anaxagoras' Nous-theology, the stylistic form of Diogenes' statement about his first principle:

καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου
 πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι
 καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν
 αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι
 καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι
 καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι
 καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι.
 καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ὃ τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου

The form of the arrangement of the divine predicates (a δίκωλον and a τρίκωλον), all beginning with forms of the word *pās*, is the *typos* of a hymn. The predicates of Diogenes' God follow the pattern of earlier pre-Socratic thinkers; see *supra*, pp. 203 ff., where I have given a comparative analysis of this form of theological thought. See Deichgraeber, loc. cit., p. 354. Cf. Euripides' imitation of this theology in Hecuba's prayer to the Air, *Troad.* 884: 'Thou, earth's support, enthroned on the earth, whoever thou mayst be, hard to discover, Zeus, be thou nature's law or the mind of man, I pray to thee: for by a noiseless course thou guidest human fate in righteousness.' The godhead invoked cryptically in the first line is Air. Euripides takes this *theologoumenon* from Diogenes, his contemporary, who lived in Athens. What Hecuba's words add to the theology of Diogenes is the effort of the poet to give this cosmic deity two more qualities which are required in a god to whom mortals can pray: that he must have a conscious mind, and that he must represent a supreme law in accordance with which he rules the world in righteousness.

Diog. C 2 and C 3 show two more traces of the influence of Diogenes' Air-theology on contemporary Greek literature. They are the more interesting because they are found not in poetic works but in a strictly scientific context, in the 'Hippocratic' treatises *On Breaths*, 3 (vi. 94, Littré) and *On Flesh*, 2 (viii. 584, Littré). The former of these passages praises Air as the cause of the life of the body and as a great power in nature. As gods used to have the honour of more than one name, so this god is called Breath in the body of organic creatures and Air in the universe. He is predicated as μέγιστος ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης (notice the imitation of Diogenes), and his omnipresence is

- believable that this term had been used by previous philosophers who, like Diogenes, interpreted nature in this teleological way. See Theiler, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
77. The eye is like the sun's disc, according to Arist. *Thesm.* 14, and the ears are like funnels, *Thesm.* 18. In *The Clouds* he lends Socrates some features taken from Diogenes, as we have seen *supra*, n. 53. The nose is compared to a wall (τείχος) dividing the face into two halves by Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 143, in a passage full of the same comparisons of parts of human nature with technical tools or inventions. It occurs also in Xen. *Symp.* v. 5 ff. Aristotle (see n. 72) has several other analogies of this sort in common with Xenophon. He has taken them all from his and Xenophon's common source, Diogenes. We find a similar analogy of the tongue with a sponge quoted expressly from Diogenes, Aët. iv. 18, 2 (Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 406); see Diog. A 22.
78. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 3, 3-9.
79. Diog. B 3.
80. In Xen. *Mem.* i. 4, 5 ff., the argument from the purposeful construction of human nature is the basis of Socrates' reflections on the gods. But in book iv. 3, 3-9, the cosmological and meteorological argument is put into the foreground. Nevertheless, Socrates adds to it, iv. 3, 11 ff., other reasons taken from the structure of human nature, beginning with the nature and function of the senses (as in i. 4, 5), though this part of the demonstration is only given in rough outline in book iv (it is evident that Xenophon has cut his source at this point, perhaps because he did not want to repeat what he had already taken from it and used in book i. 4, 5 ff.).
81. See *supra*, p. 43.
82. Ibid. iv. 3, 13. This argument for the existence of God from his works (ἔργα) became the main proof of the Stoics. It is found likewise, of course, in the Old Testament.
83. One may say with Erich Frank, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth* (N.Y., 1945), p. 33 (see also p. 49), that for the Greeks the problem of God's existence did not have the same importance which it assumed later within the Christian world, when God was conceived as transcendent, and that the primary concern of the Greek philosophers was rather with the *natura deorum*. But this is true most of all in the early period, which took the existence of the Divine in the universe for granted and turned immediately to the problem of what it was like and how it could be approached by reason. Xenophon shows that at the time of the Sophists the existence of the gods was often regarded as doubtful, or at least incapable of proof in any direct way, and therefore had to be proved from what was obviously the work of some higher creative intelligence.
84. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 3, 14. In Diogenes' cosmology the soul of the universe, Air, builds its own body, so to speak. This is possible through a process of gradually differentiated alterations (ἐρεποιώσεις) of the primal substance; see Diog. B 5.
85. Xen. *Mem.* i. 4, 9.
86. See *supra*, p. 21.
87. Ibid. i. 4, 8.
88. Ibid. i. 4, 9. Cf. the same argument, iv. 3, 14.
89. Plat. *Phileb.* 28 c.

chance (εὐτυχῶς πως συναρπάσαι), and that there is no mind anywhere else?' Similarly Plat. *Phileb.* 30 a writes: 'Does not our body have a soul? Whence did it get that soul unless the body of the universe were animated, too, having the same (soul) as the body of man and one even more perfect?' This is Diogenes' view of the human soul as 'being only a small part of God'.

CHAPTER X

THEORIES OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF RELIGION

1. On the origin of the concept of 'the Divine' (τὸ θεῖον), see *supra*, p. 31.
2. See the numerous passages discussed *supra*, p. 242, n. 37.
3. See p. 29.
4. See pp. 161, 166.
5. See *supra*, pp. 45, 50, 125.
6. Heracl. B 32.
7. On the spiral as the most fitting symbol of the historical development of Greek philosophical thought and its position in the life of Greek religion and society, see my 1943 Aquinas Lecture, *Humanism and Theology*, p. 54.
8. On the hymnic form of predication about 'the Divine' in the statements of the early thinkers, see *supra*, pp. 29 ff., and *passim*.
9. It is this opposition to the popular religion of the Greeks which predestined their philosophical theology later to become the natural ally of the Christian Church Fathers. See St. Augustine's statement *supra*, p. 3. But the religious ideas of the Greek philosophers never became a new popular religion themselves as did Christianity. They were not religion in the collective sense of the term. At the utmost they were the common religious creed of a philosophical sect in Hellenistic times. That is why the philosophical term 'sect' (αἵρεσις) was never applied to the Christian Church as a whole, but only to groups of dissenters.
10. The nature of the universe (φύσις τοῦ παντός) was the object of the earliest philosophy of the Ionians. The nature of man (φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) is a part of that universal nature. It was made the centre of their pedagogical and sociological theories by the sophists and some of their contemporaries in the field of natural philosophy, such as Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia.
11. On the relationship of Hippocratic medicine to Greek natural philosophy, see my *Paideia*, iii, pp. 4-8, 15 f. The term φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου occurs often in Greek medical literature, and in the Hippocratic school it was made the subject of separate books, such as the treatise of Hippocrates' son-in-law Polybus *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*.
12. On Heraclitus as the first philosophical 'anthropologist', see *Paideia*, i², pp. 183 and 294, and *supra*, p. 117.
13. On the Sophists' 'educational trinity' of *physis*, *mathesis*, and *askesis*, see *Paideia* i², p. 312.
14. The connexion of Protagoras' educational theories with his views of State and society is made perfectly clear by Plato in the *Protagoras* 320 d-326 e, where he introduces the great Sophist as speaker on the subject of the

27. See the physiological arguments in Xen. *Mem.* i. 4, 5 ff., and iv. 3, 11 ff.
28. Ibid. iv. 3, 16.
29. Tiresias in Eurip. *Bacchae* 272 ff. wants to prove that Dionysus is a true god. He says that there are two divine gifts of special importance to mankind: bread and wine. Demeter and Dionysus are worshipped by mortals as the givers of these two blessings. Their adoration, therefore, appears as an act of gratitude; thus they are perfect examples of Prodicus' theory of the origin of religion. Euripides must actually have taken the argument from him. The Stoic Lucilius Balbus in Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 23, 59, quotes Prodicus extensively (though without giving his name) in a passage which is concerned with the origin of the idea of the gods in general, among them Ceres and Liber. In the same book the Stoic Cleanthes is said to have distinguished four reasons for the rise of the idea of gods in the mind of man, one of which is gratitude for the gifts of nature. It is taken from Prodicus' theory (*De nat. deor.* ii. 5, 13).
30. Philod. *De piet.* c. 9, 7, p. 75 G. Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 37, 118 (Prodicus B 5). According to Philodemus, loc. cit., the Stoic Persaeus, too, had accepted Prodicus' theory of religion.
31. Sext. *Adv. math.* ix. 18 (Prod. B 5). See Eurip. *Bacchae* 272 ff. on the deity of Demeter and Dionysus (cf. n. 29). On the word νομισθῆναι in the context of Sextus' report, see *supra*, p. 226, nn. 36 and 46.
32. Sext., op. cit., ix. 52 (Prod. B 5).
33. Themist. *Or.* 30, p. 422 Dindorf (Prod. B 5).
34. See nn. 29, 30.
35. Democritus' theory of the gods, like that of Prodicus (see n. 29), was accepted by the Stoic Cleanthes. According to Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 5, 13, Cleanthes incorporated it in his own theory as the third of his *quattuor causae* of man's belief in the existence of gods. As in the case of Prodicus, Cleanthes in Cicero does not give the name of Democritus as an authority for this opinion. But the Democritean origin of the fear-theory will be sufficiently evident from our following discussion.
36. On Democritus' explanation of dream-visions as εἰδῶλα, see Plut. *Quaest. conv.* viii. 10, 2, p. 734 F (Democr. A 77). The fact that he also explained the visions of gods and demons which men experience as εἰδῶλα is reported by the author of Hermipp. *De astrol.* 122 (p. 26, 13, Kroll-Viereck) and by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 88 (ii. 383, 25 St.) (Democr. A 78-9). Lucretius v. 1169 ff. likewise emphasizes dream-visions as a source of primitive man's belief in the existence of gods. His source, Epicurus, obviously followed Democritus' theory of the origin of religion.
37. Sext. *Adv. math.* ix. 19 (Democr. B 166).
38. Sext. loc. cit.: εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερφύη καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δέ.
39. Ibid.: ἐνθεν καὶ εὗχετο εὐλόγων τυχεῖν εἰδῶλων. The phrase εὐλόγων τυχεῖν εἰδῶλων seems to reproduce Democritus' original words.
40. Stob. ii (*Ecl. eth.*) 52, 40, Wachsmuth (Democr. B 297). This passage, if a genuine fragment of Democritus' work *Περὶ εὐθυμίας*, is the earliest one in which the noun 'conscience' (συνείδησις) appears in Greek tradition.
41. Lucretius iii. 978 ff. has preserved for us Democritus' theory that a bad conscience causes man's fear of punishment after death, just as he follows

64. See *supra*, p. 183.
65. See *supra*, pp. 179–82. Critias' lawgiver combines the theory of fear (Democritus) and that of the gifts of nature (Prodicus) as the origin of the human belief in gods.
66. When Critias' lawgiver located his gods in heaven, because from heaven there appear to mortals all sorts of terrifying phenomena of nature, such as lightning, thunder, &c., he clearly took this feature from Democritus (A 75). Democritus also made his *λόγιοι* attribute the highest wisdom to their God in the same manner as Critias (Democr. B 30). Democritus also knew, as did Critias, that one of the functions of God in religion was to be the omniscient witness of all human deeds; this is proved by his derivation of the belief in punishment after death from man's bad conscience (Democr. B 297). On the other hand, Democritus' *λόγιοι* were not lawgivers but wise men, and it was Critias who stressed the practical and political use of religion as a means to rule the people. He made God's function as a witness of human deeds the very fulcrum of his theory. This theory has appealed to later statesmen: Polybius attributes to the Roman senate the same role which Critias gives to his early lawgiver, and religion (*δαιοιδαίμονια*) appears to the Hellenistic historian as one of the most important vehicles of Roman statecraft.
67. Critias' theory of religion, if correct, would be an important example of Vaihinger's *Philosophie des Als ob*. This is particularly clear from such phrases as v. 16 of B 25, *ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο*, or the last verses quoted by Sextus from the *Sisyphus*:
- οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πεῖσαι τινα
θητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.
- That Critias' idea of God had for him the character of a conscious fiction is proved by vv. 24 ff., *τούσδε τοὺς λόγους λέγων | διδαγμάτων ἡδιστον εἰσηγήσατο |* [notice the repetition of this word from v. 16], *ψευδεὶ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ*. Critias' own nephew, Plato, transcended this social theory of religion, which must have interested him greatly, in the following generation. He did not think of God as a subjective fiction made by a clever lawgiver to keep the masses under the control of law, but by determining 'God' as the idea of good itself Plato demonstrated in his *Republic* that He was in reality the all-powerful force that kept the life of every community together. He thereby replaced fiction by reality and truth. See the end of this chapter and n. 76.
68. Sextus, *Adv. math.* ix. 18 (Prod. B 5), says that according to Prodicus primitive men accepted the belief in gods (*ἐνόμισαν*) because they deified the useful gifts of nature. The word *νομισθῆναι* is repeated when he cites Demeter and Dionysus as examples for this opinion. Cf. also Philod. *De piet.* c. 9, 7, p. 75 G (Prod. B 5), *νενομίσθαι καὶ τετιμῆσθαι*. Cicero, *De nat. deor.* i. 37, 118, who follows the same source as Philodemus, translates the phrase taken from Prodicus by *habitas esse deos*, but this is obviously not enough; cf. the famous words of the accusation of Socrates, *Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ οὐδ' . . . ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων*. It is this element in *νομίζω* which Philodemus in his Hellenistic Greek wanted to express in paraphrasing it by *νενομίσθαι καὶ τετιμῆσθαι*.
69. Parmenides says (e.g. B 6, 8) that by the *communis opinio* of men the identity and non-identity of Being and Not-being has been accepted (*νενόμισται*), even though the opposite of this view is true. This is *νόμος* as opposed to *φύσις*, *ἀλήθεια*; and *νενόμισται* means 'it has been accepted as convention'.
70. Euseb. *P.E.* xiv. 3, 7; Diog. L. ix. 51 (Protag. B 4).
71. See Diels *ad* Protag. B 4.

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